United States v. Perez-Madrid , 71 F. App'x 795 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 1 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 02-3304
v. (D.C. No. 01-CR-10106-WEB)
(D. Kan.)
PEDRO PEREZ-MADRID, also
known as Raul Perez-Luevano,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, KELLY, Circuit Judges and SHADUR **, District Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Pedro Perez-Madrid entered a conditional guilty plea
to one count of being an alien found in the United States after previously being
deported for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Prior to pleading
guilty, the district court denied his motion to dismiss his indictment. In that
motion, Mr. Perez-Madrid argued that his prior deportation was constitutionally
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior District Judge, United States
District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
deficient and that the government was therefore barred from using it to establish
the “deportation” element of an offense under § 1326. Our jurisdiction arises
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
Mr. Perez-Madrid illegally entered the United States for the first time in
1986. III R. at 6. On March 25, 1997, he was deported to Mexico following a
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in El Paso, Texas. I R. Doc 19,
Exhibit A. He was subsequently found in the United States on July 14, 2000, and
was thereafter deported in August of that year. On this occasion, he was deported
without the benefit of a hearing before an IJ pursuant to the “reinstatement of
removal” authority granted to the Attorney General in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). See
also 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Following this second deportation, 1 Mr. Perez-Madrid was
again found within the United States in September 2001, which led to the charge
at issue in the present action.
In the district court Mr. Perez-Madrid filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the reinstatement of removal procedures employed
1
Following the enactment of the 1996 Amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) contained within the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) the term “removal”
was substituted for the term “deportation.” For simplicity, the former term will
be used in this opinion.
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to effect his deportation in August 2000 deprived him of due process, and that the
deportation therefore could not be used in his prosecution for violating § 1326.
See I R. Doc. 19. The district court denied the motion, however, holding that the
reinstatement procedure did not violate his rights because it merely reinstated a
prior, valid deportation order. I R. Doc 23 at 9. However, the district court also
held that Mr. Perez-Madrid was not foreclosed under the relevant statutes from
challenging the validity of the deportation order that served as the basis for the
reinstatement proceedings. Id. at 9 n.7.
Consequently, Mr. Perez-Madrid filed a second motion to dismiss
challenging his March 1997 deportation based on due process violations that
allegedly occurred during the deportation hearing. At this hearing, which was
attended by twenty aliens, the IJ advised the entire group of the various forms of
relief from deportation that might be available, the right to appeal a final order of
deportation, the right to be represented by counsel, and various other rights
regarding the deportation hearing proceedings. I R. Doc. 29, App. A, partial
transcript of deportation hearing (“transcript”) at 1-8. 2 The transcript reflects that
after the IJ made this general advisement, she began interviewing each alien
individually concerning his or her particular circumstances and the relief, if any,
the alien desired to seek. Id. at 8. In the colloquy that occurred between the IJ
2
At this hearing, Mr. Perez-Madrid used the alias Raul Perez-Luevan.
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and the first alien, Alberto Torres-Viegas–who was charged with being deportable
for being found in the United States after having been deported for committing an
aggravated felony–the IJ asked what action he wanted her to take, and he
responded by stating “[w]ell I don’t have another option really but to accept
deportation.” Id. at 10. In response, the IJ made the following statement:
Unfortunately that’s true in your case. . . . The immigration laws
changed dramatically effective September 30, 1996, and the
immigration laws provide now that if been [sic] convicted of an
aggravated felony you’re not eligible for any relief from deportation.
. . . Previously you, a lawful [] permanent resident alien such as
yourself could apply for pardons or waivers. . . . That unfortunately
Congress changed for you, the law changed dramatically started
changing [sic] April of 96. . . . So my hands are tied and there’s
nothing that I can do than [sic] order you deported from the Untied
States to your home country of Mexico.
Id. at 10-11. When the IJ interviewed Mr. Perez-Madrid concerning the
circumstances of his case, Mr. Perez-Madrid elected not to seek any of the relief
previously described, and specifically declined to exercise his right to appeal the
IJ’s order of deportation. Id. at 24-25.
In his motion to dismiss, however, Mr. Perez Madrid argued that the
statement to Mr. Torres-Viegas was erroneous in light of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). St. Cyr held that the provisions
of AEDPA and IIRIRA did not preclude an aggravated felon from obtaining relief
from deportation under § 212(c) of the INA, which was repealed by AEDPA and
IIRIRA, where the alien pleaded guilty to the underlying offense prior to the
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effective date of those acts. Id. at 326. Moreover, he argued that despite the
general advisement of rights given to the entire group at the commencement of
the hearing, the erroneous advisement to Mr. Torres-Viegas:
[C]learly was taken as applicable to all twenty aliens in the room,
and was personally understood by Perez-Madrid that no avenues of
relief from deportation were available. Thus even though some
advice relating to relief was initially given by the immigration judge,
it was later negated by the immigration court’s understanding that the
AEDPA and IIRIRA applied retroactively, a position the Fifth Circuit
agreed with until the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr.
I R. Doc. 29 at 10. Consequently, Mr. Perez-Madrid argued that he was deprived
of his right to due process during the hearing, that the error rendered it
fundamentally unfair, and that he suffered prejudice as a result because he had
plausible grounds for relief from deportation under the INA. Id. at 14-16. The
district court disagreed, holding that he failed to show that the proceeding was
fundamentally unfair or that the IJ’s comments effectively deprived him of the
right to judicial review, I R. Doc. 34 at 1-2, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
To establish a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the government must prove that
Mr. Perez-Madrid was an alien who was deported and thereafter found in the
United States without the Attorney General’s consent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839-40 (1987), the Supreme
Court held that where a procedural error in a deportation hearing effectively
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deprives an alien of the right to obtain judicial review, the result of that
proceeding cannot be used to support a conviction under § 1326. In 1996,
subsequent to the decision in Mendoza-Lopez, Congress amended § 1326 to
condition a challenge to the validity of a prior deportation order on a showing by
the alien that (1) he or she exhausted any available administrative remedies “that
may have been available to seek relief against the order,” (2) the deportation
hearing “improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review,”
and (3) “the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).
Similarly, we have held that to prevail on a collateral challenge to a prior
deportation hearing the defendant has the burden to demonstrate “that the
deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair, and that it deprived him of a direct
appeal.” United States v. Arevalo-Tavares, 210 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, to demonstrate that the hearing was fundamentally unfair, the
defendant must show that he was prejudiced. United States v. Meraz-Valeta, 26
F.3d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1994). This showing, in turn, requires that Mr. Perez-
Madrid demonstrate that (a) the comments at issue were directed to all in the
room, and (b) there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have obtained the
relief to which he now claims he was eligible had the IJ not erred in advising the
first alien. See United States v. Aguirre-Tello, 324 F.3d 1181, 1193-94 (10th Cir.
2003) (adopting the “reasonable probability” standard for demonstrating prejudice
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in a collateral attack on a deportation order.). The constitutional validity of a
deportation proceeding in a § 1326 prosecution presents a mixed question of law
and fact that we review de novo. Id. at 1188.
1. Fundamental Unfairness
We agree with the district court that even if the IJ’s comments to the first
alien were erroneous, Mr. Perez-Madrid nonetheless failed to establish that his
hearing was fundamentally unfair. It is clear from the transcript of the hearing
that the comments were not directed to Mr. Perez-Madrid, and nothing indicated
that they would apply to his particular situation. The statement to Mr. Torres-
Viegas was clearly given in the context of his charge of being deportable due to
his status as an aggravated felon. See I R. Doc. 29, App. A at 8-11. Mr. Perez-
Madrid, however, was not charged with being deportable on that ground. Rather,
the government charged that he was deportable based on the fact that he entered
the United States without being properly inspected. Id. at 24.
Furthermore, we note that the IJ’s general advisement included an
advisement that each alien was entitled to the assistance of counsel, the right to
appeal, and possibly relief from deportation under various sections of the INA. In
so doing, the IJ specifically mentioned that relief from deportation may be
available to those who have relatives who are United States citizens, I R. Doc. 29,
App. A. at 7-8, those who are eligible for voluntary departure or suspension of
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deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) and (e) (repealed by the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 §
308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-615 (1996) (effective April 1, 1997)), Id. at 7-8; and
those who might be eligible for asylum. Id. at 7. Because Mr. Perez-Madrid was
advised, albeit as part of a group and the outset of his hearing, that he might be
eligible for the various forms of relief, and because the content of the advisement
to Mr. Torres-Viegas could not have reasonably been interpreted to apply to Mr.
Perez-Madrid’s situation, we conclude that his deportation hearing was not
fundamentally unfair.
2. Prejudice
Moreover, we agree with the district court that Mr. Perez-Madrid failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the allegedly erroneous advisement to Mr.
Torres-Viegas. He argues that he was “eligible for relief under § 244 and
possibly under § 212(h) [of the INA], but was advised none was available to him,
or to the other aliens present at this uncounseled mass deportation hearing.” Aplt.
Br. at 16-17. Consequently, he argues that had it not been for the “comments that
essentially told the 20 aliens that the new law precluded relief from deportation,”
he would have had “‘plausible’ grounds for relief from deportation under either §
244 or § 212(h).” Id. at 18 This argument is without merit. As noted above, it is
the defendant in a § 1326 prosecution that has the burden to establish that the
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deportation relied upon by the government was the result of proceedings that were
fundamentally unfair and that he or she was prejudiced as a result. See Aguirre-
Tello, 324 F.3d at 1188. Mr. Perez-Madrid has failed to discharge that burden.
Mr. Perez-Madrid first argues that he had a “plausible ground” for relief
under § 244 of the INA. This section, which was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(1995), prior to being repealed effective April 1, 1997, provided two forms of
relief from deportation: suspension of deportation under § 1254(a), and voluntary
departure under § 1254(e). Significantly, relief under § 1254(a) was completely
discretionary with the Attorney General, and even then was available only if an
alien such as Mr. Perez-Madrid (1) was physically present in the United States for
a continuous period of seven years prior to the application for suspension of
deportation, (2) proves that “during all of such period he was and is a person of
good moral character,” and (3) is a person whose deportation would , in the
opinion of the Attorney General, “result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1995).
The problem with Mr. Perez-Madrid’s reliance on § 1254(a) to show
prejudice in this action is that he has made no showing that he would have been
eligible for the discretionary relief provided by the section. In his brief, he argues
only that he was continually present in the United States for over seven years
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prior to his 1997 deportation. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. However, our review of the
record and his brief reveals no suggestion or proof that he was a person of good
moral character during that seven-year period–a claim which, even if raised,
would have likely been fruitless given his Kansas convictions in 1991 (six years
prior to his deportation hearing) for attempted burglary and attempted aggravated
sexual battery. I R. Doc. 29, App. C (Journal entries). The same analysis applies
to the availability of relief under § 1254(e). The remedy previously provided in
that section–voluntary departure–required a showing of good moral character for
a five-year period preceding the application for relief and, like suspension of
deportation, was within the discretion of the Attorney General. In his brief,
however, Mr. Perez-Madrid does not even mention voluntary departure as a form
of relief that would have been available but for the alleged errors made by the IJ,
much less attempt to show that he was a person of good moral character for the
requisite period. Consequently, we hold that Mr. Perez-Madrid has failed to
satisfy his burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that he would
have obtained relief under § 1254.
We likewise reject Mr. Perez-Madrid’s claim that he had a “plausible”
ground for relief under § 212(h) of the INA, and that he therefore satisfied his
burden to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged errors in his deportation
hearing. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. Section 212(h), which is codified at 8 U.S.C. §
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1182(h), provides that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive
deportation of certain aliens upon a showing that the deportation would result in
“extreme hardship” to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child who is a United States
citizen or a lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). Mr. Perez-
Madrid argues that this form of relief was available because he had a common law
marriage with a U.S. citizen, and was “the main breadwinner and took care of his
wife and here (sic) three children.” Aplt. Br. at 12.
Even if § 1182(h) relief could be based on the existence of a common law
marriage, we do not believe Mr. Perez-Madrid has satisfied his burden because he
has not demonstrated that he had a valid common-law marriage. In Kansas, the
state where he resided prior to being deported, a common law marriage exists
only if the putative spouse can demonstrate that (1) the parties have the requisite
capacity to marry, (2) there is a “present marriage agreement between the parties,”
and (3) the parties have held themselves out to the public as husband and wife. In
Re Estate of Hendrickson, 805 P.2d 20, 21 (Kan. 1991). Although Mr. Perez-
Madrid has alleged that he and his putative wife held themselves out to the public
as husband and wife, he has offered no evidence, or even argued, that there was a
present agreement to marry as required by Kansas law. Furthermore, the extent of
Mr. Perez-Madrid’s “extreme hardship” argument required by § 1182(h) is that
such hardship would attend his deportation because he was the “main
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breadwinner” and that he helped care for his common-law wife’s children. Aplt.
Br. at 12. We do not believe this is enough to satisfy his burden of showing that
he had a reasonable probability of obtaining relief under this section. “It is well
settled that economic detriment alone is insufficient to satisfy the extreme
hardship requirement.” Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 469 (10th Cir. 1990);
see also Luna-Rodriguez v. INS, 104 F.3d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that
in the suspension of deportation context, Congress has authorized “extreme
hardship” relief “only when other factors such as advanced age, severe illness,
family ties, etc. combine with economic detriment to make deportation extremely
hard on the alien or the citizen or permanent resident members of his family”)
(quotations omitted). In light of the lack of factual support underlying his theory
of relief under this section, we conclude that Mr. Perez-Madrid has failed to carry
his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that he would have obtained
relief under § 1182(h).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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