United States v. Hutto , 84 F. App'x 6 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 9 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      No. 02-5210
    v.                                      (D.C. No. 02-CR-40-C)
    BILLY WAYNE HUTTO,                                     (N.D. Okla.)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, McKAY and McCONNELL, Circuit
    Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
    oral argument.
    Defendant-Appellant Billy Wayne Hutto was initially charged in a two-
    count indictment with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), Receiving Child
    Pornography in Interstate Commerce, and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2253
    , Criminal Forfeiture.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    A superseding indictment charged Appellant with thirty-six counts of Receipt in
    Interstate Commerce of Visual Depiction Involving Minor Engaged in Sexually
    Explicit Conduct and one count of Criminal Forfeiture. Appellant entered pleas
    of not guilty. After the trial judge denied several of Appellant’s motions,
    including a motion to suppress the search warrant, Appellant pled guilty to three
    substantive counts and consented to the forfeiture count, reserving the right to
    appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. He was convicted and sentenced to
    twenty-four months in prison on each substantive count to run concurrently, a
    $6,000 fine, and three years of supervised release. Appellant appeals his
    conviction and sentence to this court.
    Appellant filed several motions on appeal. By Order dated September 24,
    2003, we granted his Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal and denied his
    Motion for Release Pending Appeal and his Motion to Stop the Briefing Schedule.
    We are in receipt of Appellant’s supplemental authority and his Brief Relevant to
    the Supplementary Material. Appellee chose not to file a response.
    On appeal, Appellant argues that the search warrant on his residence was
    issued without probable cause; therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the
    search should be suppressed. We review the district court’s factual findings in a
    denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions regarding
    the sufficiency of the search warrant de novo. United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d
    -2-
    1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000).
    The thrust of Appellant’s argument is that the search warrant in this case
    was supported by an affidavit which contained a material factual inaccuracy.
    Appellant claims that FBI Special Agent Binney knowingly or recklessly stated in
    his affidavit that all subscribers to an e-Group website named The Candyman
    automatically received e-mails containing images of child pornography. Since
    Appellant was a subscriber, this would strongly support an inference that his
    computer hard drive contained images of child pornography. After the issuance
    of the search warrant, the FBI discovered, and disclosed to Appellant, that e-mail
    delivery of website images was not automatic. A subscriber could choose to
    receive different types of e-mail or no e-mail at all. Because e-mail delivery was
    not automatic, Appellant argues that this destroys the inference that Appellant
    would have child pornography on his home computer.
    “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists only when the supporting
    affidavit sets forth facts that would lead a prudent person to believe there is a fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a particular crime will be found in a
    particular place.” District Court Order, June 21, 2002, Aple. Supp. App. at 72
    (quoting United States v. Basham, 
    268 F.3d 1199
    , 1203 (10th Cir. 2001).
    Additionally, when there are material omissions in an affidavit supporting a
    search warrant, the warrant must be voided if the remaining content is not
    -3-
    sufficient to establish the required probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 155-56 (1978). Pursuant to “Franks, a hearing on the veracity of the
    affidavit supporting a warrant is required if the defendant makes a substantial
    showing that the affidavit contains intentional or reckless false statements and if
    the affidavit, purged of its falsities, would not be sufficient to support a finding
    of probable cause.” United States v. Avery, 
    295 F.3d 1158
    , 1166-67 (10th Cir.
    2002) (internal citations omitted).
    We agree with the district court that the clarification of the e-mail delivery
    options does not destroy the inference that Appellant would have child
    pornography on his home computer. The affidavit contains several facts that
    combine to support a finding of probable cause. The district court stated:
    These facts show that the group’s clear purpose was to share child
    pornography, that the defendant voluntarily became a member of the
    group, and that images containing child pornography were available
    to all members. It is the view of this Court that this evidence
    provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate judge to conclude that
    there was a fair probability that child pornography would be found at
    the defendant’s residence or on his computer.
    District Court Order, February 5, 2003, Aple. Supp. App., at 3. Because the
    affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause even without the
    incorrect information on e-mail delivery options, Appellant was not entitled to a
    Franks hearing and the district court correctly denied Appellant’s motion to
    suppress.
    -4-
    For substantially the same reasons as set forth by the district court in its
    Orders of June 21, 2002, and February 5, 2003, and the reasons stated herein, the
    decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-5210

Citation Numbers: 84 F. App'x 6

Judges: McCONNELL, McKAY, Tacha

Filed Date: 12/9/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023