Cesspooch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 84 F. App'x 30 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                              F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 17 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ALFRED R. CESSPOOCH, SR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                            No. 02-1538
    (D. Colo.)
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;                (D.Ct. No. 00-Z-1973)
    JOEL KNOWLES, Warden and in
    individual capacity; JACK B. DAVIS,
    Associate Warden and in individual
    capacity; THOMAS C. PETERSON,
    Associate Warden and in individual
    capacity; CHARLES ROWE,
    Lieutenant and in individual capacity;
    ROBERT LIMA, Lieutenant and in
    individual capacity; DAVID
    ARMSTRONG, Correctional Officer;
    ANTHONY F. DIMARZO,
    Correctional Officer; JAKE M.
    GEIGER, Correctional Officer;
    CHARLOTTE R. GUTIERREZ,
    Correctional Officer; PAULA G.
    PRICE, Correctional Officer;
    WESLEY A. PUMMILL, Correctional
    Officer; OFFICER SMITH,
    Correctional Officer; OFFICER
    WALKER, Correctional Officer;
    OFFICER PLOESSEL, Correctional
    Officer; OFFICER MOORE,
    Correctional Officer,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit
    Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Appellant Alfred Cesspooch, a federal inmate appearing pro se, appeals a
    district court order dismissing his civil rights suit against prison officials based
    on an incident in which several officials allegedly stripped and beat him. We
    exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    Background
    Mr. Cesspooch filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
    District of Colorado, alleging prison officials violated his constitutional rights by
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
    law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    -2-
    stripping and beating him, while others ignored and concealed the incident. He
    alleges the incident occurred February 6, 1997, but he did not initiate this action
    until September 21, 2000. Mr. Cesspooch seeks money damages pursuant to
    Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971).
    The district court referred the complaint to a magistrate judge, who
    recommended dismissing Mr. Cesspooch’s claims against the Federal Bureau of
    Prisons as barred by sovereign immunity, and dismissing four of the individually
    named defendants as barred by a two-year statute of limitations. The district
    court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the claims as to the Federal
    Bureau of Prisons and four of the individually named defendants. Because Mr.
    Cesspooch did not effect service on the remaining defendants, the district court
    did not address the claims against those parties. See Cesspooch v. Federal
    Bureau of Prisons, 
    2003 WL 77606
     (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2003) (unpublished). We
    affirmed the district court’s action. 
    Id.
    Shortly thereafter, the magistrate judge ordered Mr. Cesspooch to show
    cause why the court should not dismiss his claims against the remaining
    defendants on grounds (1) Mr. Cesspooch failed to effect service, prosecute his
    -3-
    claims, and comply with court orders; and (2) the claims are barred by sovereign
    immunity and the statute of limitations. On September 30, 2002, after
    considering Mr. Cesspooch’s response, the magistrate judge issued a thorough and
    carefully reasoned recommendation to dismiss the complaint on the grounds stated
    in its order to show cause. The recommendation advised the parties of their right
    to file a written objection “[w]ithin ten days after service of a copy of the
    Recommendation.”
    On December 5, 2002, over two months after the magistrate judge issued
    his recommendation, Mr. Cesspooch filed a “Motion of Notice of Appeals to the
    Court of Appeals” and a “Motion Objecting the Magistrate Judge Decision in the
    District Court of Colorado.” The district court issued an order in December
    adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing Mr. Cesspooch’s
    complaint. The order noted Mr. Cesspooch filed an objection, but found the
    objection was neither timely nor specific. The court thus concluded Mr.
    Cesspooch was not entitled to de novo review of the magistrate judge’s
    recommendation. Mr. Cesspooch subsequently filed a docketing statement and a
    jurisdictional memorandum brief.
    On appeal, Mr. Cesspooch does not specifically challenge the grounds the
    -4-
    district court relied on in dismissing his complaint. 1 Instead, he renews the
    allegations in his complaint. He also argues the district court should have
    appointed counsel to represent him, and should have held an evidentiary hearing
    on his claims. We address the jurisdictional question and Mr. Cesspooch’s
    arguments below.
    Discussion
    As a preliminary matter, we must determine if we have jurisdiction to
    consider this appeal. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 
    286 F.3d 1195
    , 1201 (10th
    Cir. 2002). Appellees Karl Ploessel and Gregory Walker argue we lack
    jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Mr. Cesspooch’s “Motion of Notice of
    Appeals to the Court of Appeals” appears to seek review of the magistrate judge’s
    recommendation, which is not a “final decision.”See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    (establishing “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
    of the United States”).
    We liberally construe documents filed by pro se litigants, including notices
    1
    Although we construe Mr. Cesspooch’s pro se brief liberally, see Haines v.
    Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972), we will not assume the role of advocate and address
    issues not discussed in his brief, see Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 
    927 F.2d 1156
    , 1159
    (10th Cir. 1991).
    -5-
    of appeal. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 
    992 F.2d 1033
    , 1036 n.3 (10th
    Cir. 1993). We also liberally construe the technical requirements of a notice of
    appeal to avoid injustice. See Smith v. Barry, 
    502 U.S. 244
    , 248-49 (1992). From
    pro se litigants, we have accepted docketing statements and motions on
    jurisdiction as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See Rodgers v.
    Wyoming Attorney Gen., 
    205 F.3d 1201
    , 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on
    other grounds, Moore v. Marr, 
    254 F.3d 1235
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2001). Under
    these principles, we interpret Mr. Cesspooch’s timely docketing statement and
    jurisdictional memorandum brief as a notice of appeal of the district court’s order
    dismissing his complaint. We therefore exercise jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to effect service,
    prosecute, and comply with court orders, for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Scott v.
    Hern, 
    216 F.3d 897
    , 912 (10th Cir. 2000). However, we review de novo the
    district court’s determination that a complaint is barred by the statute of
    limitations, see Indus. Constructors Corp. v. United States Bureau of
    Reclamation, 
    15 F.3d 963
    , 967 (10th Cir. 1994), and dismissal for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity, see Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. United
    States Dept. of Interior, 
    163 F.3d 1150
    , 1152 (10th Cir. 1998).
    -6-
    With these standards in mind, we have carefully reviewed the magistrate
    judge’s recommendations and the district court’s order dismissing the complaint
    for failure to effectuate service, prosecute his claims, or comply with court orders,
    and for failure to show his claims are not barred by sovereign immunity or the
    applicable statute of limitations. This review, together with our thorough review
    of the pleadings, briefs, and record on appeal, leads us to conclude the district
    court properly dismissed Mr. Cesspooch’s complaint for the reasons stated.
    While he does not challenge the specific grounds for dismissal of his
    complaint, Mr. Cesspooch claims the district court erred by declining to appoint
    counsel to represent him. In support of this position, Mr. Cesspooch states he
    does not understand the law and has difficulty reading and writing. He believes
    the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Indian Civil Rights
    Act of 1968 entitle him to appointed counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
    .
    “We review the denial of appointment of counsel in a civil case for an
    abuse of discretion.” Rucks v. Boergermann, 
    57 F.3d 978
    , 979 (10th Cir.1995).
    Neither the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 nor the Equal Protection Clause
    guarantees the right to counsel in a civil case. See 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
    ;
    -7-
    Pennsylvania v. Finley, 
    481 U.S. 551
    , 556 (1987). Although prisoners alleging
    civil rights violations have no right to counsel, see Bethea v. Crouse, 
    417 F.2d 504
    , 505 (10th Cir. 1969), the district court may appoint counsel if it determines
    doing so would be appropriate. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(1). In making this
    determination, the court considers “‘the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature
    of the factual issues raised in the claims, the litigant’s ability to present his
    claims, and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the claims.’” Rucks, 
    57 F.3d at 979
     (quoting Williams v. Meese, 
    926 F.2d 994
    , 996 (10th Cir.1991)).
    After reviewing Mr. Cesspooch’s claims and the entire record on appeal, we
    conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Cesspooch’s
    motion to appoint counsel.
    Mr. Cesspooch also argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
    merits of his claim. We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing
    for an abuse of discretion. Lasiter v. Thomas, 
    89 F.3d 699
    , 702 (10th Cir.1996).
    Because we determine the district court properly dismissed Mr. Cesspooch’s
    claims on legal grounds that did not necessitate a hearing or introduction of
    additional evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    conduct an evidentiary hearing.
    -8-
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, and for substantially the same reasons as those
    stated by the district court, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Mr. Cesspooch’s
    complaint. We further deny Mr. Cesspooch’s “Motion for Leave to Proceed on
    Appeal.”
    Entered by the Court:
    WADE BRORBY
    United States Circuit Judge
    -9-