Wu v. Salt Lake County Commission , 91 F. App'x 53 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 8 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
XIANGWEN WU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-4118, 03-4162
(D. Utah)
SALT LAKE COUNTY (D.Ct. No. 2:01-CV-860-DB)
COMMISSION; PAUL
CUNNINGHAM,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Xiangwen Wu, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
favor of Salt Lake County (the County) and Paul Cunningham. 1 In a separate
appeal, he challenges the district court’s award of costs to the County and
Cunningham. His appeals have been consolidated. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
On November 17, 1997, Wu was arrested in Salt Lake City, Utah, for
domestic violence and taken to the Salt Lake County Metro Jail. At the time of
his arrest, domestic violence was a non-bailable offense under Utah State law
unless the arrestee signed a “no contact” order. Within several hours of having
been booked, a pretrial services officer, Pat Kimball, met with Wu and evaluated
him for pretrial release. Kimball presented Wu with a “no contact” order which
Wu signed. Wu’s bail was set at $500.00. Wu did not post bail. On November
25, 1997, he was ordered released by the state court. 2
On November 1, 2001, Wu filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah against Salt Lake County, Paul
Cunningham, Commander of the Salt Lake County Metro Jail at the time of Wu’s
arrest, and several unnamed jail officers. In his complaint, Wu alleged the
1
We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
2
According to Wu’s complaint, the charges against him were eventually
dismissed.
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signing of the “no contact” order required him to be released immediately and
therefore, his continued confinement for nine days violated his constitutional
rights to liberty and to be free from unreasonable seizures. He also alleged that
because of his confinement he was unable to renew his “lawyer license” from
China and as a result, he lost income.
On August 23, 2002, upon stipulation of the parties, the district court
dismissed with prejudice Wu’s claims relating to his lawyer’s license and lost
income. On April 13, 2003, a bench trial was held on the remaining claims. The
court found in favor of the County and Cunningham. On May 8, 2003, the court
issued its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. Formal judgment was
entered on May 12, 2003.
Thereafter, the County and Cunningham moved for an award of costs and
fees in the sum of $324.05, the cost incurred in deposing Wu. Over Wu’s
objection, the district court granted the motion on June 13, 2003. These appeals
followed.
Discussion
Wu argues the district court’s judgment in favor of the County and
Cunningham was improper and should be reversed. He also asserts the district
court erred in awarding costs to the County and Cunningham.
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Judgment in Favor of the County and Cunningham
Wu contends the district court improperly found in favor of the County and
Cunningham. Specifically, he alleges that (1) after he signed the “no contact”
order, he should have been immediately released on his own recognizance, (2) he
was never informed he was required to pay bail, and (3) the County and
Cunningham were not entitled to qualified immunity. 3
Following a bench trial, we review a district court's factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Sanpete Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Carbon Water Conservancy Dist., 226 F.3d 1170, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2000). "A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or
if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208,
1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because Wu fails to cite to the record or any legal authority and has not
provided us with the trial transcript (as is his duty under the rules), we have no
way to meaningfully review the district court’s findings of facts and conclusions
of law. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (Appellant has a duty to order the transcript
of relevant proceedings), and 28(a)(7), (9) (Appellant’s brief must contain a
3
In his opening brief, Wu states the district court may have ruled against
him due to racial prejudice. This mere allegation has no support in the record and
will not be addressed further.
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statement of facts and an argument, with citations to authorities and the record).
The absence of the required transcript leaves us no alternative but to affirm the
district court’s decision. Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
175 F.3d 1221, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). See also McGinnis v. Gustafson, 978 F.2d
1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[F]ailure to file the required transcript involves
more than noncompliance with some useful but nonessential procedural
admonition of primarily administrative focus. It raises an effective barrier to
informed, substantive appellate review.”).
Nevertheless, it was the state court which set Wu’s bail. Cunningham was
not responsible for operating pretrial services and therefore, he cannot be held
liable for Wu’s continued confinement. As to the County, the district court
determined “[t]here was no policy or practice of the Salt Lake County
Commission that led to any violation of the plaintiff’s rights.” (Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law at 3.) That the County was not operating pursuant to an
official custom or policy is not clearly erroneous based on the record before us.
In fact, Wu never alleged such a custom or policy in his complaint, a prerequisite
to a finding of the County’s liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Based on the above, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the
County and Cunningham.
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Award of Costs
Wu next challenges the district court’s award of costs to the County and
Cunningham. He asserts the award of costs was improper because in its August
23, 2002 order, the court specifically stated each party was to bear its own costs
and attorneys’ fees. He contends the court’s subsequent June 13, 2003 order
awarding costs to the County and Cunningham could not reverse its August 23,
2002 order. Wu is mistaken. The district court’s August 23, 2002 order
dismissed Wu’s claims concerning his lawyer’s license and lost income. This
dismissal was pursuant to stipulation by the parties. The order’s statement that
each party was to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees pertained solely to the
dismissed claims. The County and Cunningham were still entitled to an award of
costs for prevailing on Wu’s other claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“[C]osts
other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs.”). 4 Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the costs of Wu’s deposition to them. 5 See
4
Below, the County and Cunningham moved for costs under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 and their motion became the district court’s order. This statute allows for “a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs” to the prevailing party. Because the
County and Cunningham did not move for attorney’s fees, an award of costs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was error. Nevertheless, the award was proper
under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
“The general costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, permits recovery of
deposition costs ‘necessarily obtained for use in the case.’” Mitchell v. City of
Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1204 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2),
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Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001) (we review
an award of costs under Rule 54(d) for an abuse of discretion) (citation omitted).
Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in favor of the County and
Cunningham and its award of costs to them.
Entered by the Court:
TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
United States Circuit Judge
(4)). “‘[T]his definition authorizes recovery of costs with respect to all
depositions reasonably necessary to the litigation of the case.’” Id. (quoting Furr
v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1550 (10th Cir. 1987)). Here, there is no
allegation that Wu’s deposition was not “necessarily obtained for use in the case.”
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