United States v. Saenz , 97 F. App'x 836 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 12 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-1317
(D.C. Nos. 03-M-980 and
ABEL SAENZ, 99-CR-317-M)
(D. Colo.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Abel Saenz, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
correct his sentence. Saenz contends that the district court erred in ruling that his
issues had been raised and decided on direct appeal. This court granted an
application for a certificate of appealability and we now affirm in part and reverse
in part.
I.
Saenz and three co-defendants were charged with federal drug crimes.
Saenz entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute or possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine. The
plea agreement indicated that, under the tentative computation of his criminal
history, the estimated offense level could result in a sentencing range of 46 to 115
months and that the career criminal offender adjustment under USSG § 4B1.1 did
not apply. 1
The agreement also stated that it was “not conditioned on the
defendant being in a particular history category,” R., Vol. 1, Doc. 69 at 8; that the
United States Probation Office would “further investigate [defendant’s] criminal
1
USSG § 4B1.1(a) provides that:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant
offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
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history,” id. at 7; and that the court “may impose any sentence, up to the statutory
maximum,” id.
In preparing its presentence report, the probation department discovered
a New Mexico felony drug conviction, which together with two already-known
Colorado felony drug convictions, triggered the operation of the career-offender
enhancement provisions of USSG § 4B1.1. Based on this discovery, the
presentence report recommended the classification of Saenz as a career offender
and a corresponding sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. The government
advocated application of the revised calculation.
The proposed increase in sentencing range led to a series of hearings. At
the first hearing, Saenz did not formally seek to withdraw his guilty plea, but he
asserted that the government should be compelled to comply with the sentencing
range stated in the plea agreement. At Saenz’s request, his attorney moved to
withdraw from the case. The court continued the sentencing proceeding so that
the probation department could gather more information about Saenz’s criminal
history. During a second hearing, the court granted the attorney’s motion to
withdraw and again continued the proceedings, this time to allow Saenz to obtain
replacement counsel. At the final sentencing hearing, Saenz’s new attorney asked
to withdraw the guilty plea. The court denied the motion and, after allowing for
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a downward departure for substantial assistance, sentenced Saenz to 159 months’
imprisonment.
Saenz filed a direct appeal. He argued that he should have been permitted
to withdraw his plea because the government violated the agreement when it
“agreed with the probation department’s recommendation that he in fact be
sentenced as a career offender.” United States v. Saenz , 10 Fed. Appx. 701, 707
(10th Cir. May 8, 2001) (unpublished). In evaluating the district court’s denial of
the motion, this court looked at seven factors, including “‘whether the plea was
knowing and voluntary’” and “‘the quality of the defendant’s assistance of
counsel.’” Id. at 707-08 (quoting United States v. Siedlik , 231 F.3d 744, 749
(10th Cir. 2000)). 2
This court decided that none of the factors favored allowing
withdrawal of the plea and found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
denial of the motion. Id. at 708. Specifically, we determined that “the plea was
knowing and voluntary, in the sense that Mr. Saenz had read and understood its
terms and was not coerced into making it.” Id. With regard to counsel’s advice
2
The remaining factors reviewed by the court were:
“(1) whether the defendant asserted his innocence; (2) whether the
government will be prejudiced if the motion is granted; (3) whether
the defendant has delayed in filing the motion; (4) the inconvenience
to the court if the motion is granted; . . . and [(5)] whether the
granting of the motion would cause a waste of judicial resources.”
Id. at 707-08 (quoting Siedlik , 231 F.3d at 749).
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about a potential sentence, we specifically noted that “although Mr. Saenz asked
to have his first attorney released, there is no evidence that he was ineffective in
any way.” Id.Saenz then filed his § 2255 motion. In a brief order, the district court
denied the motion on procedural grounds, without reaching the underlying
constitutional claims. The denial was based on a determination that the motion
was “another attempt to litigate the same issues that were resolved” in the direct
appeal. R., Vol. 2, Doc. 192. This appeal followed. Since Saenz raises only
questions of law, we review the district court’s order de novo. United States v.
Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 537 U.S. 961 (2002).
II.
A defendant may not assert issues in a § 2255 motion which have been
considered on direct appeal. United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir.
1994). 3 We therefore examine each of Saenz’s claims to determine if the district
court was correct in deciding that it had been previously resolved. We note,
however, that many of Saenz’s § 2255 claims rely on allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The general rule is that this court addresses ineffective
3
An exception to the rule, not applicable in the instant case, occurs when
there has been an intervening change of law. Warner, 23 F.3d at 291 (citing
United States v. Prichard , 875 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir. 1989)).
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assistance of counsel claims in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal.
United States v. Montoan-Herrera , 351 F.3d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
United States v. Galloway , 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
Only in “rare instances” does an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “need
no further development prior to review on direct appeal.” Galloway , 56 F.3d
at 1240. The “exception to the rule exists when ‘the record is sufficient, or where
the claim simply does not merit further factual inquiry.’” Montoan-Herrera ,
351 F.3d at 465 (quoting United States v. Gordon , 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir.
1993)).
Saenz’s primary assertion, set out most fully in his first claim, is that he
entered into an involuntary guilty plea as the result of (1) misleading statements
by the court, the government, and counsel on the severity of the sentence he
would receive upon his guilty plea; (2) his inability to use and understand
English, coupled with his attorney’s lack of Spanish-speaking capability; and
(3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On direct appeal, the record was
sufficient for us to reject Saenz’s assertion that he was misinformed or misled
about the length of his prospective sentence. The district court correctly ruled
that Saenz may not resurrect this theory.
However, additional aspects of Saenz’s initial claim are raised for the first
time in his § 2255 motion. Saenz claims that his difficulty with the English
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language prevented his understanding of the proceedings. He also contends that
his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in ways unrelated to the length of the
sentence: incorrect guidance on the reversibility of the plea agreement; failure to
investigate, research, or discuss the relevant facts and law; and concurrent
representation of a co-defendant. None of these issues could have been resolved
upon the record compiled on direct appeal. We therefore remand these portions
of the first claim, and similar assertions set out in the second and fifth claims, for
further development of the record and a dispositive ruling.
Saenz’s motion also asserts two interrelated claims for relief that were not
addressed on direct appeal, but nevertheless may be decided in this § 2255 appeal
without further factual inquiry. In claims three and four, Saenz asks this court to
set aside one of the Colorado state convictions which entered into his criminal
history calculation or, alternatively, abate his § 2255 action while he collaterally
attacks the conviction in state court. A defendant may challenge a previous
conviction in a later sentencing proceeding only by showing “a jurisdictional
defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” Custis v. United
States , 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994). Other constitutional errors, including “claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel” and “failure to assure that a guilty plea was
voluntary,” are immune from collateral attack in a sentencing proceeding. Id.;
see also United States v. Garcia , 42 F.3d 573, 580-81 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing
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Custis ). Saenz’s assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel in the state case
does not undermine the federal career-offender enhancement. Accordingly,
we need not either analyze the course of the state criminal proceeding or abate
this action while the state system does so.
III.
To summarize, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Saenz’s first and
fifth claim to the extent that they rely on allegations of misleading statements and
ineffective assistance of counsel related to the length of Saenz’s sentence upon
entry of the guilty plea. We also affirm the dismissal of his third and fourth
claims, which challenge the Colorado state criminal conviction. The remainder of
Saenz’s first and fifth claims, along with his second claim alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, are remanded for further development of the record and
a determination on the merits. 4
4
In his opening brief, Saenz appealed the dismissal of a sixth claim, which
alleged that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
challenge the lack of notice of the government’s intent to seek the career-offender
sentence enhancement. Saenz’s reply brief concedes that 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) does
not require notice in his situation and asks to withdraw the issue from our
consideration. Accordingly, we do not address this issue on appeal.
Saenz has also asserted that he was denied due process by the manner in
which the district court adjudicated his motion to vacate. In light of our
resolution of his res judicata issues, we need not reach this contention.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED
in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order
and judgment. Saenz’s motion to supplement the record on appeal with exhibits
is denied.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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