United States v. Scarborough , 134 F. App'x 238 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 7, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-7068
v.
(D.C. No. CR-03-118-1-P)
(E.D. Okla.)
STANLEY DANYE
SCARBOROUGH,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Stanley Danye Scarborough (“Defendant”) pled guilty to three counts of
drug possession with intent to distribute. Prior to sentencing, he filed a pro se
motion to withdraw his plea, which the district court denied. Defendant now
appeals his conviction as well as the court’s decision to sentence him to 151
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
months’ imprisonment. Taking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a), we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
On November 14, 2003, the federal grand jury for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma issued a three-count indictment against Defendant. (Aplt. App. at 15-
16.) Count I charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally possessing in
excess of 50 grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. (Id. at 15.) Count
II charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally possessing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. (Id. at 16.) Finally, Count
III charged Defendant with knowingly and intentionally possessing a detectible
amount of cocaine with intent to distribute. (Id.)
After being appointed counsel, Defendant pled not guilty to all charges. A
jury trial was initially scheduled for January 2, 2004, but was later postponed to
February 2, 2004. (Id. at 3.) Jury selection commenced on February 2, 2004 and
trial was set for February 17, 2004. (Id. at 8.) On February 13, Defendant
changed his plea to guilty on all counts before a magistrate judge 1 and waived his
right to a jury trial. (Id. at 18-19.) At the plea hearing, Defendant admitted to
Defendant consented to proceed before the magistrate judge for the
1
purposes of changing his plea, thus the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the plea
was never formally adopted by the district court. (Aplt. App. at 18.)
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possessing with an intent to distribute approximately 75 grams of crack cocaine,
“a small amount” of methamphetamine, and an unspecified amount of cocaine.
(Id. at 37.) The magistrate accepted Defendant’s guilty plea and referred the
matter to the probation department for preparation of a sentencing report. (Id. at
38-39.)
One week later, Defendant filed a pro se motion with the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he “[did] not agree with the plea because of
certain civil liberties that have been violated under prejudicial/judicial error.”
(Id. at 41.) At a hearing on the motion, Defendant, represented again by his
appointed lawyer, alleged that his prosecution was racially motivated and that he
did not actually possess the amounts of drugs he had previously admitted to
possessing. (Id. at 47, 51.) The district court denied the motion, holding that
Defendant “[had] not met his burden of establishing a ‘fair and just’ reason to
allow withdrawal of his pleas of guilty.” (Id. at 78.)
The probation department issued a pre-sentence report (“PSR”) on March
24, 2004, and the district court set sentencing for June 18, 2004. (Id. at 10, 92.)
According to the PSR, Defendant’s base offense level (32) and criminal history
category (I) specified a guideline range of 121-151 months. (Id. at 97, 104.)
The probation officer recommended a two-point offense level enhancement based
upon evidence that two firearms were found in Defendant’s bedroom. (Id. at 97);
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see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). With an adjusted offense level of thirty-four, the
new guideline range was 151-188 months. (Id. at 92.) However, the probation
officer also recommended a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
bringing the range back down to 121-151 months.
Defendant, now represented by a different attorney, filed objections to the
PSR and a motion to reconsider the withdrawal of the guilty plea. (Id. at 79.)
The district court denied the motion to reconsider in a minute order, stating that
the motion “contains no new evidence which establishes that the defendant is
innocent or that the defendant’s plea of guilty was not knowingly and voluntarily
entered.” (Id. at 11.)
At sentencing, the district court overruled Defendant’s objections to the
PSR. (Id. at 12.) The Government also filed an objection to the downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, which the district court granted. The
court then sentenced Defendant to 151 months’ imprisonment (the bottom of the
calculated range) on each of the three counts, terms to run concurrently, followed
by a term of 60 months’ supervised release. (Id. at 12-13.) In addition, the court
imposed a $300 special assessment. (Id. at 13.) Defendant timely filed a notice
of appeal. (Id. at 14); see Fed. R. App. P. (4)(b)(1)(A)(i).
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the
district court abused its discretion by failing to grant Defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea; (2) whether the district court’s refusal to permit a two-
level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was clearly
erroneous; and (3) whether the district court erred in applying a two-level upward
adjustment for the presence of firearms when that issue was neither pled nor
proved.
I. Withdrawal of Defendant’s guilty plea
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of
discretion and will not reverse absent a showing that the court acted “unjustly or
unfairly.” United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1997).
A district court may allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea before
sentencing “upon a showing . . . of any fair and just reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(d). The burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason rests with the
defendant, based on the following considerations: (1) Defendant’s assertion of
innocence; (2) resulting prejudice to the government; (3) Defendant’s delay in
filing the withdrawal motion; (4) inconvenience to the court; (5) Defendant’s
assistance of counsel; (6) knowledge and voluntariness of the plea; and (7)
resulting waste of judicial resources. Graves, 106 F.3d at 343.
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Here, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Significantly, at the
hearing on his motion to withdraw, Defendant admitted that he had no evidence to
support his assertions that (1) his prosecution was racially motivated; or (2) he
actually possessed a lesser quantity of drugs than the amount to which he
admitted in his plea colloquy. (Aplt. App. at 47-52.) Thus, nothing in the
motion calls into question Defendant’s guilt or the voluntariness of the plea. In
addition, the District Court correctly noted that by changing his plea just days
before trial (and after a jury had been empaneled), allowing him to withdraw that
plea and demand a new jury would place significant hardship on the government
and waste judicial resources. (Id. at 6-7.)
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration does raise some issues with the
quality of Defendant’s legal representation at the plea colloquy. In an affidavit
attached to the motion to reconsider, Defendant contends that his attorney told
him that if Defendant did not falsely admit to having seventy-six grams of crack,
his sentence would be doubled. (See Aplt. App. at 87-88.) This allegation, if
true, would be quite troubling. But the fact of the matter is that it is supported
only by Defendant’s self-serving affidavit which was written with the benefit of
hindsight. Given the fact that Defendant admitted at the plea hearing that he was
satisfied with his legal representation, we are not left with a “definite and firm
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conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment” by refusing to
countenance Defendant’s revised version of events. (Id. at 35); Moothart v. Bell,
21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Defendant’s conviction is therefore affirmed.
II. Acceptance of responsibility
Defendant claims that the district court, in calculating his sentence, erred
by refusing to grant a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 2 In the PSR, the probation officer recommended that the
court decrease Defendant’s offense level by two points based on Defendant’s
decision to plead guilty and admit his guilt at the plea colloquy. (Aplt. App. at
96.) At the sentencing hearing, the Government objected to this downward
adjustment, and the court sustained the objection. (Id. at 12.)
Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for purposes of U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1 is a factual question that we review under a clearly erroneous standard.
United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005). We recognize that
“[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s
2
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) provides, “If the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2
levels.”
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acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing
judge is entitled to great deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5.
Appellant’s failure to designate the transcript of the sentencing hearing as
part of the record on appeal has hampered our efforts at reviewing whether the
district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. While we do know that the
Government made an objection to the downward adjustment and that the court
sustained this objection, we have no way of knowing precisely why and for what
reasons the court chose to sustain the objection. (See Aplt. App. at 12.)
Counsel’s failure to designate the relevant record requires this court to hold that
Appellant has not met the burden of proving that the district court’s findings were
clearly erroneous. See McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1550 (10th
Cir. 1991); Trujillo v. Grand Junction Reg’l Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir.
1991) (“When a trial transcript is not designated as part of the record on appeal,
an appellate court cannot review the district court’s factual findings and must
accept them as correct.”).
Even working from the record we have, it is clear that in the process of
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant challenged the factual basis of his
conviction by contesting the quantity of drugs involved. Defendant cannot on the
one hand claim that his conviction is factually incorrect and on the other hand
accept responsibility for his actions. See United States v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361
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F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 180 (2004) (noting that
“admission of the factual elements of guilt is certainly essential to a finding that a
defendant accepted responsibility”). As a result, we hold that the district court’s
decision to deny a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was not
clearly erroneous.
III. Sentencing enhancement for possession of firearms
At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which applies when the defendant possesses a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm) during the offense. (Aplt. App. at 12.) This
enhancement was based upon a statement in the PSR that “[t]he evidence in this
case shows that two firearms, a .22 caliber Winchester rifle and a .380 caliber
handgun were found in the defendant’s bedroom during a search of his
residence.” (Id. at 97.) During his plea colloquy, Defendant never admitted to
possessing or using a weapon. (See id. at 21-40.)
In his appellate brief, Defendant argues that he is entitled to be resentenced
in light of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Blakley held
Washington’s sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it
permitted a judge to make factual findings that enhanced a defendant’s sentence
beyond the sentence supported solely by the facts admitted by the defendant or
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2538. In United States v.
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Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court extended the rule in Blakely to
federal sentences and held that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 765. To remedy this
constitutional violation, the Court excised the statutory provisions making the
federal sentencing guidelines mandatory. See id. at 764-65.
It does not appear that Defendant raised a Sixth Amendment
Booker/Blakely-type argument below. Rather, in his objections to the presentence
report, Defendant merely challenged whether the facts contained in the PSR
satisfied the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, not whether the district court
could make findings of fact without violating the Constitution. 3 (Aplt. App. at
110-11.) Thus, our review is for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the [district] court’s attention.”); see Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (noting
that plain error applies to Booker claims).
3
Specifically, Defendant lodged three objections to the PSR regarding the
presence of firearms in his residence. (Aplt. App. at 110-11.) First, Defendant
argued that the guns were not found in proximity to the drugs or in an area where
at least part of the drug transaction occurred. (Id. at 110.) Second, Defendant
asserted it was improbably that the guns were related to the offense because they
were unloaded. (Id.) Finally, Defendant argued that the ammo magazines were
also empty and therefore could not have been related to the offense. (Id. at 111.)
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Our analysis is guided by the familiar four-part plain-error analysis in
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): “There must be [1] an error [2] that
is plain and [3] that affect[s] substantial rights.” Id. at 732. If so, then, [4] the
appellate court has discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.; see also
United States v. Clifton, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 941581, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 25,
2005) (applying plain error analysis to a constitutional Booker error).
A plain error is a clear or obvious legal error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-
34. At the time the district court sentenced Defendant, neither Booker nor
Blakely had been decided. Nonetheless, “in a case such as this—where the law at
the time of [sentencing] was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal—it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate
consideration.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). Here, there
was a plain error because the district court enhanced Defendant’s sentence on the
basis of a fact neither admitted by the defendant nor proven to a jury: the
possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense.
Defendant has the burden of establishing that this plain error affected his
substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. This is done by showing that
there is “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403
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F.3d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). We have recognized
at least two ways in which a defendant can carry his burden under the third prong
of the plain error test. First, if the defendant shows a reasonable probability that
a jury applying the reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same
facts found by the court applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the
error has affected his substantial rights. See Clifton, 2005 WL 941581, at *6.
Second, a Booker error may affect substantial rights if the defendant shows “a
reasonable probability that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under
the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), [4] the district court judge would
reasonably impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range.” Clifton, 2005 WL
941581, at *6.
Here we assume, without deciding, that Defendant has met his burden under
this second approach. Given the fact that the district court chose to sentence
Defendant at the bottom of the enhanced guidelines range, there is at least a
reasonable probability that it would have imposed a shorter sentence if it had not
erroneously enhanced the Defendant’s sentence. See Clifton, 2005 WL 941581,
4
Section 3553(a) requires sentencing courts to take account of factors such
as the “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant”, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the range suggested by
the Guidelines, id. § 3553(a)(4), and the need for sentencing uniformity for
defendants with similar criminal histories and found guilty of similar conduct, id.
§ 3553(a)(6).
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at *7 (considering, inter alia, the fact that district judge sentenced defendant at
bottom of erroneous guideline range in finding that third prong of Olano was
met).
However, under the fourth Olano factor, we will only correct a plain error
affecting substantial rights if that error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. As noted
above, the error in question here is of a constitutional dimension, since the district
court enhanced Defendant’s sentence on the basis of facts (other than prior
convictions) not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, we apply
a “less rigid” plain error analysis. See Clifton, 2005 WL 941581, at *6.
Evidence that would tend to support an exercise of our discretion
under this standard might include, for example: (a) a sentence
increased substantially based on a Booker error; (b) a showing that
the district court would likely impose a significantly lighter sentence
on remand; (c) a substantial lack of evidence to support the entire
sentence the Guidelines required the district court to impose; (d) a
showing that objective consideration of the § 3553(a) factors
warrants a departure from the sentence suggested by the Guidelines;
or (e) other evidence peculiar to the defendant that demonstrates a
complete breakdown in the sentencing process.
United States v. Dowlin, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1155882, at *18 (10th Cir. May
17, 2005) (citations omitted).
But even under this relaxed standard, we are unable to conclude that the
error in this case satisfies the fourth prong of Olano. While the error enhanced
Defendant’s sentence, we cannot say that the enhancement was “substantial.”
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Here, the district court’s Booker error caused a two-point increase in Defendant’s
offense level. While this is by no means an insignificant error, it is not so
substantial as to satisfy the fourth Olano prong. Cf. United States v. Dazey, ___
F.3d ___, 2005 WL 846227 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 2005) (finding fourth prong of
Olano met where Booker error led to a sizable 20 level enhancement). And
although Defendant was sentenced at the bottom of the erroneous guidelines
range, this fact alone does not necessarily mean that the district court would
impose a “significantly” lighter sentence on remand. Furthermore, Defendant has
not pointed to anything in the record which might indicate that the firearms seized
during the search of his residence (and used to enhance his sentence) were not
actually his. Thus, there is nothing to suggest a lack of evidence supporting the
guidelines sentence. Finally, we see nothing particularly unique on the facts of
this case that would implicate the factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or
demonstrate “a complete breakdown in the sentencing process.” Dowlin, 2005
WL 1155882, at *18.
Thus, although Defendant may have arguably demonstrated a plain error
that affects substantial rights, we will not exercise our discretion to correct the
error because it does not, in our view, “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Defendant’s conviction and
hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny
Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We also AFFIRM Defendant’s
sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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