Heuser v. San Juan County Board of County Commissioners , 162 F. App'x 807 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                                                                  F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    January 10, 2006
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT            Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    ANTHONY HEUSER; NONA
    HEUSER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                               No. 05-2011
    (D.C. No. CIV-04-105 RB/RLP)
    SAN JUAN COUNTY BOARD OF                             (D. N.M.)
    COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
    MARION FARNSWORTH, in his
    individual capacity; ROBERT
    BATLEY, in his individual capacity;
    DAVID VELASQUEZ, in his
    individual capacity; AILEEN
    NOURSE, in her individual capacity,
    Defendants,
    and
    JERRY LARRAÑAGA, New Mexico
    Taxation and Revenue Department, in
    his individual capacity,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    -------------------------
    AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
    UNION OF NEW MEXICO
    Amicus Curiae.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiffs-appellants Anthony Heuser and Nona Heuser appeal from an
    order of the district court dismissing their complaint against defendant Jerry
    Larrañaga based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and alternatively, granting
    Larrañaga’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. For the
    reasons below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    The Heusers own property in San Juan County, New Mexico. In June 2000,
    they received a notice from the San Juan County Assessor that changed the
    classification of their property from agricultural to non-agricultural.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    -2-
    In January 2001, the Heusers appeared before Larrañaga and the San Juan
    County Tax Protest Board (Board) to contest the reclassification. Larrañaga was
    Chairman of the Board and presided at the hearing. In a written decision issued
    in March 2001, the Board upheld the reclassification of the Heusers’ property.
    The Heusers disagreed with the Board’s decision, and in May 2001, they
    filed an appeal in state court pursuant to New Mexico statutes. In October 2001,
    the parties to the state court action stipulated to the entry of a court order that
    reversed the Board’s decision and restored the Heusers’ agricultural classification
    for the tax year 2000, which resulted in a forty dollar savings.
    In January 2004, the Heusers filed a complaint in the United States District
    Court for the District of New Mexico pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
     and 1988 for
    alleged violations of their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
    the tax hearing. Their complaint requested “money damages and equitable relief.”
    Aplt. App. at 1. In particular, they sought to recover the attorney fees they
    incurred in their appeal of the Board’s decision to the state court.
    THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
    The theory of the Heusers’ lawsuit was that Larrañaga, a state employee,
    had a vendetta against them because they had obtained a favorable summary
    judgment ruling against San Juan County in an unrelated civil rights lawsuit.
    -3-
    They argued that Larrañaga had a score to settle and that he used his position as
    Chairman of the Board to decide against them. 1
    The district court granted Larrañaga’s motion to dismiss, finding that
    although the Heusers sued Larrañaga in his individual capacity, their claims were
    in reality a lawsuit against the state, which is immune from liability under the
    Eleventh Amendment. 2 Alternatively, the court granted Larrañaga’s summary
    motion on the basis of qualified immunity. 3
    ANALYSIS
    This court has an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction even
    when neither party has contested jurisdiction. Lopez v. Behles (In re Am. Ready
    Mix, Inc.), 
    14 F.3d 1497
    , 1499 (10th Cir. 1994). Nor are we bound by a prior
    1
    We note the dubious logic of this theory. The Heusers’ tax hearing was in
    January 2001, and the Board’s decision was issued in March 2001. The adverse
    summary judgment ruling was not issued until August 2001–several months after
    the tax hearing and decision. Heuser v. Johnson , 
    189 F. Supp. 2d 1250
     (D. N.M
    2001).
    2
    The American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico has filed an amicus
    brief challenging the district court’s application of the Eleventh Amendment as
    contrary to our opinions in Cornforth v. University of Oklahoma Board of
    Regents , 
    263 F.3d 1129
     (10th Cir. 2001), and    Griess v. Colorado , 
    841 F.2d 1042
    (10th Cir. 1988). Because our resolution of this case does not involve the
    Eleventh Amendment we do not address this issue on appeal.
    3
    The Heusers apparently resolved their claims against the San Juan County
    Board of Commissioners, Marion Farnsworth, Robert Batley, David Velasquez
    and Aileen Nourse, who were also named as defendants in the federal court
    lawsuit.
    -4-
    exercise of jurisdiction in a case when it was not questioned and it was passed on
    sub silentio. Rice v. Office of Servicemembers’ Group Life Ins., 
    260 F.3d 1240
    ,
    1245 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
    The Tax Injunction Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1341
    , provides that “[t]he district
    courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
    any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in
    the courts of such State.” This court has held that § 1341 is a broad prohibition
    against the use of the equity powers of federal courts involving state tax matters.
    Brooks v. Nance, 
    801 F.2d 1237
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 1986).
    Moreover, although 
    28 U.S.C. § 1341
     on its face does not proscribe
    jurisdiction with regard to claims for damages under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , the
    principle of comity prohibits federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction
    over § 1983 damage claims where the taxpayer has a plain, adequate, and
    complete remedy in state court to correct any violations of their federal rights.
    Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 
    454 U.S. 100
    , 116 (1981).
    Setting aside the fact that this court perceives no violation of the Heusers’
    federal rights, the relevant inquiry is whether they had a plain, adequate, and
    complete remedy under state law to correct an erroneous decision and raise any
    alleged violations of their federal rights. Brooks, 
    801 F.2d at 1240
    .
    -5-
    Here, its undisputed that the Heusers not only had a plain, adequate, and
    complete remedy to correct what they believed was an erroneous decision, but the
    decision was in fact reversed. More to the point, their 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims
    -6-
    could have been brought in state court. Garcia-Montoya v. State Treasurer’s
    Office, 
    16 P.3d 1084
    , 1088 (N.M. 2001).
    This appeal is DISMISSED.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
    -7-