United States v. Hernandez-Juarez ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 23, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-2251
(D . N.M .)
SAN TIAG O H ERNAN DEZ-JUA REZ, (D.Ct. No. CR-05-489 JH)
also known as Alejandro M oreno-
M orales,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Santiago Hernandez-Juarez pled guilty to illegal reentry into the
United States of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (2) and (b)(2). He now appeals his forty-six-
month sentence, contending his sentence is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553and the criteria announced in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), due
to mitigation evidence he presented. W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s
conviction and sentence.
On December 13, 2004, M r. Hernandez-Juarez was arrested for illegally
entering the United States after deportation to M exico. Following his guilty plea
to reentry of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated felony, a
probation officer prepared a presentence report, calculating his base offense level
at eight, under U. S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual (USSG ) § 2L1.2(a). The
probation officer also applied a sixteen-level upward adjustment, based on M r.
Hernandez-Juarez’s prior South Carolina convictions for robbery and involuntary
manslaughter, both arising from the same incident, which the probation officer
categorized as “crimes of violence” pursuant to USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). After
applying a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and
factoring in M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s criminal history at Category III, the
probation officer calculated M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s sentencing range at forty-six
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to fifty-seven months imprisonment.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker and the criteria in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), M r. Hernandez-Juarez objected to the presentence report for the
purpose of seeking a reduction of his sentence below the sentencing guideline
range. W hile M r. Hernandez-Juarez did not contest the categorization of his prior
offenses as “crimes of violence,” he claimed a reduction was warranted based on
the mitigating circumstances surrounding: 1) those prior offenses; 2) his difficult
childhood; and 3) his inability to financially support himself and his family in an
impoverished region of M exico. W ith respect to his prior convictions, he claimed
he played an “extremely minor role” in the South Carolina robbery, given he was
drunk and remained in the vehicle while his counterparts entered a home to rob its
occupants and tied up and left a man w ho later died of a heart attack. He also
provided a copy of his confession to those prior offenses, suggesting it was not
knowing or voluntary, as evidenced by the facts: 1) it was barely legible; 2) the
police told him he could get the death penalty if he did not confess; and 3) his
attorney and the judge strongly urged him to accept a plea bargain mid-trial. In
addition, he argued his short sentences for those offenses (i.e., five years for
involuntary manslaughter and seven years for robbery, which ran concurrently)
corroborated his contention he was a minor participant.
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As further grounds for mitigation of his sentence, M r. Hernandez-Juarez
asserted he grew up in an economically impoverished area of southern M exico
subject to government oppression and rebel activity; was raised by relatives, one
of whom beat him; and attended school only through the second grade, leaving
him functionally illiterate. H e also suggested he unsuccessfully attempted to
work in another part of M exico and only reentered the United States for the sole
purpose of earning sufficient sums to support his family and pay for his return to
southern M exico. M r. Hernandez-Juarez also claimed he was “shocked and
horrified to learn how seriously the U nited States punishes illegal reentry
offenses.”
At the sentencing hearing, M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s counsel explicitly stated
M r. Hernandez-Juarez did not object to the presentence report or addendum but
continued to request a sentence reduction below the sentencing guideline range on
the same grounds. In support of the requested reduction, M r. Hernandez-Juarez
spoke on his own behalf and described some of the dire circumstances of his
childhood and his inability to financially support his family.
The district court considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
the applicable sentencing guidelines, the facts of the case, and M r. Hernandez-
Juarez’s criminal history and concluded the sentencing guideline range of forty-
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six to fifty-seven months w as reasonable, given M r. Hernandez-Juarez illegally
reentered the United States after previously being deported for “crimes of
violence” involving manslaughter and robbery. The district court then sentenced
M r. Hernandez-Juarez at the low end of the sentencing range at forty-six months
and recommended the government begin removal proceedings during service of
his sentence.
On appeal, M r. Hernandez-Juarez continues to argue his sentence is
unreasonable under § 3553 and the advisory criteria announced in Booker because
of the mitigation evidence he presented. For the first time on appeal, M r.
Hernandez-Juarez also claims: 1) the probation officer improperly double-
counted his prior offenses by using them to both calculate his criminal history and
apply the sixteen-level enhancement; and 2) § 2L1.2 is “too draconian” and
provides a term of sentence “greater than necessary” because it provides for a
sixteen-level enhancement for his prior felony convictions, which were also used
to calculate his criminal history.
In considering M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s arguments, it is clear the applicable
sentencing guidelines assess the base offense level for unlawfully entering or
remaining in the United States at eight and recommend a sixteen-level increase
for a prior “crime of violence.” See USSG § 2L1.2(a) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). The
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application note to § 2L1.2 defines a “crime of violence” in illegal reentry cases
and specifically enumerates robbery and manslaughter as crimes of violence. See
cmt. n.1(B)(iii). W hile w e recognize the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory
rather than mandatory under the principles announced in Booker, they continue to
be a factor the district court must consider in imposing a sentence. See United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). W e have also
determined Booker “indicates that trial courts must accord deference to the
Guidelines ....” See United States v. Crockett, 435 F.3d 1305, 1318 (10th Cir.
2006).
In this case, M r. Hernandez-Juarez does not contest the characterization of
his prior offenses as “crimes of violence” under the applicable guidelines, but
nevertheless seeks a reduction of his sentence based on his argument his
confession and guilty plea w ere involuntary and unknowing. In essence, M r.
Hernandez-Juarez is collaterally attacking his state convictions. However, a
defendant may not collaterally attack a state conviction used to enhance his
federal sentence or used in calculating his criminal history, except in cases of
complete denial of legal counsel. See United States v. Delacruz-Soto, 414 F.3d
1158, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381
(10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581 (10th Cir. 1994). In
this case, it appears M r. Hernandez-Juarez had representation of counsel at the
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time of his prior offenses and, therefore, we reject his attempt to collaterally
attack his convictions.
W ith respect to M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s argument his sentence is
unreasonable because of the mitigation evidence offered, we first note that a
presumption of reasonableness attaches to a sentence, like here, which is w ithin
the correctly-calculated sentencing guideline range. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1053-
54. A defendant may rebut the presumption attached to a sentence within the
guideline range by demonstrating the sentence is unreasonable when viewed
against the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, id. at 1053, which include
consideration of whether the sentence imposed reflects the seriousness of the
offense, promotes respect for the law , provides just punishment, affords adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, and protects the public from further crimes of the
defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).
In this case, after considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
the applicable sentencing guidelines, the facts of the case, and M r. Hernandez-
Juarez’s criminal history, the district court refused to depart downward and
concluded the sentencing guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months was
reasonable under the circumstances. W e agree, given M r. Hernandez-Juarez
entered the country illegally and pled guilty to prior offenses of robbery and
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involuntary manslaughter, all of which are serious or violent crimes. His
suggestion his sentence is too stringent for the crime of reentry is simply a
generalized attack on the offense of reentry and does not constitute a sufficient
basis for lenience in this case. Nor has M r. Hernandez-Juarez shown why he
should be treated differently than others who, like him, illegally reentered the
country after deportation, and we find his claim of ignorance of the law
concerning the penalties for reentering the country unavailing. “[N]othing more
than a showing of general intent” that M r. Hernandez-Juarez willfully and
knowingly reentered the country is required, so it is irrelevant whether he
willfully and knowingly engaged in criminal behavior or did not understand the
consequences of his actions. United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160,
1165 (10th Cir. 1999).
As to M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s claim he was a minor participant in his prior
offenses, warranting a sentence reduction, it is clear he pled guilty to robbery and
involuntary manslaughter, regardless of the circumstances he now suggests
surrounded his involvement. Both of those offenses are specifically enumerated
as crimes of violence for the purpose of a sentence enhancement, and he does not
contest their characterization as violent crimes. Even if he had contested the
characterization of his prior offenses, we follow a categorical approach and look
only at undisputed information, rather than engage in a fact-finding inquiry on a
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prior offense previously adjudicated. United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266,
1270 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1385 (2006). In this case, other
than his mere assertions, M r. Hernandez-Juarez has not directed us to anything in
the record, including any undisputed information or documentation, to support his
position he was a minor participant in the South Carolina offenses to which he
pled guilty. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the district
court to apply a sixteen-level enhancement for M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s prior
offenses.
Similarly, the district court’s sentence w as reasonable, despite M r.
Hernandez-Juarez’s arguments he only returned to the United States due to his
financial situation and family obligations. M r. Hernandez-Juarez has not shown
why either his financial circumstances or his family responsibilities present an
extraordinary case for the purpose of establishing his sentence is unreasonable.
Similarly, we do not believe M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s sentence is unreasonable
based on his alleged difficult childhood. Conceivably, many similarly-situated
defendants could argue they, too, experienced difficult childhoods as a means to
mitigate the consequences associated with reentry into this country after
comm itting a violent crime. Under the circumstances presented, it was not
unreasonable for the district court to determine that a sentence imposed at the
bottom of the applicable guideline range sufficiently reflected the factors or
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considerations in § 3553, and M r. Hernandez-Juarez has not otherwise
demonstrated his sentence is unreasonable when viewed against these factors.
Finally, we must reject M r. H ernandez-Juarez’s double-counting argument.
To begin, we have long declined to rule on issues not raised in the district court
when, as here, the defendant cannot show an impediment that precluded his
raising the issue or that the ground not raised constituted plain error resulting in
manifest injustice. See U nited States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir.
1988). Even if we considered the issue, in this case, the application note to
§ 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines expressly states “[a] conviction taken into
account under subsection (b)(1) [which includes a crime of violence] is not
excluded from consideration of w hether that conviction receives criminal history
points ....” See cmt. n.6. W e have generally upheld the use of prior convictions
to calculate both criminal history categories and sentence enhancements where,
like here, the guidelines permit such application, and M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s
argument is less than persuasive for the purpose of questioning our clear and
long-held precedent. See United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419, 421 (10th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1990).
M oreover, w hile this circuit has not directly considered whether § 2L1.2 allow s
double-counting, another circuit has addressed M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s argument
straight on and rejected it on grounds the application note to § 2L1.2 expressly
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allows a sixteen-level enhancement “in addition to any criminal history points
added for such conviction.” See United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d
692, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1997). Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable
for the district court to defer to § 2L1.2 and follow the same approach in using
M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s prior offenses to calculate his criminal history and to
further enhance his offense level because those same prior offenses were crimes
of violence. Finally, M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s rather summary argument that
§ 2L1.2 is “too draconian” and provides for a term of sentence “greater than
necessary” is essentially a facial challenge to the validity of the sixteen-level
enhancement, which we have applied on numerous occasions to criminal
sentences. W e find M r Hernandez-Juarez’s summary argument, raised for the
first time on appeal, unpersuasive in overcoming the presumption his sentence is
reasonable or in otherwise establishing that the guideline is invalid.
For these reasons, we A FFIRM M r. Hernandez-Juarez’s conviction and
sentence.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY
United States Circuit Judge
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