United States v. Espinoza ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 10, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-2121
v. (D.C. No. CR-04-852 )
(D .N.M .)
A LEJA N D RO ESPIN O ZA ,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, EBEL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Alejandro Espinoza challenges his conviction for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. After a jury trial, M r. Espinoza was convicted and sentenced to
240 m onths imprisonment to be followed by five years supervised release. On
appeal, M r. Espinoza challenges his conviction on four grounds: (1) the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the case so that M r. Espinoza
could present additional evidence, (2) the government violated M r. Espinoza’s
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Fifth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony about his decision to remain silent
after arrest, (3) the district court abused its discretion in denying M r. Espinoza’s
motion for a mistrial based on certain comments made by the government during
an objection, and (4) the cumulative errors made during trial require reversal for a
new trial. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
During December 2003 and January 2004, Grant County, New M exico
deputies set up two controlled methamphetamine purchases from Debra James.
M s. James was arrested and agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. M s.
James told deputies that her supplier was “M iguel M anzo,” a man whom deputies
later learned was actually M r. Espinoza. Deputies then recorded a series of
telephone conversations betw een M s. James and M r. Espinoza in which the two
discussed methamphetamine sales and the proceeds from those sales. Eventually,
M s. James set up a meeting with M r. Espinoza in order to deliver money to him
that she owed from a previous methamphetamine purchase. W hen M r. Espinoza
arrived to pick up the money, deputies arrested him.
At trial, M s. James testified that she had purchased methamphetamine from
M r. Espinoza for her personal use beginning in September 2003. M s. James
testified that she eventually allowed M r. Espinoza to store methamphetamine at
her house and that she ultimately began delivering methamphetamine for M r.
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Espinoza. M s. James testified that she also received money from a street-level
methamphetamine distributor named “Johnny,” which she deposited into a bank
account controlled by M r. Espinoza. M s. James testified that M r. Espinoza
supplied her with the methamphetamine that she sold to the deputies.
During the cross-examination of M s. James, M r. Espinoza’s counsel asked
whether M r. Espinoza drove a 1999 Dodge Durango pickup. The prosecutor
objected stating: “Defendant is trying to elicit testimony that should come from
the defendant through this witness.” Aplt. Br., tab 2, at 177. W hen the district
court asked counsel the point of the question, counsel explained that he sought to
show that M r. Espinoza had sold the truck and had a lot of money from the sale.
The prosecutor then reiterated: “Exactly, Your Honor. That is testimony from the
defendant, if he chooses to testify, not to testify for the defendant through the
testimony of this witness.” Id. The district court overruled the government’s
objection.
The government later called another witness, Drug Enforcement
Administration Agent Jacinto Flores. Agent Flores testified that when M r.
Espinoza was arrested, he possessed two driver’s licenses–one bearing the name
Alejandro Espinoza and another bearing the name M iguel M anzo. Agent Flores
also testified that shortly after the arrest, he advised M r. Espinoza that it would be
in his best interest to cooperate. The prosecutor then asked, “A nd what was his
response to that question?” Aplt. Br., tab 3, at 184. Agent Flores answ ered: “H is
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response to me was that I sounded like those detectives in the last case he had in
California, and he still wound up being screwed. He said he wanted a law yer this
time.” Id. Defense counsel did not object at this point.
After the government rested, M r. Espinoza moved for a mistrial alleging
prosecutorial misconduct based on the comments made by the prosecutor
follow ing the objection made during M s. James’s cross-examination and also
based on Agent Flores’s reference to M r. Espinoza’s prior conviction. M r.
Espinoza argued the objection improperly commented on a prior case in which he
was involved. The district court denied the motion.
Subsequently, based on representations by defense counsel, the district
court announced that M r. Espinoza had decided not to call any witnesses. The
district court’s announcement prompted an outburst by M r. Espinoza: “You’re
going to give me life without the possibility of parole, and you’re not going to
allow my side to be heard.” Aplt. Br., tab 5, at 217. The district court then
excused the jury and reprimanded M r. Espinoza. The district court then recessed
to allow M r. Espinoza to consult with defense counsel. W hen court reconvened,
defense counsel stated that he may have erred in failing to call Officer Larry
Lutonsky as a witness. Defense counsel asked leave to call Officer Lutonsky. In
support of this request, defense counsel stated:
W ell, I believe from the Discovery that my client pointed out to me
today that there was marijuana found in the house w hen–in D ebra
James’ house after it was searched. And I believe this witness is the
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witness who took that marijuana into–into evidence; that I believe
Debra James said on the witness stand that there was no marijuana in
the house.
Id. at 225.
The government objected to the motion to reopen, describing M r.
Espinoza’s outburst as “tactical” because even if M r. Espinoza felt he could not
voice his objections through counsel, he could have leveled his complaint well
before the jury entered the courtroom. Id. The government also noted that
ample discovery had been provided to counsel. The district court denied the
motion to reopen, stating that extending the trial would disrupt its calendar. The
district court also suggested that Officer Lutonsky’s testimony would only have
limited impeachment value. The district court also agreed that M r. Espinoza’s
outburst appeared to be calculated.
During closing rebuttal, the prosecutor remarked:
There is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever, that the [defendant] or
Debra James was dealing in marijuana or cocaine. As a matter of
fact, the only time those words were ever uttered in this trial came
out of the mouth of M r. W right [defense counsel], and nobody else.
And you are warned–I mean, instructed what the lawyers say,
including myself, is not testimony, it’s just argument and shouldn’t
be considered to [sic] you as fact.
II R. Supp. at 31.
Following the government’s rebuttal, the district court instructed the jury
that “[t]he law does not require the defendant to prove his innocence or produce
any evidence at all, and no inference, whatever, may be drawn from the election
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of the defendant not to testify.” Id. at 7. The district court further instructed: “I
have ordered stricken from the record the testimony of Agent Flores regarding
the conversation he had with the defendant, after the defendant’s arrest, about the
defendant’s prior involvement with the authorities in California. Don’t consider
any testimony or other evidence which has been stricken in reaching your
decision.” Id. at 4.
M r. Espinoza was subsequently convicted.
Discussion
I. The M otion to Reopen
W e review the denial of a motion to reopen the evidence for abuse of
discretion. M orsey v. Chevron USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1477 (10th Cir. 1996).
A district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is “arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d
1222, 1236 (10th C ir. 2006). Even if a district court abuses its discretion, we
will not reverse if the error is harmless. United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909,
914 (10th Cir. 2002).
As we noted in United States v. M ontgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 757 (10th Cir.
1980), the “trial court has some interest in seeing that justice is done and in
seeing that all the facts are presented.” Against this backdrop, we find
instructive those factors the Third Circuit has relied upon in deciding whether a
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district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to reopen the evidence.
United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2002). In Coward, the court
considered the following factors: (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the
character of the testimony, (3) the effect of granting the motion, (4) the
reasonableness of the excuse for failing to present the evidence prior to resting,
and (5) whether belated receipt of the evidence would mark it with distorted
importance, prejudice the other party’s case, or preclude the other party from
adequately addressing it. Id. at 181. Application of these factors in the instant
case demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
First, although the motion was made shortly after the district court
announced that the defense had concluded its case, the timing of the motion was
suspect because M r. Espinoza was present in court when his counsel informed
the court that he did not expect to call any witnesses. Aplt. Br., tab 4, at 189.
Thus, M r. Espinoza could not have been totally surprised when his counsel rested
the following day without calling any witnesses.
Second, the character of the testimony to be offered by Officer Lutonsky at
best w as cumulative, as well as collateral, impeachment evidence, which would
ordinarily be inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). At trial, M r. Espinoza’s
counsel stated that the purpose of Officer Lutonsky’s testimony was to impeach
M s. James, who had testified that no marijuana had been found when the police
searched her house. Aplt. Br., tab 5, at 224, III R. at 164. W hile M r. Espinoza’s
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appellate counsel argues that Officer Lutonsky’s testimony was “substantive”
and supported M r. Espinoza’s theory that he only supplied M s. James w ith
marijuana and not methamphetamine, this purpose was not advanced before the
trial court. M r. Espinoza’s counsel tried to develop such a theory in the cross-
examination of M s. James but was unable to do so. III R. at 162, 178-79.
M r. Espinoza’s trial counsel extensively cross-examined and impeached
M s. James on numerous points. These included: (1) that she stood to receive
significant benefits from her cooperation with the government, (2) that she had
admitted prior marijuana and methamphetamine use, (3) that she had multiple
suppliers of methamphetamine, albeit for personal use, (4) that she was
terminated by her employer for violating company policies, and (5) that she
failed to inform the police about methamphetamine later found in her home.
Allowing Officer Lutonsky to testify would have simply added another point of
impeachment among many.
Third, reopening the trial would have delayed the proceedings and
disrupted the district court’s already busy calendar. M r. Espinoza requested a
weekend continuance so he could locate Officer Lutonsky. This would have
delayed closing arguments and jury instruction from Friday, January 21, 2005 to
M onday, January 24, 2005. It would have also disrupted another trial the district
court was set to begin the following week.
Fourth, it appears that trial counsel was aware of the nature of Officer
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Lutonsky’s probable testimony given discovery prior to trial. Aplt. Br., tab 5, at
225. Thus, it appears that defense counsel made a reasonable tactical choice to
forego this evidence until his client suggested otherw ise at the close of the trial.
Such a deliberate choice is not a sufficient excuse for failing to offer testimony
prior to the close of evidence.
Finally, we do not think that the late receipt of this evidence would have
prejudiced the government or prevented the government from addressing it, or
that the jury would have placed undue importance on it.
Because most factors militate against reopening the evidence, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Our conclusion in this case
does not mean, however, that district courts should view motions to reopen with
skepticism. To the contrary, when the burden is not significant, and assuming
the admissibility of the proposed evidence, prudence suggests that district courts
should lean towards granting motions to reopen so that the parties have a full
opportunity to be heard.
II. The Testimony About M r. Espinoza’s Right to Remain Silent
M r. Espinoza argues that the government violated his Fifth Amendment
rights when Agent Flores testified about M r. Espinoza’s decision to remain silent
immediately after his arrest. W e generally apply harmless error review when the
government improperly references a defendant’s decision to exercise his Fifth
Amendment rights. See United States v. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir.
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2005). However, when a defendant fails to offer a contemporaneous objection to
such an impermissible comment, we review for plain error. United States v.
Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 826-27 (10th Cir. 1997). Under the plain error
standard, a defendant must show: (1) that the district court committed error, (2)
that the error was plain, (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, and (4)
that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732
(10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). To show that an error affected substantial rights, a
defendant must typically demonstrate that the outcome of the proceedings was
affected. Id.In this case, M r. Espinoza failed to object to Agent Flores’s testimony on
the basis that the testimony violated his Fifth Amendment rights, so our review is
for plain error. The government concedes that the first two prongs of the plain
error standard are met because, under established law, “once a defendant invokes
his right to remain silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any
Fifth Amendment rights which defendant exercised.” Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1261.
The government strenuously argues, however, that M r. Espinoza cannot show
that Agent Flores’s statement affected his substantial rights.
In determining whether an error affects substantial rights, we apply the
same factors considered in harmless error analysis, except that the burden falls to
the defendant. See U nited States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Thus, w e
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must consider:
(1) the use to which the prosecution puts the silence, (2) who elected
to pursue the line of questioning, (3) the quantum of other evidence
indicative of guilt, (4) the intensity and frequency of the reference,
and (5) the availability to the trial judge of an opportunity to grant a
motion for mistrial or to give curative instructions.
Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1261.
As to the first factor, it is not clear that the government put Agent Flores’s
statement to much use at all. Agent Flores was called principally to testify
regarding M r. Espinoza’s use of the alias “M iguel M anzo” and his possession of
two different driver’s licenses. This testimony was important to the
government’s case because M s. James said she knew M r. Espinoza as “M iguel
M anzo.” W hile counsel for the government did ask the question that prompted
Agent Flores’s testimony regarding M r. Espinoza’s decision to remain silent, it
does not appear that the government tried to use the testimony as substantive
evidence of guilt.
Furthermore, we are convinced from our review of the briefs and record,
that a significant quantity of other evidence indicated M r. Espinoza’s guilt,
including the testimony of M s. James, recorded phone conversations between M r.
Espinoza and M s. James, bank records of cash deposits into M r. Espinoza’s bank
account, and the fact that M r. Espinoza was arrested at a prearranged meeting to
collect a drug debt. This evidence, without the implication created by Agent
Flores’s testimony, was more than enough for a reasonable jury to convict M r.
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Espinoza and surely dictated the outcome of the case.
Additionally, the reference to M r. Espinoza’s choice to remain silent was a
singular incident which was not repeated nor subsequently commented upon by
the prosecution. And, the district court struck this portion of A gent Flores’s
testimony from the record sua sponte, ordering the jury to disregard it. W e
presume the jury followed this instruction. See United States v. Cherry, 433
F.3d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 2005). For these various reasons, we conclude that M r.
Espinoza has failed to show Agent Flores’s testimony affected his substantial
rights. Accordingly, M r. Espinoza has failed to satisfy the plain error standard.
III. The M otion for M istrial
W e review the district court’s denial of M r. Espinoza’s motion for a
mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2002). A district court “may
appropriately grant a mistrial only when a defendant’s right to a fair and
impartial trial has been impaired . . . .” Id. 1 W e affirm the district court because
we find there was no prosecutorial misconduct.
1
M r. Espinoza argues that our review should be de novo because the
district court denied the motion for a mistrial because of an error of law –namely
that it mischaracterized defense counsel’s failure to object as invited error. Aplt.
Br. at 32. Based on the record, it appears the district court rejected the motion for
mistrial because the government engaged in no misconduct. Aplt. Br., tab 5, at
204-05. Regardless, because we conclude there was no misconduct on the part of
the government, w e w ould affirm under either standard of review.
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M r. Espinoza argues that counsel for the government engaged in
misconduct because, during an objection, he “said essentially that counsel was
attempting to obtain testimony from the witness that should come from the
defendant,” and that “[t]his was a comment on M r. Espinoza’s right not to testify
[that] violated his Fifth Amendment rights.” Aplt. Br. at 30. In determining
whether a prosecutor’s remarks are in fact a comment on a defendant’s right not
to testify, we ask “whether the language used by the prosecution was manifestly
intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily
take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” United States v.
Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006). “[M ]anifest intent will not be
found if some other explanation for the prosecutor’s remark is equally plausible.”
Id. Additionally, “[t]he question is not whether the jury possibly or even
probably would view the remark in this manner, but whether the jury
necessarily would have done so.” Id.In this case, there is no evidence that the prosecutor “manifestly intended”
to comment on M r. Espinoza’s failure to testify. The prosecutor’s remarks came
during a colorable objection to questions posed by defense counsel. It is quite
plausible, if not probable, that the prosecutor made the comments because he was
objecting to a perceived attempt by defense counsel to introduce impermissible
hearsay evidence. Indeed, although it overruled the prosecutor’s objection, the
district court ordered M s. James to answer only those questions to which she
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possessed personal knowledge. This isolated statement made during an objection
simply is not misconduct. 2
IV. The Cumulative Effect of the “Errors”
M r. Espinoza also argues that there is cumulative error requiring reversal.
Cumulative error analysis “aggregates all the errors that individually have been
found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes w hether their
cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no
longer be determined to be harmless.” United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d
1162, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006). Given that we have found only one error in this
case (A gent Flores’s testimony about M r. Espinoza’s decision to remain silent)
we will not reverse on grounds of cumulative error. See W orkman v. M ullin,
342 F.3d 1100, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that cumulative error analysis
requires at least tw o errors).
A FFIR ME D.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
2
Even if the prosecutor’s comm ents were misconduct, they did not affect
the fairness of the proceedings. The district court gave an adequate instruction on
M r. Espinoza’s right to remain silent, the remarks were extremely limited, and
they played little role in the case as a whole. See United States v. Gabaldon, 91
F.3d 91, 95 (10th Cir. 1996).
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