Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance v. Hill , 227 F. App'x 765 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 18, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
G RA IN D EA LER S M U TU A L
IN SU RAN CE C OM PA N Y ,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v. No. 06-7060
(D.C. No. 04-CV -019-JHP)
C ARL H ILL, doing business as JHC (E.D. Okla.)
M anagement Financial Corp.,
Defendant – Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, Circuit Judge, BROR BY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Carl Hill appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
his former insurer, Grain Dealers M utual Insurance Co. (“G rain Dealers”). Hill
contends that Grain Dealers’ attempt to cancel his insurance coverage violated his
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
policy and state law. Therefore, he argues, the policy remained in effect at the
time his business was destroyed by fire. W e conclude that Grain Dealers did not
comply with the terms of the policy when it canceled Hill’s coverage.
Accordingly, we REV ER SE the district court’s judgment and REM AND for
further proceedings.
I
In M ay 2003, Hill renewed his insurance policy with Grain Dealers to cover
his business from M ay 28, 2003 to M ay 28, 2004. He elected to pay monthly
installments of $145.50, except for the first payment of $301 which he made on
M ay 12, 2003. Hill contends that this payment consisted of a $20 past due
amount, and two monthly payments. Future payments were due on the 28th of
each month. In June, Grain Dealers sent Hill a bill requesting payment of
$145.50 by June 28. He sent this payment late, on July 9; Grain Dealers received
it on July 14. In the meantime, Grain Dealers had issued a cancellation notice on
July 7, demanding payment of $306 by July 27. The notice stated that, if payment
was not received by that date, the policy would be canceled effective July 27 at
12:01 a.m. The $306 figure represented tw o monthly payments, plus a late fee.
Hill claims he never received this notice.
Grain Dealers cashed Hill’s July 9 check, but did not reinstate the policy
because the payment was for less than the full amount demanded. It sent Hill a
refund check on August 20, after deducting a $20 late fee. Hill’s business was
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destroyed by fire on August 29. In a cruel twist of fate, he received Grain
Dealers’ refund check the next day. Grain Dealers refused to cover Hill’s losses
on the ground that the policy had been canceled effective July 27.
Invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Grain Dealers filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no contractual obligation to Hill
after the policy was canceled on July 27, 2003. The district court granted Grain
Dealers’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that it had followed the
required procedures to cancel the policy. The district court’s order did not
explain, however, why Grain Dealers could accelerate the payment schedule to
demand payment of the July 28 premium on or before July 27, or why it could
reject the $145.50 payment sent on July 9 for the July premium.
II
W e review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Lanman v. Johnson County, 393 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The parties agree that Oklahoma state law controls. In this diversity case,
we must “apply Oklahoma law with the objective that the result obtained in the
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federal court should be the result that would be reached in an Oklahoma court.”
Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
“To ascertain the nature of [an insurer’s] contractual obligations to [the
insured] . . . we must examine the provisions of the policy.” M ay v. M id-Century
Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 132, 140 (Okla. 2006). Hill’s insurance contract included a
section entitled, “Commercial Direct Bill Payment Plan,” which provides:
Cancellations
Any monthly bill not paid within the payment grace period will
automatically prompt a cancellation notice for nonpayment of
premium. The effective date of cancellation will be the later of
either the paid premium earned date or determined according to the
number of state legal days, plus mailing time. This will vary
between states.
...
Reinstatements
W e will automatically reinstate the policy when at least the past due
premium is received and the payment envelope is post marked [sic]
prior to the cancellation date. There is no reinstatement fee;
however, there is an NSF fee of $20.00 for any non-sufficient funds
payment.
(emphasis added).
Grain Dealers, as the insurer and drafter of the insurance contract, carries
the burden of establishing its right to demand that the payment due July 28 be
paid on or before July 27, as well as its right to reject Hill’s late payment for the
July premium. See Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Tharel, 174 P. 773,
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774 (Okla. 1918) (holding burden is on insurance company to demonstrate strict
compliance w ith insurance contract’s cancellation provisions); see also M etro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Rosier, 117 P.2d 793, 796 (Okla. 1941) (stating “all doubt arising
from ambiguities and conflicting provisions is resolved against the one who
prepared the [insurance] contract”).
Grain Dealers received Hill’s past-due payment, postmarked July 9, well
before the July 27 cancellation date. Under the “Reinstatements” policy provision
quoted above, it was then required to “automatically reinstate the policy.” G rain
Dealers maintains that the July payment could not reinstate the policy because the
policy had not yet been canceled. This argument is plainly meritless. The
“Reinstatements” provision explicitly states that the policy will be reinstated if
payment is mailed “prior to the cancellation date.” The term “reinstatement,” as
used in the policy, clearly applies to situations in which a cancellation notice has
been issued, but that policy has yet to be cancelled.
To the extent that the term “reinstatement” could be considered ambiguous,
it must then be construed against Grain Dealers. See M cM inn v. City of
Oklahoma City, 952 P.2d 517, 522 (Okla. 1997) (“If terms in the contract are
ambiguous, it must be construed against the drafter of the contract.”); see also
M ax True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 869 (Okla.
1996) (“The interpretation of an insurance contract and whether it is ambiguous is
determined by the court as a matter of law .”). A ccordingly, we reject Grain
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Dealers’ argument that it could not reinstate Hill’s policy because it was not yet
cancelled.
W e also construe the phrase “at least the past due premium” against G rain
Dealers. On July 27, the date of cancellation, only the June 28 premium was past
due. The second $145.50 included in the cancellation notice was not due until
July 28. Grain Dealers asserts, without citation to the record, that it “was fully
within policy terms to also include the July premium payment.” But it is
incumbent upon Grain Dealers, not Hill, to cite to a policy provision or legal
authority permitting it to accelerate the due date for the July 28 payment. It has
not done so. The cancellation notice also demanded payment of a late fee.
However, construing the policy in favor of Hill, we conclude that a late fee is not
a part of the “past due premium.” Accordingly, Hill’s July payment of $145.50,
not the $306 demanded by Grain D ealers, satisfied his obligation to pay the “past
due premium” and Grain D ealers has not established its right to cancel Hill’s
insurance coverage.
W e recognize that Hill did not make the payments due on July 28 and
August 28. He states that he did not receive a bill and did not realize he owed a
payment. Grain Dealers did not send a bill because it had purportedly canceled
the policy. Nevertheless, an insurance policy remains in effect until it is properly
canceled. See Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. v. M iller, 248 P. 1112, 1112-14
(Okla. 1926); see also Empire Fire & M arine S. Co. v. Spurlock, 593 P.2d 768,
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770 (O kla. 1979) (holding workers’ compensation insurance policy remained in
effect because it was not canceled pursuant to statutory requirements). Because
Grain Dealers’ attempt to cancel the policy was ineffective, the policy remained
valid notwithstanding Hill’s failure to pay the premiums due July 28 and August
28. See Bankers’ Reserve Life Co. v. Rice, 226 P. 324, 326 (Okla. 1924) (“The
mere default in payment by the insured does not affect the validity of the contract
of insurance. The provision in the note amounts only to an option in favor of the
company to forfeit the insurance, if it should elect to do so.”).
III
Finally, Hill asserts claims against G rain Dealers for breach of contract,
bad faith, and estoppel. Grain Dealers maintains that these claims were not
properly before the district court. W e do not address this issue, leaving it for the
district court to determine. Grain Dealers’ m otion to file a surreply brief to
address this dispute is DENIED.
IV
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is
R EM A N DED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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