Franco v. Regents of the University of Colorado , 233 F. App'x 786 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 20, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
VIN CENT D. FRANCO, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 06-1136
v. (D. Colorado)
R EG EN TS O F TH E U N IV ER SITY OF (D.C. No. 03-CV-2209-M SK-M JW )
COLORADO, a body corporate,
Defendant - Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HA RTZ, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
The University of Colorado School of M edicine dismissed Vincent Franco
as a student in December 2001. In November 2003 he filed suit against the
school in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, raising
three claims under the Rehabilitation Act: discrimination, failure to
accommodate, and retaliation. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The district court granted
summary judgment against him on the last two claims, and a jury found in favor
of the school on the discrimination claim. On appeal M r. Franco does not
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
challenge the summary judgments. His sole contention is that the jury verdict
cannot stand because the jury was misled by an erroneous instruction on the
meaning of qualified. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e affirm
because the jury found M r. Franco to be qualified, so the instruction could not
have prejudiced him.
The unchallenged jury instruction on the elements of M r. Franco’s
discrimination claim required him to establish (1) that he was disabled, (2) that he
“was qualified to be and to remain a student at the University of Colorado School
of M edicine, with or without reasonable accommodation,” (3) that he was
dismissed from the school solely because of his disability, and (4) that the school
receives federal financial assistance (and is thus governed by the Rehabilitation
Act). Aplt. App. at 135. His argument on appeal relates to Jury Instruction 9,
which addresses the second of these elements. It stated:
For purposes of determining whether M r. Franco was
“qualified to be and to remain a student at the University of Colorado
School of M edicine, with or w ithout reasonable accommodation,”
you are instructed as follows. M r. Franco was “qualified” to be and
remain a student if he met the school’s academic and technical
requirements, based on his performance w hen assisted by those
specific accommodations he either actually requested or that the
University provided to him. You should not speculate as to whether
there were other accommodations that could have been made.
Aplt. App. at 136. M r. Franco complains of the final two sentences of this
instruction. He contends that these sentences inappropriately direct the jury to
ignore accommodations for M r. Franco that the school might have been obligated
-2-
to provide on its own initiative. That is, he argues that the instruction “precluded
the jury from considering the failure of the School of M edicine to take any action
to proactively work with M r. Franco to allow him to succeed in medical school.”
Aplt. Br. at 12.
W e are skeptical about the merits of the challenge. In particular, the final
sentence is clearly unobjectionable, because jury findings may not rest on
speculation. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. M agneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th
Cir. 2004). Indeed, Jury Instruction 2, to which no objection was raised,
instructed the jury: “Any finding of fact you make must be based on
probabilities, not possibilities. Facts may not be based on surmise, speculation or
conjecture.” Aplt. App. at 130.
In any event, we need not address the merits of Instruction 9 because any
error in that instruction did not harm Mr. Franco. The instruction, by its own
terms, related to only one element of M r. Franco’s cause of action: “whether
M r. Franco was ‘qualified to be and to remain a student at the University of
Colorado School of M edicine, with or without reasonable accommodation.’”
Aplt. A pp. at 136 (quoting Instruction 8, id. at 135). Yet the jury found in his
favor on that element. Question 2 on the Verdict Form asked the jury: “Has
Vincent D. Franco, Jr. proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was
qualified to be and to remain a student at the University of Colorado School of
M edicine, with or w ithout reasonable accommodation?” Aplee. Supp. App. at 37.
-3-
The jury answered “Yes.” Id. Perhaps a different instruction, one preferred by
M r. Franco, would have made it easier for him to establish that he was qualified.
But the bottom line is that he convinced the jury that he was.
The element on which M r. Franco failed to persuade the jury was the third
element: that the school dismissed him “solely because of his disability.” Id. H e
contends that an error in Instruction 9 nevertheless harmed his case because the
jury was instructed that it “must consider all instructions as a whole,” Aplt. Reply
Br. at 5, and Instruction 9 therefore “affect[ed] the jury’s ability to consider
evidence about whether he was dismissed from school solely based on his
disability,” id. at 6. But this contention assumes that the jury selectively read
Instruction 9, focusing on the portion that M r. Franco challenges w hile w holly
ignoring that the instruction governs, by its own terms, only the question of
M r. Franco’s qualification. W e reject this assumption. “Juries are presumed to
follow the court’s instructions.” Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d
1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2000).
W e A FFIR M the judgment below.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
-4-