Embrey v. United States ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
July 9, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
W ILLIA M J.R . EM B REY ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 07-7031
v.
(D.C. No. 06-CV -437-JHP)
(E.D. Okla.)
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Respondent - Appellee.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
W illiam J.R. Embrey, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of coram nobis
challenging his 1969 federal bank-robbery conviction. Construing his petition
with the liberality it is due, see Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007);
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007), M r. Embrey suggests
his aged conviction rests on a violation of the federal structure of our
Constitution. Because, among other defects, the writ of coram nobis is not a
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ).
This case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
proper vehicle for (re)litigating years- or decades-later issues that were or could
have been raised earlier, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of M r. Embrey’s
petition.
***
Three weeks before Christmas, on December 4, 1968, M r. Embrey robbed
W ebbers Falls State Bank, a bank in M uskogee County, Oklahoma, insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, taking $793. In 1969, a federal grand
jury charged him with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the Federal
Bank Robbery Act; the indictment specifically stated that the stolen money was
“insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.” Indictment, Tab 4,
Gov’t Ex. Following trial, the U nited States D istrict Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma convicted M r. Embrey and sentenced him to eight years of
incarceration – a sentence that was to run consecutively to a separate state
sentence. See J. and Commitment, Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 1. After serving his state
sentence, M r. Embrey, on M ay 19, 1972, commenced his eight-year federal
sentence. See Return, Tab 4.
Following such a long spell in prison for his original offense, one would
have hoped M r. Embrey might have found another line of work; as it was, he
rapidly returned to his former trade. In 1980, shortly after his release, the United
States District Court for the W estern District of M issouri convicted M r. Embrey
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after he committed another bank robbery and sentenced him back to prison. See
Dec. 23, 1988 M em. Order E.D. Okla., at 1-2, Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 7.
On July 5, 1988 – more than 19 years after his first bank-robbery
conviction but while serving his sentence for the second bank robbery – M r.
Embrey sought to attack his 1969 conviction collaterally in a petition seeking a
writ of coram nobis or habeas corpus. M r. Embrey claimed, inter alia, that
because the 1969 indictment failed to mention 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f), which defines
“bank” under the Federal Bank Robbery Act as “any institution the deposits of
which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,” the grand jury
failed to charge and the government failed to prove that M r. Embrey committed a
federal, rather than a state, crime. See June 30, 1988 Coram Nobis or 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 3, at 2-7; see also Aug. 12, 1988 Embrey Reply, at 1-
8, Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 5. The district court analyzed the petition as one for
habeas corpus relief and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction because M r. Embrey
had completed his sentence for the 1969 bank robbery and thus w as no longer “in
custody” (at least for the challenged 1969 bank-robbery conviction) under the
statute. See J., Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 6; see also Dec. 23, 1988 M em. Order E.D.
Okla., at 1-2, Tab 4, Gov’t Ex., at 7. It is unclear from the record before us
whether M r. Embrey appealed.
Turning at last to the events giving rise to this particular appeal, on
October 6, 2006, M r. Embrey filed in the United States District Court for the
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Eastern District of Oklahoma another petition for writ of coram nobis challenging
his 1969 conviction. In a similar but slightly different vein to his 1988 petition,
M r. Embrey challenged the jurisdiction of the 1969 court on the basis that he
committed a purely intrastate offense and therefore the district court’s
proceedings represented an intrusion on state sovereignty. See Oct. 6, 2006
Coram N obis, Tab 1.
On M arch 30, 2007, the district court denied M r. Embrey’s requested relief,
holding that M r. Embrey failed to meet his heavy burden of showing his 1969
conviction represented a “complete miscarriage of justice.” See Feb. 26, 2007
M ag. J. Rep. and Rec., at 4. Indeed, M r. Embrey admitted that he robbed the
Oklahoma bank, arguing only that a purely intrastate bank robbery should not
count as a federal crime. See, e.g., Dec. 8, 2006 Embrey Ans. Br., Tab 5, Gov’t
Ex., at 56. M r. Embrey timely filed this present appeal on June 4, 2007,
contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him, because (1)
the grand jury charged him in, and the district court convicted him based upon, a
defective indictment, as he outlined in his (resurrected) 1988 petition; and (2) he
comm itted a purely intrastate bank robbery, and under the Constitution (including
Article I, § 8, Clause 17; Article IV, § 4; the Ninth Amendment; and the Tenth
Amendment), Article II of the Articles of Confederation, and a plethora of pre-
New-Deal-Era cases, the federal government trampled Oklahoma’s sovereignty,
as he outlined in his 2006 district court argument. See Aplt. Op. Br. at 1-26.
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***
In its common law form, the writ of coram nobis was a “procedural tool
whose purpose [was] to correct errors of fact only, and its function [was] to bring
before the court rendering judgment matters of fact, which if known at [the] time
of judgment was rendered, would have prevented its rendition.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 338 (6th ed. 1990). 1 Despite the advent of the federal rules replacing
many common law procedures, the writ remains with us, albeit in a somewhat
modified form. In United States v M organ, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), the United
States Supreme Court explained that the A ll W rits Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),
authorizes federal courts to continue to issue the w rit in extraordinary cases,
including to address invalid convictions which have continuing consequences
when the petitioner has served his or her sentence and is no longer “in custody”
sufficient to invoke a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
M organ, 346 U.S. at 506-13.
The M organ Court suggested, however, three prerequisites to the granting
of a writ of coram nobis. First, the petitioner must have exercised diligence in
bringing his or her claim. See id. at 511 (“Such an attitude may reflect the rule
1
“In Latin, ‘coram nobis’ means ‘before us.’ Originally, the petition was
submitted in the court of the King’s Bench, or ‘before us’ in the sense of being
before the King. In contrast, the writ of coram vobis, an analogous procedure,
was brought before judges of the court of Common Pleas, or ‘before you.’ The
distinction between these terms is virtually meaningless in the American context.”
United States v. Thom as, 49 Fed. Appx. 781, 783 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpub.)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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that deliberate failure to use a known remedy at the time of trial may be a bar to
subsequent reliance on the defaulted right.”). Under our case law, moreover, the
petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating his or her due diligence. See Klein
v. United States, 880 F.2d 250, 253-54 (10th Cir. 1989).
Second, the writ is only available when other remedies and forms of relief
are unavailable or inadequate. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (“[W]e think, no
other remedy being then available and sound reasons existing for failure to seek
appropriate earlier relief, this motion in the nature of the extraordinary writ of
coram nobis must be heard by the federal trial court.”). W e have explained that
this means the petitioner “must exhaust all otherwise available remedies, which
includes seeking post-conviction relief under § 2255.” United States v.
Carpenter, 24 Fed. Appx. 899, 905 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpub.) (citing United States
v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 751, 755 (6th Cir. 2001) and Goldstein v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 940 F. Supp. 1505, 1508 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). Neither may the
writ be employed to litigate issues that were or could have been raised on direct
appeal or in other, collateral litigation. See United States v. Stefanoff, 1998 W L
327888, at *2 (10th Cir. June 22, 1998) (unpub.) (citing Barnickel v. United
States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[C]oram nobis . . . (like habeas
corpus) cannot be used to reach issues that could have been raised by direct
appeal.”); United States v. M iller, 1996 W L 200330, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 25,
1996) (unpub.) (citing Klein, 880 F.2d at 254 n.1).
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Third and finally, the writ is available to correct errors of a fundamental
nature. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512. The proceedings leading to the petitioner’s
underlying criminal conviction are presumptively correct, see id.; see also Klein,
880 F.2d at 253, and the petitioner has the burden of asserting a jurisdictional or
constitutional error resulting in a “complete miscarriage of justice.” Id. To meet
this burden, a petitioner must, among things, assert his or her “innocence of the
charge.” United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 934 (10th Cir. 1994). 2
Given these hurdles, the Supreme Court has indicated that “it is difficult to
conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of coram
nobis] would be necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S.
416, 429 (1996); see also Casias v. United States, 421 F.2d 1233, 1234 (10th Cir.
1970) (applying M organ and quoting the Supreme Court: “continuation of
litigation after final judgment and exhaustion or w aiver of any statutory right to
review should be allowed through this extraordinary remedy only under
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice”).
W hen review ing on appeal the district court’s denial of a petition for w rit
of coram nobis, we review for clear error the district court’s factual findings, de
novo questions of law , and for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to
2
Traditionally, as well, the writ was “available only to bring before the
court factual errors material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding
itself, such as the defendant’s being under age or having died before the verdict.”
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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deny the writ. See United States v. Gaddis, 200 Fed. Appx. 817, 819 (10th Cir.
2006) (unpub.) (citing Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 1996)
and United States v. M andancici, 205 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 2000)).
***
M r. Embrey’s appeal fails on nearly all applicable scores. W ith respect to
his first argument on appeal – the allegedly defective nature of his 1969
indictment – there is no question but that M r. Embrey could have raised this, or
any other legal deficiency in the indictment, in his original 1969 criminal
proceedings. See Stefanoff, 1998 W L 327888, at *2 (citing Barnickel, 113 F.3d at
706); see also M iller, 1996 W L 200330, at *1 (citing Klein, 880 F.2d at 254 n.1).
W e have, however, no indication he did so. Instead, M r. Embrey appears to have
waited until 1988 to bring this argument to court. At that time, of course, the
district court did not address the merits, instead holding that it lacked jurisdiction
under Section 2255. But M r. Embrey was free to challenge this ruling on appeal
– arguing, perhaps, that a coram nobis petition does not require a petitioner’s
current incarceration. W e cannot tell from the record, however, whether M r.
Embrey appealed, let alone what arguments he pursued. Given all this, we are in
no position to say that M r. Embrey has satisfied either the first or second M organ
prongs. Far from showing the requisite diligence, he waited years – decades even
– before bringing his argument. And far from showing a lack of other modes for
litigating his claim, he does not dispute that he could have raised his argument in
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his direct 1969 criminal proceeding or that he did raise it once already in his 1988
collateral proceeding. M aking matters worse, he did not even raise this point
before the district court in the current proceedings, instead waiting to (re)launch it
on appeal.
M r. Embrey’s second argument – that bank robbery ought to be treated
exclusively as a state offense – likewise could have been raised in his original
1969 criminal proceedings or in his 1988 collateral proceedings. Yet, M r.
Embrey waited until October 2006 before seeking to litigate the point. Even if it
were possible to overlook his lack of diligence and the fact that other modes of
relief were available to him, we w ould agree with the district court that M r.
Embrey fails to demonstrate (or even allege) a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Indeed, far from protesting his innocence, M r. Embrey candidly concedes he is
guilty of the bank robbery at issue, see, e.g., Dec. 8, 2006 Embrey Ans. Br., Tab
5, Gov’t Ex., at 56, and under our received precedents, his charge that the federal
government lacks constitutional authority to criminalize illicit acts in the banking
field can be described no more charitably than frivolous. See, e.g., Westfall v.
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United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927); Clark v. United States, 184 F.2d 952,
953-54 (10th Cir. 1950). 3 Affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M . Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
3
Neither is this the sort of factual issue traditionally suited to the coram
nobis writ. See supra note 2.
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