Pino v. United States , 273 F. App'x 732 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 8, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL PINO and AMY PINO, as
parents of deceased Nevin Michael
Pino,
Plaintiffs - Appellants, No. 06-7108
(D.C. No. 05-CV-502-RAW)
v. (E.D. Okla.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McCONNELL, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
This case is before us following receipt of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
answer to the question of state law we certified to it on October 29, 2007. See
Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2007). That court’s answer
requires us to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in this case
and to remand for further proceedings.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
As our certification order explains in greater detail, Michael and Amy Pino
appealed to us the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
United States on their wrongful death claim brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2671, et seq., asking us to certify to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court the following question: As of September 1-2, 2003, did
the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053, afford a cause
of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable, stillborn fetus?
For reasons explained in our certification order we did so, and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently answered our certified question in the
affirmative, holding that the state’s wrongful death statute did afford a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a nonviable, stillborn fetus as of September 1-2,
2003. See Pino v. United States, --- P.3d ---, 2008 OK 26, ¶ 24 (Okla. 2008).
The court explained that the Oklahoma legislature’s 2005 amendment to the
wrongful death statute, which expressly allowed claims like the Pinos’, was a
clarification and not a change in the law, and that the existence of a cause of
action before this amendment was “consistent with the purposes of [the wrongful
death statute], our decisions in Evans [v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976)],
Graham [v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993)], and Nealis [v. Baird, 996 P.2d
438 (Okla. 1999)], and with Oklahoma public policy.” Id.This answer is definitive and dispositive of the Pinos’ summary judgment
appeal. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States
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specifically and only because it held no such cause of action existed under
Oklahoma law as of September 1-2, 2003. D. Ct. Order at 2-3. With the
Oklahoma Supreme Court now having concluded otherwise, we are obliged to
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s orders or the opinion of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. So ordered.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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