Ackward v. Bruce , 316 F. App'x 782 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    March 18, 2009
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    WORD ACKWARD, JR.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 08-3102
    (D.C. No. 5:07-CV-03052-WEB)
    LOUIS BRUCE, Warden, Hutchinson                       (D. Kan.)
    Correctional Facility; PAUL
    MORRISON, Kansas Attorney
    General,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before MURPHY, McKAY, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    Word Ackward, an Oklahoma prisoner serving a life sentence for felony
    murder, appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . We granted a certificate of
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    appealability (COA) on one issue: whether the introduction of the murder
    weapon and associated testimony at trial had a substantial and injurious effect on
    the verdict and consequently prejudiced Mr. Ackward’s constitutional rights.
    Because we conclude that the admission of this evidence was harmless, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    The following is a brief summary of the facts, taken primarily from the
    Kansas Supreme Court’s direct appeal decision. State v. Ackward, 
    128 P.3d 382
    ,
    385-86, 388, 392-93 (Kan. 2006). We presume the facts found by the state court
    to be correct. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1).
    On February 12, 2003, Joshua Buckman was killed by gunshot at a Topeka,
    Kansas apartment complex. On the night of the murder, he and his friend, Nathan
    Wells, met Mr. Buckman’s friends, Mr. Ackward and Mario Oneal, at a gas
    station. Mr. Buckman and Mr. Wells, who were in one car, followed
    Mr. Ackward and Mr. Oneal, who were in another car, to the apartment complex
    and parked next to them. Mr. Ackward backed the car he was driving into the
    parking space, so the driver’s windows were facing each other. Mr. Buckman and
    Mr. Ackward went into an apartment building, while the other two stayed in the
    cars. According to Mr. Ackward, they went to the apartment building so that
    Mr. Buckman could buy marijuana.
    -2-
    A short while later, Mr. Wells and Mr. Oneal heard two gunshots.
    Mr. Oneal moved to the driver’s seat of the car he was in and pointed a gun at
    Mr. Wells, who was in the other vehicle, and asked him for money. As Mr. Wells
    responded that he had no money, Mr. Ackward ran from the apartment building to
    the passenger side of the car where Mr. Oneal was waiting for him. Mr. Ackward
    yelled that he had money. Mr. Wells saw that Mr. Ackward was holding a gun.
    Mr. Ackward and Mr. Oneal left. In the car, Mr. Ackward told Mr. Oneal that he
    and Mr. Buckman had fought and that he had shot Mr. Buckman twice.
    Police questioned Mr. Ackward for at least eight hours, and videotaped the
    entire time he was in the interview room. Over the course of the eight hours,
    Mr. Ackward changed his story several times. During questioning, Mr. Ackward
    asked to talk to his father. Although the two conversed alone, police listened to
    the conversation. It appeared that Mr. Ackward and his father discussed the
    location of the gun. When Mr. Ackward’s father left the police station, police
    officers followed him. He proceeded to a house where he picked up something
    outside the house. As he was driving away, police officers stopped him. He had
    a black magazine clip with ammunition in it.
    After Mr. Ackward’s father left the police station, Mr. Ackward requested
    an attorney. Despite that request, the police continued the interrogation.
    Mr. Awkward confessed to shooting Mr. Buckman and agreed to show the police
    where he had hidden the gun.
    -3-
    The trial court suppressed the statements Mr. Ackward made after he
    requested an attorney. But the court declined to suppress the gun. Mr. Ackward
    was convicted of felony murder and attempted possession of marijuana with the
    intent to distribute and sentenced to life and fourteen months’ imprisonment,
    respectively.
    The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences.
    Ackward, 
    128 P.3d 382
    . In doing so, that court held that the trial court erred in
    admitting the gun, because it was seized in violation of Mr. Ackward’s Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel. 
    Id. at 396-97
    . Nonetheless, the Kansas Supreme
    Court determined that the error did not prejudice Mr. Awkward and was harmless
    because there was ample evidence of the presence of a gun during the crime and
    Mr. Ackward’s possession of it. 
    Id. at 397
    . The court pointed to Mr. Wells’s
    eyewitness testimony and Mr. Ackward’s statement. 
    Id.
    Mr. Ackward then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
    district court, challenging the Kansas Supreme Court’s harmless error analysis.
    He argued that the Kansas Supreme Court erred in failing to apply the
    beyond-a-reasonable-doubt harmless-error standard set forth in Chapman v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 22-24 (1967). The federal district court agreed, but held
    that the error was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 638
    (1993). Consequently, the district court denied habeas relief and a COA.
    -4-
    ANALYSIS
    Legal Standards
    Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, habeas
    corpus relief will not be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state
    court unless that court’s adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable
    application of Supreme Court precedent or the decision was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1), (2). A state-court decision is contrary to clearly
    established law “if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law
    set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Bell v. Cone, 
    535 U.S. 685
    , 694 (2002).
    In this case, the parties agree, and the federal district court correctly
    concluded, that the Kansas Supreme Court applied an incorrect harmless error
    standard, and should have applied the Chapman proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
    harmless-error standard. In other words, the court’s decision was contrary to
    clearly establish Supreme Court precedent. See Turrentine v. Mullin, 
    390 F.3d 1181
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2004). Because the Kansas Supreme Court decided this
    claim under an improper standard, we do not give deference to its decision. See
    Revilla v. Gibson, 
    283 F.3d 1203
    , 1220 n.14 (10th Cir. 2002).
    Instead, like the district court, we consider whether the error “had
    substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
    Brecht, 
    507 U.S. at 623
    ; see Fry v. Pliler, 
    551 U.S. 112
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 2321
    , 2328
    -5-
    (2007) (holding that Brecht provides proper standard even though state court
    failed to review error “for harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman.”). We review the district court’s
    harmlessness conclusions under Brecht de novo. See Turrentine, 
    390 F.3d at 1189
    .
    In examining the entire record, we will conclude that an error has a
    “substantial and injurious effect” if we are “in ‘grave doubt’ about the effect of
    the error on the jury’s verdict.” Bland v. Sirmons, 
    459 F.3d 999
    , 1009 (10th Cir.
    2006) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 
    513 U.S. 432
    , 435 (1995)). “‘Grave doubt’
    exists where the issue of harmlessness is ‘so evenly balanced that [we are] in
    virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.’” Id. at 1009-10 (quoting
    O’Neal, 
    513 U.S. at 435
    ). Relevant factors we may consider in our harmlessness
    analysis include the importance of the evidence to the government’s case, whether
    the evidence was cumulative, whether there is other evidence corroborating or
    contradicting the evidence, and the strength of the government’s case. Cf.
    Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 684 (1986) (listing factors to consider
    when conducting harmless-error analysis under Chapman).
    Application of Legal Standards
    Upon de novo review and after considering the entire record, we agree with
    the district court that admission of the gun was harmless under Brecht. The gun
    -6-
    played a minor role in the trial; the prosecutor did not emphasize the gun; and the
    prosecution’s case against Mr. Ackward was strong.
    The testimony of Mr. Wells and Mr. Oneal implicated Mr. Ackward in the
    murder. Both testified that Mr. Ackward and Mr. Buckman entered the apartment
    building, that they heard two gunshots, and that they saw Mr. Ackward run out of
    the apartment building after they heard the gunshots. Mr. Wells more specifically
    testified that within a minute of hearing the two gunshots, Mr. Ackward ran from
    the apartment building carrying a gun and yelling about having money.
    Mr. Oneal testified that Mr. Ackward told him that he shot someone he had been
    fighting with. When Mr. Oneal asked Mr. Ackward if he had killed
    Mr. Buckman, Mr. Ackward responded that he did not think so. Mr. Oneal
    further testified that in his statement to police, he said that Mr. Ackward told him
    that he pulled his gun and shot Mr. Buckman twice.
    In addition to the testimony of these two witnesses, other facts suggest that
    admission of the gun evidence was harmless. Mr. Ackward’s father obtained the
    gun’s magazine clip immediately after meeting with Mr. Ackward, thereby
    suggesting that Mr. Ackward told him where to find it. There was no dispute that
    a gun was used to commit the murder. In one of his versions of what happened,
    Mr. Ackward admitted shooting Mr. Buckman, after the two had struggled over
    Mr. Buckman’s gun. Indeed, Mr. Ackward never argued at trial that he did not
    kill Mr. Buckman.
    -7-
    Moreover, the prosecutor did not focus on the gun in opening or closing
    arguments. In his opening statement, the prosecutor mentioned that there were
    two shots in the apartment building, that Mr. Ackward ran out of the apartment
    building holding the gun, and that Mr. Buckman was killed by a gunshot wound.
    The prosecutor only briefly commented on the gun in closing argument, again
    mentioning that Mr. Ackward ran from the apartment building with the gun that
    was the murder weapon.
    CONCLUSION
    While we will not dismiss the gun as having no significance to the jury, we
    cannot conclude that it and the emphasis placed on it by the State caused its
    admission to have a substantial, injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht,
    
    507 U.S. at 637
    . Because the evidence of guilt in this case was strong, admission
    of the evidence concerning the gun was harmless. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
    district court’s judgment.
    Entered for the Court
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    -8-