United States v. Lopez-Hodgson , 333 F. App'x 347 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
May 28, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 08-2106
v. (D.C. No. 2:06-CR-00260-LH-1)
(D.N.M.)
CARLOS ROBERTO LOPEZ-
HODGSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
After being found competent to stand trial, Carlos Roberto Lopez-Hodgson
pled guilty to reentry of a deported alien after a conviction for an aggravated felony,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues on appeal that the competency
determination, and therefore his conviction, must be reversed. Specifically, he
maintains that the district judge (1) erroneously admitted expert testimony at the
competency hearing, and (2) clearly erred in finding him competent. We have
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1 and we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
The district judge appointed Dr. Samuel Roll, a forensic psychologist, to
examine Mr. Lopez-Hodgson. Dr. Roll explained in a psychological report that Mr.
Lopez-Hodgson understood the nature of the accusations against him and the
possible penalties. R., Vol. I, Doc. 41, at 1 (Psychological Report by Samuel Roll,
Ph.D., P.A.). He also understood that he had his own attorney, that the prosecutor
would try to demonstrate his guilt, and that an impartial judge would be involved in
the proceedings. Id. at 1–2. Dr. Roll opined that with certain significant limitations,
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was capable of informing his attorney about pertinent facts. Id.
at 2.
However, Dr. Roll concluded that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was unable to
meaningfully assist in his own defense. Id. He explained that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson
suffered from mild mental retardation, and had impairments in his ability to think
logically. Id. He further opined that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson suffered from “a blending
of schizophrenic thought disorder with paranoid aspects.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was later confined at the United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners. While at that facility, Dr. Richard Frederick, a forensic
psychologist, evaluated Mr. Lopez-Hodgson. Dr. Frederick prepared a written report
1
The Government’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Mootness)
is denied.
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and testified at the competency hearing.
Dr. Frederick observed and communicated with Mr. Lopez-Hodgson, discussed
his situation with other staff members, and enrolled him in a psycho-educational
group. R., Vol. III, at 11 (Competency Hearing Transcript). Dr. Frederick also
called Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s attorney and considered IQ scores from Dr. Roll’s
report. Id. at 11, 37, 41
Dr. Frederick administered a test, the Validity Indicator Profile, and Mr.
Lopez-Hodgson’s performance was consistent with below average IQ–better than
mental retardation. Id. at 14–15. However, Dr. Frederick did not administer a
standardized IQ test on Mr. Lopez-Hodgson. Id. at 15. He did not think such a test
would be useful because Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s behavior did not correlate with
somebody who might have mental retardation. Id. at 16. Therefore, in his opinion,
psychological testing was not the most useful way to evaluate Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s
cognitive capacities. Id.Dr. Frederick explained that, while at the facility, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson went
into great detail as to what he thought the sentencing Guidelines might be for him
if he were to plead guilty or be found guilty. Id. at 24–25. When Dr. Frederick
spoke to Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s attorney about the incident, the attorney said that Mr.
Lopez-Hodgson had memorized the information. Id. at 25.
In addition, Dr. Frederick testified that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson had been placed
in a locked unit after disobeying a prison officer, but the officer did not give Mr.
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Lopez-Hodgson an incident report within 24 hours. Id. at 26. For the incident report
to be sustained, the officer was required to give Mr. Lopez-Hodgson an incident
report within 24 hours. Id. Mr. Lopez-Hodgson asked to be let out of the locked
unit because the incident report had not been delivered within 24 hours. Id. When
questioned by Dr. Frederick, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson said that he read about the policy
in the inmate handbook when he arrived at the prison. Id. at 26–27. He had arrived
two months earlier. Id. at 27.
Dr. Frederick further testified that when he would not grant Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson’s request to move to a different unit at the facility, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson
approached the administrative staff and asked to go to a different unit. Id. at 28.
Dr. Frederick testified that the manner in which he evaluated Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson–the tests he chose to administer and observation–was the standard way to
evaluate a patient in a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 19–20. Dr. Frederick testified that
he did not think Mr. Lopez-Hodgson had any mental illness, and he was “very
confident” that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was competent to stand trial. Id. at 30–31.
At the competency hearing, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson objected to Dr. Frederick’s
testimony, arguing that his opinion was based solely on observation. Id. at 35. Mr.
Lopez-Hodgson argued that objective tests and scientific methodology accepted by
the scientific community must underlie the opinion. Id. at 35–36. The district judge
overruled the objection and admitted Dr. Frederick’s testimony, explaining, id. at 36:
I hold that the court’s obligation is as a gatekeeper, and I find that the
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doctor has described facts and data, and the facts and data that are used
by this witness are traditionally used by other witnesses of the same
type and [in] similar circumstances. He has, to my opinion, applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts from the case.
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson also provided the report and testimony of Dr. Susan Cave,
a clinical psychologist. Dr. Cave found Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s IQ to be in the mental
retardation range. R., Vol. I, Doc. 46, at 5 (Forensic Evaluation Report by Susan B.
Cave, Ph.D.). She explained that she gave Mr. Lopez-Hodgson an IQ test, and he
scored in the first percentile for intelligence. R., Vol. III, at 47 (Competency
Hearing Transcript). In other words, ninety-nine percent of the people in his age
group had a higher level of cognitive functioning. Id.Dr. Cave further indicated that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson knew what the charges
were, knew he could plead guilty or not guilty, knew that a sentence would be served
in prison, and knew that he would be released if found not guilty. Id. at 50–51. He
defined “not guilty” as not having done anything wrong. Id. at 51. He also
understood the role of his defense attorney and the role of the prosecutor, knew that
the judge’s job was to sentence him, and knew that the witnesses were there to prove
he did something wrong. Id. at 52. Dr. Cave also explained that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson
would be able to recall and discuss what happened in his case, but would have
trouble responding to rapid questioning. R., Vol. I, Doc. 46, at 7 (Forensic
Evaluation Report by Susan B. Cave, Ph.D.). However, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson could
not remember if he had entered a plea. R., Vol. III, at 53 (Competency Hearing
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Transcript).
Dr. Cave explained that her greatest concern about Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s
competency was his comprehension of what was being said while he was in court
because of his weak vocabulary. Id. at 60. She was also concerned that he would
just go along with whatever he was told to do, and that he would make decisions
without fully understanding the implications for the future. Id. She asserted that she
had seen retarded people that she thought were competent, but Mr. Lopez-Hodgson
was not one of those people. Id. at 61. Dr. Cave further testified that observation
alone is not an accepted scientific method of evaluation. Id. at 59.
Following the testimony at the competency hearing, the district judge
explained, id. at 71–72:
I listened to Dr. Frederick carefully, and it is my experience in
listening to and hearing the testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists
who work at the medical center for federal prisoners, and the method
that they use to evaluate and make determinations about competency,
that this doctor did what they all do. He examined the individual by
communicating, and if necessary, if tests were valuable, they would do
that.
In this case, according to Dr. Frederick, those kind of tests that
were run by Dr. Cave were purposeless for this individual. And to
observe how someone operates or conducts himself in the circumstances
of the mental hospital is a traditional method of their evaluation. I’ve
seen many reports and heard countless testimony about that method of
evaluation, so to hear somebody come in here and say that’s not an
accepted way to do it is just flat unbelievable.
So I was very impressed with the testimony of Dr. Frederick, and
it was done in accordance with the methods used in these matters in
prison settings, and I conclude that the defendant is competent to stand
trial. That doesn’t mean that he has the understanding that a lawyer
might have of the facts and the issues, but that’s not required, and I’m
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going to accept the testimony and evaluation by Dr. Frederick and find
that the defendant is competent.
The district judge then prepared an “Order of Competency.” Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson entered into a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(a)(2) in which he “reserve[d] the right to appeal the . . . Order of Competency.”
He then pled guilty to reentry of a deported alien after a conviction for an aggravated
felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1326, and received a sentence of time served and
two years of unsupervised release.
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson maintains (1) that the testimony of Dr. Frederick was
erroneously admitted, and (2) that the competency finding is clearly erroneous.
A. Admission of Dr. Frederick’s Testimony
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson argues that the district judge erroneously admitted Dr.
Frederick’s testimony. First, he argues that the district judge abandoned his
gatekeeping function by failing to make reliability findings concerning the
testimony. Second, he argues that Dr. Frederick’s method of determining
competence was unreliable.
In response, the Government asserts that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson waived the right
to appeal the admission of Dr. Frederick’s testimony in his written plea agreement.
We conclude that he reserved his objection that Dr. Frederick’s testimony was
unreliable. However, we further conclude that the testimony was properly admitted.
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1. Reservation of the Issues
A defendant is normally precluded from appealing his conviction after
pleading guilty. United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004).
However, with the consent of the judge and the government, a defendant may enter
a conditional guilty plea “reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court
review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(a)(2).
We apply a three-pronged analysis to determine whether we may consider an
appellant’s argument after the appellant enters into a conditional plea agreement that
waives his right to appeal a conviction. Anderson, 374 F.3d at 957. We must
determine: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of
appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his or
her appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice. Id. Only the first prong is reasonably in question here. 2
When considering whether an appeal falls within the scope of a waiver of
appellate rights, the general rule is that appellate rights are waived unless reserved
2
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson has failed to argue that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his appellate rights or that enforcing the waiver would be unjust,
other than indirectly by arguing that the competency determination is clearly
erroneous. As explained below, the competency determination is not clearly
erroneous. Therefore, we conclude that the latter two prongs of the three-prong test
do not preclude enforcement of the waiver. See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 958–59
(holding that the appellant holds the burden of demonstrating the absence of a
knowing and voluntary plea or a miscarriage of justice, and finding a knowing and
voluntary wavier when the appellant failed to raise the proposition on appeal).
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in the plea agreement. United States v. Ochoa-Colchado, 521 F.3d 1292, 1299 (10th
Cir. 2008). “‘In determining a waiver’s scope, we will strictly construe appeal
waivers and any ambiguities in these agreements will be read against the Government
and in favor of a defendant’s appellate rights.’” Anderson, 374 F.3d at 957. In so
doing, the text of the plea agreement is our guide. Id.Further, a reservation of the right to appeal a pretrial ruling by the district
judge extends only to theories raised in the challenged ruling. Ochoa-Colchado, 521
F.3d at 1299; see also Anderson, 374 F.3d at 956–58 (holding suppression theory
waived when the appellant did not seek suppression on that theory before the district
judge, even though the appellant reserved the right to appeal the order denying his
motion to suppress).
In his plea agreement Mr. Lopez-Hodgson “reserve[d] the right to appeal
the . . . Order of Competency.” Necessarily implied in that reservation are theories
raised before the district judge that demonstrate that the competency determination
is erroneous. See Ochoa-Colchado, 521 F.3d at 1299 (holding that a reservation of
the right to appeal a specific pretrial ruling by the district judge extends only to
theories raised in the challenged ruling). Mr. Lopez-Hodgson failed to object to the
absence of any reliability findings regarding Dr. Frederick’s testimony. Therefore,
he is precluded from raising this argument on appeal.
However, the exclusion of Dr. Frederick’s testimony may have altered the
district judge’s competency determination, and Mr. Lopez-Hodgson objected to that
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testimony because of its supposed unreliability. Therefore, he may raise the
argument that Dr. Frederick’s testimony was inadmissable due to its unreliability.
2. Reliability of Dr. Frederick’s Testimony
The district judge’s application of the legal standard in deciding whether to
admit or exclude an expert’s testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir. 2006). This broad
discretion applies in making the reliability determination. Id. We reverse only if the
district judge’s conclusion is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly
unreasonable, or when we are convinced the district judge made a clear error of
judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Id.Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a district judge must satisfy himself or
herself that the proposed expert testimony is both reliable and relevant before
permitting a jury to assess the testimony. Id. Reliability questions may concern the
expert’s data, method, or his application of the method to the data. United States v.
Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009).
In reviewing whether an expert’s testimony is reliable, the trial judge must
assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion.
Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1123. The testimony must be based on scientific
knowledge, which implies a grounding in the methods of science based on actual
knowledge, rather than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. United States
v. Gabaldon, 389 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2004). An inference or assertion must
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be derived by the scientific method and must be supported by appropriate
validation–i.e., good grounds, based on what is known. Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328
F.3d 1212, 1222 (10th Cir. 2003).
While expert opinions must be based on facts which enable the expert to
express a reasonably accurate conclusion as opposed to conjecture or speculation,
absolute certainty is not required. Id. Further, it need not be proven that the expert
is undisputably correct or that the expert’s theory is generally accepted in the
scientific community. Id. Rather, it must be shown that the method employed by the
expert in reaching the conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based
on facts which satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements. Id.In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court provided
four nonexclusive factors that a trial judge may consider in making its reliability
assessment: (1) whether the theory at issue can be and has been tested; (2) whether
the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a
known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the
methodology’s operation; and (4) whether the theory has been accepted in the
relevant scientific community. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1123 (citing Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993)). The Daubert factors’
relevance in assessing reliability depends on the nature of the issue, the expert’s
particular expertise, and the subject of the expert’s testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). District judges have broad discretion to
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consider a variety of other factors. Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1222. For example, expert
testimony can rely on experience. Nacchio, 555 F.3d at 1258.
Here, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that Dr.
Frederick’s testimony was reliable. To form his competency opinion, Dr. Frederick
spoke with and observed Mr. Lopez-Hodgson, discussed Mr. Lopez-Hodgson with
other staff members, and enrolled him in a psycho-educational group. In addition,
he called Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s attorney, considered IQ scores from Dr. Roll’s
report, and conducted his own psychological testing. The record also makes clear
that he relied on his extensive experience in performing competency evaluations.
While Dr. Cave testified that observation alone is not an accepted scientific
method of evaluation, Dr. Frederick did not rely merely on observation to evaluate
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s competence. Moreover, Dr. Frederick testified that the
manner in which he evaluated Mr. Lopez-Hodgson–the tests he chose to administer
and observation–was the standard way to evaluate a patient in a psychiatric hospital.
See Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1123 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94)
(explaining that whether the theory has been accepted in the relevant scientific
community is a factor in determining reliability). The district judge’s determination
that Dr. Frederick’s testimony was reliable was not an abuse of discretion. See also
Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that using
experience and observation to deduce an explosion’s cause was a generally
acceptable method of investigating fires, and although not susceptible to testing or
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peer review, it was not an abuse of discretion to find the testimony to be reliable).
B. The Competency Determination
Mr. Lopez-Hodgson argues that the determination that he was competent to
stand trial is clearly erroneous. We disagree.
The Constitution forbids the trial of a defendant who lacks mental competency.
United States v. deShazar, 554 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009). The standard for
assessing competency is that the defendant must have “‘sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding [and
have] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”
United States v. Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
Competency to stand trial is a factual determination that can be set aside only
if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.
2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. Id.When determining a defendant’s competency, the district judge may rely on
a number of factors, including medical opinion, the judge’s observations of the
defendant, and an attorney’s representation about his client’s competency. Id. at
1179; see United States v. Cornejo-Sandoval, _ F.3d _, _ (10th Cir. 2009). In
addition, that a defendant suffers from a mental illness or disorder does not
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necessarily mean that he is incompetent. deShazar, 554 F.3d at 1286. Moreover,
that a defendant can recite the charges against him or her, list witnesses, and use
legal terminology are insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant is competent.
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 2001).
Here, the district judge did not clearly err when he determined Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson to be competent. Dr. Frederick, a forensic psychologist, testified that he
was “very confident” that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was competent to stand trial. Mr.
Lopez-Hodgson’s actions described by Dr. Frederick indicate competence. While
at the hospital, Mr. Lopez-Hodgson memorized parts of the sentencing Guidelines.
In addition, he objected when a prison officer violated a prison policy that he had
read about two months earlier.
While both Dr. Roll and Dr. Cave expressed concerns about Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson’s competence, the district judge was entitled to instead credit Dr.
Frederick’s opinion. See United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
2000) (“[I]t is not clearly erroneous for a district judge to declare a defendant
competent by adopting the findings of one expert and discounting the contrary
findings of another.”). Dr. Roll and Dr. Cave provided, at best, questionable support
for their conclusion that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson was incompetent.
Both Dr. Cave and Dr. Roll indicated that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson had a strong
understanding of his predicament. For example, Dr. Cave explained that he
understood the charges and the possible outcomes. He also understood the role of
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his defense attorney and the role of the prosecutor, knew that the judge’s job was to
sentence him, and knew that the witnesses were there to prove he did something
wrong. And Dr. Roll opined that with certain significant limitations, Mr. Lopez-
Hodgson was capable of informing his attorney about pertinent facts.
While Dr. Roll opined that Mr. Lopez-Hodgson suffered from “a blending of
schizophrenic thought disorder with paranoid aspects,” that fact alone does not
render Mr. Lopez-Hodgson incompetent. See deShazar, 554 F.3d at 1286 (observing
that a defendant’s suffering from a mental illness or disorder does not necessarily
mean that the defendant is incompetent).
Finally, Dr. Cave testified she was concerned about Mr. Lopez-Hodgson’s
weak vocabulary, that he would do whatever he was told, and that he would make
decisions without fully understanding the implications for the future. These
concerns, while legitimate, likely exist with regard to a great many criminal
defendants, most of which are not legally incompetent. The competency finding is
not clearly erroneous.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to determine Dr.
Frederick’s testimony to be reliable. Moreover, the finding of competency is not
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clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
Entered for the Court,
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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