Green v. Auto Pro of Oklahoma LLC , 345 F. App'x 339 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 3, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMONA GREEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-6228
(D.C. No. 5:08-CV-00020-HE)
AUTO PRO OF OKLAHOMA LLC; (W.D. Okla.)
RON HOKETT; CITY OF BETHANY,
a political subdivision, JAY COFFEY;
CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, HOLLOWAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff appellant Ramona Green appeals the district court’s dismissal,
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 11, 2005, Ms. Green purchased a 1993 Infiniti from defendant
Auto Pro and used her 1990 Cadillac as a trade-in. She soon decided that the
Infiniti was a lemon and, according to her, convinced defendant Ron Hokett, an
associate of Auto Pro, to rescind the deal. She returned the Infiniti to the Auto
Pro lot with a rescission letter and reclaimed the Cadillac.
Mr. Hokett then filed a complaint with the City of Bethany, Oklahoma,
reporting that the Cadillac had been stolen. The City reported the complaint to
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database.
Some time later, Ms. Green, while driving the Cadillac, noticed that she
was being followed by two men in a Crown Victoria. Meanwhile, police dispatch
had informed defendant Jay Coffey, an Oklahoma City police officer, that an
individual was following a 1990 Cadillac that he had previously reported stolen.
The dispatcher also told Officer Coffey that the NCIC had noted the possibility
that the driver of the Cadillac may be the vehicle’s original owner who had earlier
traded it in. Officer Coffey then proceeded to overtake the vehicles.
Eventually all three parties, Ms. Green, Officer Coffey, and Mr. Hokett, in
the Crown Victoria, entered a parking lot where Officer Coffey pulled Ms. Green
over and exited his patrol car. He and another officer handcuffed Ms. Green and
arrested her, explaining that the car she was driving had been reported stolen.
While in the squad car, Mr. Green explained her side of the story and identified
-2-
for Officer Coffey a duplicate title she had in her possession as well as a copy of
the rescission letter she had left for Mr. Hokett. Officer Coffey examined the title
and noted that it was a duplicate issued on October 26, 2005.
Officer Coffey then interviewed Mr. Hokett who told him that Ms. Green
had purchased a 1993 Infiniti from him, using her 1990 Cadillac as a trade in. He
said that she had signed the original title over to him but later returned the Infiniti
and took the Cadillac. Officer Coffey then returned the Cadillac and its keys to
Mr. Hokett and took Ms. Green to jail where she was detained. She was released
the next day, and the district attorney declined to press charges.
In state court, Ms. Green brought § 1983 claims, a consumer-protection
claim, and various state-law tort claims against defendants Auto Pro, Mr. Ron
Hokett, the City of Bethany, the City of Oklahoma City (OKC), and Officer
Coffey. The § 1983 claims consisted of a Fourth Amendment claim of illegal
seizure resulting from her arrest and detention and a Fourteenth Amendment
claim of unconstitutional deprivation of property. Defendants removed the case
to federal court where the district court granted motions to dismiss from OKC,
Officer Coffey, and the City of Bethany.
The district court issued three relevant orders for purposes of this appeal.
In the first, the district court ruled that Ms. Green’s complaint failed to state a
claim under either the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth
Amendment claim of illegal seizure failed because Officer Coffey had probable
-3-
cause to arrest Ms. Green. The Fourteenth Amendment claim of unconstitutional
deprivation of personal property failed because the complaint alleged, at most, the
negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of property, an allegation
inadequate to implicate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court therefore granted Officer Coffey’s motion to dismiss but
granted Ms. Green leave to amend her complaint.
On June 3, 2008, the court granted Officer Coffey’s renewed motion to
dismiss and ruled that, because there was no constitutional violation by Officer
Coffey, there was no liability for OKC, thus mooting the City’s motion to
dismiss. 1 In the June 3, 2008, order, Ms. Green was again granted leave to
amend, this time with respect to her claims against the City of Bethany. On
September 16, 2008, the district court granted the City of Bethany’s motion to
dismiss.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellate jurisdiction over OKC
Before we address the merits, we need to consider appellee OKC’s
contention that we lack jurisdiction over it because Ms. Green’s notice of appeal
lists only the September 16, 2008, order which did not address the claims against
OKC, those having already been dismissed, and disposed only of the City of
1
Ms. Green filed a notice of appeal from this order but voluntarily dismissed
her appeal after this court informed her that the appeal was premature.
-4-
Bethany’s motion to dismiss. In support of this argument, OKC cites Hubbert v.
City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1991), and Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d
1386 (10th Cir. 1990), superseded by Rule as recognized in Dodger’s Bar &
Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1440
(10th Cir. 1994). Those cases, however, are inapposite because they deal with the
omission of party names in a notice of appeal and, as noted, Laidley has been
superseded by amendment to Fed. R. App. P 3(c).
In addition to specifying the party or parties taking the appeal, Fed. R. App.
P. 3(c) requires that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part
thereof being appealed.” The requirement is mandatory. Averitt v. Southland
Motor Inn, 720 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 1983). As noted, the district court
entered an order on June 6, 2008, dismissing the claims against OKC and Officer
Coffey. Ms. Green filed a premature notice of appeal of that order, but later
voluntarily dismissed the appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). In her motion to
dismiss, Ms. Green alternatively asked that this court “Stay Completion of Filing
Her Initial Appellate Documents pending a decision regarding the City of Bethany
in the District Court.”
Ms. Green’s second notice of appeal, filed on October 14, 2008, appealed
“from the final judgment entered in this action on the 14th day of September,
2008.” The September 14, 2008, order dealt only with dismissal of the City of
Bethany. That order, however, was a final and appealable order, and the notice of
-5-
appeal relative to it permits this court to review claims of error in the earlier
interlocutory orders in the same case. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373,
1382 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). “‘A notice of appeal that names the final judgment is
sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment
under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all
earlier interlocutory orders.’” Id. (quoting 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3949 at 440 (Supp.
1994)). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the June 3, 2008, order
dismissing the claims against OKC.
B. Dismissal of Claims against OKC and the City of Bethany
The fact that we have jurisdiction over the June 3, 2008, order dismissing
Ms. Green’s claims against OKC, however, does not mean that we will review the
merits of that ruling. Other than a cursory sentence stating that she should have
been allowed to conduct discovery of the City’s training policies and her charge
that the district court erred by “granting a de facto dismissal to the City of
Oklahoma City,” Aplt. Br. at 11, Ms. Green makes no substantive legal argument
regarding the district court’s dismissal of her claims against OKC. Her brief
similarly fails to include argument regarding the dismissal of claims against the
City of Bethany. Ms. Green has therefore waived any consideration of the
dismissal of OKC and the City of Bethany on appeal. Bledsoe v. Garcia,
742 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1984).
-6-
C. Dismissal of Claims against Officer Coffey
Our review of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo. Sunrise Valley,
LLC v. Kempthorne, 528 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2377 (2009). All well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint are accepted
as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “The court’s
function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the
parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone
is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Id.(quotation omitted).
The district court held that Ms. Green’s claims against Officer Coffey
failed because the facts as pleaded did not state a violation under either the Fourth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree.
As to the Fourth Amendment claim,
[w]e analyze the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest under
the probable cause standard. A police officer may arrest a person
without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that person
committed a crime. Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances
within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he or she has
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent
person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an
offense.
Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and quotation
omitted). In order to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest, officers
must “reasonably interview witnesses readily available at the scene, investigate
-7-
basic evidence, or otherwise inquire if a crime has been committed at all.” Id. at
1476-77. Officer Coffey had probable cause to arrest Ms. Green. He had a report
from the police dispatcher that the NCIC listed the Cadillac as having been stolen
in Bethany and that the driver may be the vehicle’s original owner. Officer
Coffey interviewed both Ms. Green and Mr. Hokett at the scene and examined the
duplicate title presented to him by Ms. Green, noting that it was issued after the
Cadillac had been traded in. He also reviewed the copy of the rescission letter
regarding the matter. Taken together, this information provided ample probable
cause for arrest, and the district court correctly determined that Ms. Green failed
to establish a Fourth Amendment violation.
Turning to her Fourteenth Amendment claim, Ms. Green’s complaint states,
at most, a negligent deprivation of her personal property. She has therefore failed
to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, and dismissal of this
claim was also proper. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
D. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-8-