Elwell v. Byers , 699 F.3d 1208 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
November 14, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ANN ELWELL; GREG ELWELL,
PlaintiffsAppellees,
v. Nos. 11-3172 & 11-3174
BOB BYERS; LYNNEA KAUFMAN,
DefendantsAppellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-2227-EFM)
Carl W. Ossman (Brian Dempsey and David W. Davies, with him on the briefs), State of
Kansas - SRS Legal Division, Topeka, Kansas, for the Defendants-Appellants.
Charles T. Schimmel (W. Greg Wright with him on the briefs), Beam-Ward Kruse
Wilson Wright & Fletes LLC, Overland Park, Kansas, for the Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before LUCERO, HOLLOWAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
This case grows out of an avoidable tragedy. Ann and Greg Elwell were in the
process of adopting T.S., a young boy who had been in their care almost his entire life.
But approximately one month after a complaint of emotional abuse of another child in the
Elwells’ care—which all parties agree did not raise concerns for T.S.’s safety or welfare
and was subsequently deemed unsubstantiated—state officials withdrew the license
allowing the Elwells to care for T.S. and removed him from their home without any
advance notice. Despite a state court’s finding that the agency acted wrongfully in
removing the boy, he was never returned to them.
The Elwells brought suit against several state officials involved in the removal
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court
concluded that qualified immunity did not shield the state officials from liability. We
agree with the district court that the defendants violated the Elwells’ Due Process rights
when they removed T.S. without notice. However, despite our sympathy for the Elwells’
plight, we must conclude that this violation was not clearly established in our case law at
the time of T.S.’s removal. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
I
We recite the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See
Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2010). Ann and Greg Elwell, a
married couple with two biological children, held a license issued by the Kansas
Department of Health and Environment (“KDHE”) that allowed them to keep two foster
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children in their home.1 They became foster parents of T.S. in March 2006, when the
child was three months old. Very soon thereafter, the parental rights of T.S.’s biological
parents were terminated. The Elwells bonded with the child over the next year and took
substantial steps towards adopting him. They were identified as T.S.’s “adoptive
resource” and, with the support of the state department of Social and Rehabilitative
Services (“SRS”), a state court approved of the proposed adoption plan and set the final
adoption hearing for May 4, 2007.
On April 4, 2007, SRS received a report that Mrs. Elwell had emotionally abused
another foster child in her care. The report alleged that Mrs. Elwell kept the child in
soiled clothes for a short period after the child wet herself. Although SRS initially
decided the allegations had substance, the agency agreed to designate the report as
unsubstantiated after the events at issue in this case transpired.
SRS, KDHE, county health officials, and the Elwells agreed to remove the
allegedly abused child from the Elwell home. Initially, agency staff did not express
concern that T.S. might have to be removed as well. However, KDHE eventually
concluded that it would terminate the Elwells’ foster care license. As the investigation
into the complaint progressed, SRS made plans to place T.S. with another family. No
one notified the Elwells of the possibility of T.S.’s removal. In fact, defendant Lynnea
1
Technically speaking, the Elwells had an exception to their day care license that
allowed them to provide foster home care to two children. However, in the interests of
brevity and clarity, we refer to the Elwells’ foster care exception as a foster care license.
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Kaufman, an SRS supervisor, directed other agency employees to keep this information
from the Elwells until the investigation was complete.
Sometime in early May, SRS decided it would deem the report of emotional abuse
as substantiated. On May 11, agency staff held a meeting and determined that T.S. would
be removed from the Elwells’ home and placed with a different family on the following
Monday. On that day, May 14, KDHE withdrew the Elwells’ foster care license,
effective immediately. SRS officials arrived at the Elwell home and told Mrs. Elwell
they were removing T.S. This was the first the Elwells heard of SRS’s plan. In Mrs.
Elwell’s words, the family was “devastated.”
Despite the revocation of their KDHE license, T.S. could have remained in the
Elwells’ care if an adoption placement agreement had been completed. KDHE indicated
that it would have been willing to delay withdrawing the license to allow this step to be
taken. Defendants Kaufman and Bob Byers, however, determined that SRS would not
sign an adoption consent form, and thus elected not to offer an adoption placement
packet.
The Elwells alleged that SRS violated a Kansas statute that required thirty-day
notice to foster parents before a foster child who had been in their care for at least six
months could be removed. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2558 (2007).2 They sought a hearing
in state court to challenge T.S.’s removal. The state court found that “[t]here were no
concerns for [T.S.’s] safety and protection in the Elwell home” and that SRS “could have
and should have notified the Elwells of the intent to remove” him. Unfortunately,
2
The statute has since been amended. See 2008 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 169, § 13.
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litigation over T.S.’s placement dragged on, and the court did not consider the possibility
of returning T.S. to the Elwells until March 2008. By then, T.S. had been living with
another family for almost a year, and the court concluded that T.S. had significantly
bonded with that family and that removing him from his new home would be more
disruptive than beneficial. Although the court sympathized with the Elwells’
“unrectifiable loss,” it concluded that removing T.S. a second time was not the proper
remedy for the harm they had suffered.
The Elwells subsequently filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal
district court against Kaufman and Byers, asserting violations of procedural and
substantive due process rights. The defendants asserted qualified immunity with respect
to both claims. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court granted qualified
immunity on the substantive due process claim, but denied it as to the procedural due
process claim. Kaufman and Byers now appeal the denial of qualified immunity.
II
A
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds when such denial presents “abstract issues of law.” Shrum v. City of
Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2006). We review the district court’s
determination as to qualified immunity de novo. Amundsen v. Jones, 533 F.3d 1192,
1198 (10th Cir. 2008). To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that the official’s actions violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right
was clearly established at the time of the action. Id. Courts retain discretion to consider
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those questions in the order they see fit. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).3
It is “often beneficial,” however, to address the constitutional merits first, in order to
“promote[] the development of constitutional precedent.” Id. That rationale suits this
case well.
The concurrence would not have us address the constitutional question. We
conclude that the question is appropriately considered for two reasons. First, the district
court’s legal ruling was that a protected liberty interest exists, and that is the issue before
us on appeal. We can affirm a lower court’s ruling on any grounds adequately supported
by the record, even grounds not relied upon by the district court. See Dummar v.
Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 2008). The statutory basis of the district court’s
conclusion does not foreclose our review of the constitutional question.
Second, as we discuss infra, both the Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (hereinafter “OFFER”), and
we in Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), dodged the constitutional
issue presented in this case. As the Court recently reaffirmed, addressing the
constitutional issue is often “advantageous” under such circumstances. Camreta v.
3
Qualified immunity only extends to “government officials performing
discretionary functions.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Because the
discretionary-function question is quite obvious in many cases, it is frequently omitted
from the qualified immunity analysis. See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32. It is quite
apparent that Kaufman and Byers were engaging in official, discretionary functions when
they decided to remove T.S. without prior notice. Perhaps for this reason, the
discretionary-function element was not a matter of dispute below. Accordingly, we find
meritless the Elwells’ argument that Byers and Kaufman waived their entitlement to
qualified immunity by not mentioning this point in their opening brief.
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Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011). “[O]ur regular policy of avoidance sometimes
does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of
official conduct permanently in limbo.” Id. As the Camreta court explained:
Consider a plausible but unsettled constitutional claim asserted against a
government official in a suit for money damages. The court does not
resolve the claim because the official has immunity. He thus persists in the
challenged practice; he knows that he can avoid liability in any future
damages action, because the law has still not been clearly established.
Another plaintiff brings suit, and another court both awards immunity and
bypasses the claim. And again, and again, and again. So the moment of
decision does not arrive. Courts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to
address novel claims, fail to give guidance to officials about how to comply
with legal requirements. Qualified immunity thus may frustrate the
development of constitutional precedent and the promotion of law-abiding
behavior.
Id. (footnote, quotation, and citations omitted).
We are faced with such a dilemma. By passing over the constitutional issue on
multiple occasions, courts have failed to clarify the law with the result that these
tragedies continue to occur without legal recourse to the victims. Accordingly, we
proceed to the constitutional question.
B
The first step in assessing a claimed procedural due process violation is to identify
a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. A liberty interest can either
“inhere in the Due Process clause or it may be created by state law.” Boutwell v.
Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation and ellipses omitted). The
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district court held the Elwells’ liberty interest was created by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258(2007). We disagree with the district court’s conclusion regarding state law.4
1
For state law to create a liberty interest, it must establish substantive predicates to
govern official decisionmaking and mandate an outcome when relevant criteria have been
met. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1989), abrogated on other
grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 & n.5 (1995); see also PJ ex rel. Jensen
v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1200 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying Thompson framework in
child welfare case). “If the decisionmaker is not required to base its decisions on
objective and defined criteria, but instead can deny the requested relief for any
constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all, the State has not created a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249
(1983) (quotations omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 &
n.5. In other words, “process is not an end in itself”; when state law creates a mandatory
procedure but does not guarantee a particular substantive outcome, it does not confer a
protected liberty interest. Id. at 250; see also Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 998 F.2d 1559,
1570 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The mere expectation of receiving a state afforded process does
not itself create an independent liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause.”).
At the time of the events at issue, Kansas state law provided:
Change of placement; removal from home of parent, findings by court.
4
We have been admonished that “a court of appeals should review de novo a
district court’s determination of state law.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225, 231 (1991).
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(a) . . . [I]f a child has been in the same foster home or shelter facility for
six months or longer, or has been placed by the secretary in the home of a
parent or relative, the secretary shall give written notice of any plan to
move the child to a different placement unless the move is to the selected
preadoptive family for the purpose of facilitating adoption. The notice shall
be given to: . . . (3) the foster parent or custodian from whose home or
shelter facility it is proposed to remove the child . . . .
(b) The notice shall state the placement to which the secretary plans to
transfer the child and the reason for the proposed action. The notice shall
be mailed by first class mail 30 days in advance of the planned transfer . . . .
(c) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice, any person receiving notice
as provided above may request, either orally or in writing, that the court
conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the change in placement is in
the best interests of the child concerned. When the request has been
received, the court shall schedule a hearing and immediately notify the
secretary of the request and the time and date the matter will be heard. . . .
The secretary shall not change the placement of the child, except for the
purpose of adoption, unless the change is approved by the court.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258 (2007).
The Elwells argue that the statute guarantees, absent certain exceptions, that a
foster child will not be removed without prior notice. But the guarantees of the statute
are plainly procedural rather than substantive. “There is no articulable distinction
between the object of [the Elwells] asserted entitlement and the process [they] desire[] in
order to protect [their] entitlement.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,
772 (2005) (Souter, J., concurring). The statute does not prohibit the ultimate removal of
a child if certain requirements are satisfied; it simply mandates procedures that must be
followed prior to removal. Subsections (a) and (b) require only notice, which this court
has described as the “core of procedure.” See Elliott v. Martinez, 675 F.3d 1241, 1245
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(10th Cir. 2012); see also Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that statute requiring notice to foster parents does not create a liberty interest).
Subsection (c) presents a slightly closer question. That provision allows for a
hearing upon request, which is clearly procedural. But it also states that SRS “shall not
change the placement of the child, except for the purpose of adoption, unless the change
is approved by the court.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258(c) (2007). This provision requires
that a child not be removed from a foster home, except by court order, once a hearing has
been requested. But this provision does not mandate any particular outcome of the
procedures at issue; rather, it simply sets the rules as to a child’s placement pending that
outcome. And because the statute does not direct that “a particular outcome must
follow,” it cannot give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Thompson, 490
U.S. at 462.
2
Having rejected the Elwells’ statutory argument, we consider whether they
possessed a liberty interest that is inherent in the Due Process Clause. There can be no
doubt that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974). As the Court declared
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children, . . . and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
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of happiness by free men.” Id. at 399. “[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citation omitted).
Although these venerable cases concern families with some biological connection,
the Supreme Court has made clear that “biological relationships are not exclusive
determination of the existence of a family.” OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843. Although a
biological relationship bears some import, the Court stressed that “the importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society,” rests in part on “the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in promoting a way of life through the instruction of children.” Id. at 844(quotation and alteration omitted). “No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving
and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist
even in the absence of blood relationship.” Id.The OFFER Court acknowledged that foster families and biological families differ
in at least one important respect: Unlike biological families, “whatever emotional ties
may develop between foster parent and foster child have their origins in an arrangement
in which the State has been a partner from the outset.” Id. at 845. Nonetheless, the Court
indicated that the liberty interest in family association may extend to foster parents in
certain circumstances:
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At least where a child has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never
known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several years
in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster family
should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and
fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family. For this reason,
we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated
individuals.
Id. at 844.
In Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), we applied OFFER to
a case involving preadoptive parents. We noted that the status of preadoptive parents
“differs significantly” from that of typical foster-care parents, who care for children on a
temporary basis because the object of the preadoptive placement was to locate a
“permanent, stable home.” Id. at 1384. Although they “have not yet attained the status
of adoptive parents, who like natural parents, have a protected liberty interest in their
familial relationships with their children,” preadoptive parents have a more “significant
relationship than foster care because of the possibility of developing a permanent
adoptive relationship.” Id. at 1384. On this basis, we distinguished several sibling-
circuit cases holding that typical foster families lack a protected liberty interest in
maintaining the foster home. Id.Following OFFER, we acknowledged that because “the claimed interest [of
preadoptive parents] derives from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the
State, it is appropriate to ascertain from state law the expectations and entitlements of the
parties.” Id. (quoting OFFER, 431 U.S. at 845). Looking to the specific facts of the
Spielman case, we held that “[t]he preadoption agreement, coupled with the SRS
representations at the time the children were placed with the [preadoptive parents], may
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have given the [preadoptive parents] a reasonable expectation of developing a permanent
relationship with the child that rises to a liberty interest meriting limited due process
protection.” Id. at 1385. Rather than holding outright that such an interest existed,
however, we concluded any due process rights of the Spielmans had been honored
because they were afforded a hearing before the child was removed. Id.
We cannot follow the same path in this dispute because the Elwells were not
afforded even the most elemental process—notice—before T.S. was removed.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Spielman’s analysis is persuasive in spite of its tentative
determination and hold that the Elwells had a liberty interest in their relationship with
T.S. Several facts specific to the Elwells’ circumstances counsel in favor of this
conclusion. First, as in Spielman, the parental rights of T.S.’s biological parents had been
terminated. See id. at 1384; see also OFFER, 431 U.S. at 846 (distinguishing a
hypothetical case in which a foster parent’s potential liberty interest would conflict with
that of a biological parent). Second, the Elwells had cared for T.S. for an extended period
of time; they were essentially the only parents T.S. had ever known when the events at
issue occurred. See id. at 844 (noting that foster parents “should hold the same place in
the emotional life of the foster child” if the “child has been placed in foster care as an
infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously for several
years in the care of the same foster parents”). Third, and also like the Spielmans, the
Elwells were very close to becoming adoptive parents, although some steps remained in
that process. See Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1379.
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In addition, nothing in either state law or the contractual arrangements at issue
would have tempered the Elwells’ “reasonable expectation of developing a permanent
relationship” with T.S. Id. To the contrary, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258 (2007), the
Elwells were statutorily guaranteed thirty days’ notice prior to removal of T.S. from their
home. Similarly, a state court order approving the Elwells’ adoption plan stated that T.S.
was not to be removed from the Elwells care, absent an emergency, without written
consent of the court. And the Elwells’ Foster Care Placement Agreement explicitly
required thirty days written notice prior to removal.
We recognize that the typical foster care arrangement generally does not create a
liberty interest in familial association. See Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1384 (citing cases).
But the Elwells, who had cared for T.S. nearly his entire life and were on the verge of
adopting him, fall closer to the status of adoptive parents than in the ordinary, temporary
foster arrangement. Thus, we do not need to define precisely where the liberty interest
threshold falls on this spectrum, but conclude that the Elwells fall on the protected side of
that line under the facts of this case.
3
Our conclusion that the Elwells possessed a liberty interest does not end our due
process inquiry; the Elwells must also demonstrate that they were deprived of their
interest without sufficient process. Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214,
1219 (10th Cir. 2006). It is clear that the parental rights of biological parents may not be
terminated without “fundamentally fair procedures.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
754 (1982). And, even outside the familial association context, “some kind of hearing is
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generally required before a person is deprived of a protected interest.” Spielman, 873
F.2d at 1385.
State actors may forgo pre-deprivation process only in “extraordinary situations
where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event.” Id. We have recognized that “‘[v]alid governmental interests’
include emergency circumstances which pose an immediate threat to the safety of a
child.” Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1245 (10th Cir. 2003). Such
threats to the safety of children clearly implicate an important governmental interest that
must be taken seriously in this context. Further, because preadoptive parents’ liberty
interest is not as strong as that of biological parents, a lesser threat to safety might justify
postponing the process due to preadoptive parents. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 (the
“process due” depends on “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of
error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental
interest supporting use of the challenged procedure”).
But the defendants have not shown that there was any concern for T.S.’s welfare.
To the contrary, both Kaufman and Byers candidly admitted that there were no
immediate safety concerns about leaving T.S. in the Elwells’ home. Agency staff
members similarly testified that there was no emergency as to T.S.’s safety or welfare
when he was removed. Moreover, the state court found that “no emergency existed
requiring immediate action to move [T.S.].”
The Elwells claim entitlement to the bare minimum of process—notice. We have
no difficulty concluding that the Elwells’ interest entitled them to this “elementary and
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fundamental requirement.” Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the Elwells’ constitutional
rights were violated when T.S. was removed from their home without any advanced
notice.5
C
Because the Elwells’ constitutional rights were violated, we must consider
whether those rights were clearly established. “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be
clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or
the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to
be as the plaintiff maintains.” Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 733 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted).
Spielman is the only Tenth Circuit decision on point, and given its assumed-but-
not-decided conclusion as to whether preadoptive parents possess a liberty interest, 873
F.2d at 1385, it surely cannot have rendered a violation clearly established. The effect of
that decision was just the opposite: Spielman left the law unclear. The Elwells claim that
5
The statute upon which the Elwells rely required notice thirty days prior to
removal. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258 (2007). Our holding is not dependent on that
statute, and thus it does not follow that the Constitution requires notice that far in
advance. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755 (“The minimum requirements of procedural due
process being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State
may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the
preconditions to adverse official action.” (quotation and alteration omitted)). But in light
of the fact that the Elwells did not receive any advance notice, we need not decide
precisely how far in advance preadoptive parents must be apprised of the impending
removal, or define the bounds of any other procedural protections. See Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (notice must be delivered at “a
reasonable time”). We simply hold that the defendants violated the Elwells’ rights by
failing to provide them any advance notice whatsoever.
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a single case decided by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania clearly established that
certain foster parents possess a liberty interest in maintaining their family structure. See
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.Supp. 318, 326-27 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Although the precise
quantum of case law sufficient to clearly establish a violation is a matter of some dispute,
we think it quite evident that a single case from an out-of-circuit district court cannot
clearly establish the law in the Tenth Circuit. Moreover, McLaughlin’s holding was
grounded in state law, making it inapplicable in light of our conclusion that Kansas law
did not give rise to the Elwells’ protected interest.
The district court concluded that the Kansas statute itself clearly established the
constitutional violation. But as explained in § II.B.1, supra, we conclude that the statute
did not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest, let alone clearly establish one.
Although Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2258 (2007) might have apprised the defendants that their
conduct was contrary to state law, it could not have established that removal of T.S.
without notice was unconstitutional for qualified immunity purposes. See, e.g., Buck v.
City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that the clearly
established inquiry turns on whether defendants had “fair warning that their conduct
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (emphasis added)). A violation of state law
does not necessarily violate the constitution. And on the constitutional question, no court
had answered whether preadoptive parents in the Elwells’ position possessed a liberty
interest in familial association.
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The Elwells suffered a devastating violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and we are not insensitive to their plight. But given the state of the case law, we
must reverse the district court’s qualified immunity determination.
III
We REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds and REMAND with instructions that summary judgment be entered.
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11-3172, 11-3174, Elwell. v. Byers
MATHESON, J., concurring
I concur in the result and join the majority opinion except for Sections II.B.2,
II.B.3, and II.C. I do not join these sections because the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity to Defendants Kaufman and Byers rested exclusively on its
conclusion that the Elwells had a clearly established liberty interest under Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 28-2258. Our reversal on this point makes it unnecessary to discuss whether the
Elwells had a liberty interest in their relationship with T.S. arising under the Due Process
Clause.
The district court recognized that a liberty interest could arise under (1) federal
law, i.e., the Due Process Clause itself, or (2) state law, i.e., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 28-2258.
On the first basis, the court concluded that such a liberty interest was not clearly
established under Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent. It observed that the
Supreme Court has “never decided the question definitively” and that “there is no clear
answer in the Tenth Circuit.” Elwell v. Byers, No. 08-2227-EFM, 2011 WL 1980277, at
*2 (D. Kan. May 20, 2011). In other words, if the Due Process Clause itself were the
Elwells’ only basis for a liberty interest, the district court would have granted the
Defendants qualified immunity based on a lack of clearly established law.1
The district court then turned to whether Kan. Stat. Ann. § 28-2258 could give rise
to a liberty interest. In its words, this was “the only liberty interest that could have been
1
The court later opined, “as a matter of first impression,” that the Due Process
Clause does give rise to a liberty interest. Elwell v. Byers, No. 08-2227-EFM, 2011 WL
1980277, at *4 (D. Kan. May 20, 2011). But this determination was unnecessary because
the court had already stated the law was not clearly established on this point.
clearly established.” Elwell, 2011 WL 1980277, at *2. The court held that the statute
gave rise to a clearly established liberty interest and that the Defendants were not entitled
to qualified immunity because they violated the statute when they removed T.S. from the
Elwells’ home without notice.
I agree with the majority opinion’s holding in Section II.B.1 that the Kansas
statute does not give rise to a liberty interest. This holding reverses the sole basis for the
district court’s qualified immunity ruling and thus grants the Defendants the relief they
seek on appeal. We should not go on to discuss the Due Process Clause issue because it
was not the basis of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.2
2
This court has recognized that it “may affirm on alternative grounds . . . when
those grounds are dispositive, indisputable, and appear clearly in the record.” United
States v. Schneider, 594 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010). The majority opinion’s
discussion of the Due Process Clause issue does not qualify as an affirmance on
alternative grounds because this court is reversing the district court’s qualified immunity
decision.
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