Graves v. Mazda Motor Corporation , 405 F. App'x 296 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 15, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHERYL EMILY GRAVES and DON
GRAVES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants, Nos. 10-6011, 10-6094
v. (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-00035-F)
(W.D. Okla.)
MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
In this products liability case, plaintiffs Cheryl and Don Graves ask us to
reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mazda Motor
Corporation. This we cannot do. The only evidence the Graves presented to
establish liability came from their proffered expert. The district court, however,
excluded that expert on Daubert grounds, and its decision to do so, we conclude,
did not amount to an abuse of discretion. So it is we must affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
This case arises out of a trip Mrs. Graves took to Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
Upon arriving at the Hattiesburg airport, she picked up her rental car — a Mazda6
with an automatic transmission. At the end of her stay in Mississippi and while
en route to the airport to depart for home, Mrs. Graves got lost and pulled over at
a private home to ask for directions. When exiting the car, Mrs. Graves left the
engine running but thought she had placed the car’s shifter in “park.” As it turns
out, the gear shifter was in “reverse” and, when she stepped out, the car rolled
backwards, knocked her to the ground, and ran her over.
Bringing this diversity lawsuit, Mrs. Graves and her husband sought
damages from Mazda for the injuries she suffered, alleging that the company’s
gear shifter was defectively designed. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs
offered expert testimony from Stephen Syson, a human factors engineer. The
district court, however, excluded Mr. Syson’s testimony as unreliable and then,
given the absence of any other probative evidence of liability and applying
Mississippi’s products liability law, granted summary judgment in favor of
Mazda. As the prevailing party, Mazda later sought to recoup its taxable costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. Ultimately, the district
court awarded Mazda $8,737.98 — slightly over half of what the company had
sought. On appeal, the plaintiffs seek to undo both the district court’s summary
judgment decision and its cost award.
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II
We first consider the summary judgment question. In their own approach
to that question, the parties spend most of their time debating whether the district
court should have applied Oklahoma’s products liability law (as the plaintiffs
contend) or Mississippi’s (as the district court did and Mazda prefers). But the
only essential difference between the two laws is that the latter requires a
products liability plaintiff to proffer a feasible alternative design to the
purportedly defective one. Compare Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974) (requiring proof that product had a “defect” and that the
defect made it “unreasonably dangerous” to the consumer), with Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-1-63 (requiring proof of an “unreasonably dangerous” defect and a “feasible
design alternative that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the
harm”). And that single elemental difference doesn’t affect the outcome of this
case.
That’s because, as the district court noted, the plaintiffs’ case founders on
an element common to both Oklahoma and Mississippi law — one requiring any
products liability plaintiff to identify an unreasonably dangerous design defect.
See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363; Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63. To survive summary
judgment under either state’s law, then, Mr. and Mrs. Graves had to come forward
with evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that
Mazda’s gear shift design was defective and unreasonably dangerous. See Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 56. The only evidence Mr. and Mrs. Graves proffered on this score came
from Mr. Syson and, after the district court excluded that evidence, the plaintiffs
were left without any evidence to stave off summary judgment. Thus, this appeal
really hinges on the propriety of the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Syson.
We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th
Cir. 1999). Of necessity, this standard of review “implies [that] a degree of
discretion [is] invested ” in the district judge to issue a decision “based upon what
is fair in the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law.” Valley
Forge Ins. Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, we may reverse the district
court only if its discretionary decision fell beyond the “bounds of the rationally
available choices [before it] given the facts and the applicable law in the case at
hand. ” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The boundaries of the rationally available choices available to a district
court in this field are well marked. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 indicates that a
district court should allow an expert to testify if “(1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In assessing whether an expert’s
opinion is reliable enough to be admitted, a district court may consider whether
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(1) the opinion at issue can be and has been tested, (2) the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) there is a known or potential
rate of error, and (4) the technique has general acceptance in the relevant
discipline. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
While these Daubert factors aren’t meant as a one-size-fits-all test to be applied
rotely to all experts, and while the district court enjoys much discretion in how it
goes about assessing the reliability of an expert’s proffered testimony, the central
objective of the district court in any Daubert inquiry is and must be to ensure that
any expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42, 152 (1999). Thus, to discharge its
Daubert gatekeeping responsibility, the district court must take enough steps to
confirm that it has “assess[ed] the reasoning and methodology underlying the
expert’s opinion,” Milne v. USA Cycling, Inc., 575 F.3d 1120, 1134 (10th Cir.
2009) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1123 (10th Cir.
2006)), and “determine[d] whether it is scientifically valid and applicable.”
Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th
Cir. 2000).
In ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of establishing
Mr. Syson’s reliability, the district court applied these principles in a sensible
way, and one with which we entirely agree. As the district court noted, Mr.
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Syson failed to provide any data or industry standard, or to conduct any testing, to
confirm his view that Mazda’s gear shift design was defective. Instead, Mr.
Syson’s proffered testimony merely described how the Mazda shifter works,
pointed out the multiple “detents” between “drive” and “park,” and noted that
each detent is larger than the diameter of the shift lever. From this, Mr. Syson
leaped directly to the conclusion that Mazda’s design fails to allow for “smooth”
shifting and so is defective and unreasonably dangerous. But without any
reference to data suggesting how “smoothly” an ordinary consumer would expect
a gear shift to move, without any confirming evidence indicating how Mazda’s
design might cause shifting troubles for ordinary drivers, without any reference to
how engineering standards might have counseled against Mazda’s gear shift
design, and without any other evidence suggesting its reliability, the district court
was right to exclude Mr. Syson’s testimony. Admittedly, as the plaintiffs point
out on appeal, Mr. Syson did provide a list of “safety systems analysis”
techniques that, he contended, Mazda should have used in assessing its design.
But even here, Mr. Syson failed to offer any evidence suggesting that Mazda
actually failed to use these techniques. And he failed to present any evidence
suggesting that these techniques, in any event, would have led Mazda to conclude
that it needed to pursue a different gear shift design.
In the end, then, while the district court and we appreciate and recognize
Mr. Syson’s credentials and don’t doubt the value someone in his field can bring
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to defective design cases, the evidence he proffered in this case rests on no more
than his say so — and that isn’t good enough to require its admission. “Nothing
in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence” based on only “the ipse dixit of the expert[,]” however
well qualified he may be. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157; see also Milne, 575 F.3d at
1134 (upholding exclusion of expert whose “conclusions about the safety
precautions that should have been taken are . . . mere speculation” and explaining
that “‘[i]t is axiomatic that an expert, no matter how good his credentials is not
permitted to speculate.’”) (quoting Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088).
To this, the plaintiffs reply by pointing to two district court opinions from
outside this circuit. These decisions, the plaintiffs say, suggest that testimony
from human factor engineers like Mr. Syson should be allowed without requiring
any external evidence suggesting the reliability of their testimony. See St. Pierre
v. Maingot, No. 1-2281, 2003 WL 25689900 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2003)
(unpublished); Michaels v. Mr. Heater, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 992 (W.D. Wis.
2006). It is difficult to tell, however, what the basis of the expert’s opinion was
in the unpublished St. Pierre case, and in Michaels the expert appears to have
referenced and relied on industry standards and methods, not just his own say so,
to support his proffered opinions. See Michaels, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 999. In this
way, Michaels illustrates that human factor engineering is a field in which theses
like Mr. Syson’s are susceptible to testing or can be based on industry standards
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and methods, a point made by other authorities as well. See, e.g., William D.
Bliss, Defective Product Design — Role of Human Factors, 18 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 2d 117, § 5 (noting that human factors engineers deal with “highly-specific,
data-related questions” such as: “How far from the seated operator can a control
switch be located and still be reached? How much seat adjustment must be
provided so that both the fifth percentile operator and the ninety-fifth percentile
operator can reach the operating controls?”).
Besides, we are bound not by extra-circuit district court decisions but by
our own precedent. And that precedent is clear and unequivocal that the ipse dixit
of an expert, no matter how qualified he may be, is never enough to guarantee
him a ticket to admissibility. Not only did we so hold in Milne, 575 F.3d at 1134,
and Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088, but we have so held for many years in many cases,
see e.g., Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1125-26 (expert report insufficient to allow
district court to “assess the reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s
opinion,” and “casual mention of a few scientific studies” was not enough)
(internal quotation omitted); Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1237-38
(10th Cir. 2001) (district court properly “excluded the evidence because [the
expert] had not based his conclusion on the results of tests or calculations specific
to [the plaintiff’s] accident”).
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Given that Mr. Syson’s testimony was properly excluded and no other
evidence suggesting that Mazda’s design was defective, we affirm the district
court’s summary judgment disposition.
III
That leaves us only with the plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s cost
award to Mazda of $8,737.98 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The plaintiffs charge
that most of the depositions Mazda took, and the costs the company incurred in
doing so, weren’t necessary. But the district court found otherwise. And the
district court possesses “broad discretion” in awarding costs which we will not
disturb unless that court “(1) commits legal error, (2) relies on clearly erroneous
factual findings, or (3) where no rational basis exists in the evidence to support
its ruling.” In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th
Cir. 2009).
No such reversible error exists here. The depositions in question were of
individuals who spoke to Mrs. Graves’s injuries immediately after the accident
and the condition of the car before and after the accident. Ronnie Woullard, for
example, was the owner of the home where Mrs. Graves’s accident took place.
Not only did he observe and talk to Mrs. Graves, Mr. Woullard also drove the
Mazda6 back onto his driveway and thus could well have had relevant
information regarding how the car operated and the presence of any defect.
Similarly, the first five emergency responders were in a good position to observe
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the immediate scene of the accident and Mrs. Graves’s injuries. The two family
members deposed, Linda Bland and DeAnna Brekke, were with Mrs. Graves
forty-eight hours prior to the incident and spoke to her shortly afterward. As the
district court concluded, it was eminently reasonable for Mazda to think this
information necessary for trial, relevant both to the question of damages and
whether the car was defective.
The plaintiffs’ complaint about the district court’s award of costs
associated with the copying of DVDs and CDs given to experts and counsel fails
for a similar reason. These items contained photographs of the scene, videos of
the vehicle inspection, and other investigatory documents obviously pertinent, as
the district court concluded, to the preparation for a trial. See Williams, 558 F.3d
at 1149 (noting that “the burden of justifying copy costs is not a high one”
(internal quotation omitted)). While the plaintiffs may be right that Mazda could
have avoided making copies for its experts and counsel by, for example,
uploading its digital files onto a centralized database, and while that method of
distributing information may some day become mandatory, our case law has not
yet prohibited prevailing parties from recovering costs incurred in employing
more traditional methods of copying and distributing material information. See
id. (“Nor do we think the fact documents are available in a central depository, as
Plaintiffs allege here, inexorably leads to the conclusion that copies made for an
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attorney’s use were not reasonably necessary to the litigation of the case”
(internal quotation omitted)).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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