Hambelton v. Canal Insurance Company , 405 F. App'x 321 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 16, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
DOUG HAMBELTON,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 10-6127
v. (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00208-F)
(W.D. Okla.)
CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Canal appeals the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Hambelton as
a prevailing party under Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3629(B). Reviewing the district
court’s legal conclusions regarding attorneys’ fees de novo, see West American
Insurance Co. v. AV&S, 145 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998), and the amount of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the award for abuse of discretion, see Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw &
Assocs., 616 F.3d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 2010), we affirm.
I
The facts of this case are set forth in Hambelton v. Canal Insurance Co.,
No. 10-6069 (10th Cir. 2010), also announced today, in which we affirmed the
district court’s judgment for Hambelton on his breach of contract and bad faith
claims.
II
In this case, Canal appeals only the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees.
It argues the court: (1) should have applied Missouri attorney fee law; (2)
incorrectly concluded that Hambelton submitted an adequate proof of loss under
Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3629; (3) incorrectly awarded attorneys’ fees because the
“core element” of Hambelton’s case was not the insured loss; and (4) awarded
unreasonable fees.
A
Canal argues that the district court should have applied Missouri attorney
fee law instead of Oklahoma law. But its attempt to create a conflict of laws
question fails: both Oklahoma and Missouri allow for awards of a reasonable
amount of attorneys’ fees where an insurer failed to pay a valid claim. “When
there is no conflict, the court applies the law of the forum.” Emp’rs Mut. Cas.
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Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1170 (10th Cir. 2010) (alterations
omitted).
B
Oklahoma’s statute authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees to prevailing
insureds provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the insurer, receiving a proof of loss, to submit
a written offer of settlement or rejection of the claim to the insured
within ninety (90) days of receipt of that proof of loss. Upon a
judgment rendered to either party, costs and attorney fees shall be
allowable to the prevailing party. For purposes of this section, the
prevailing party is the insurer in those cases where judgment does not
exceed written offer of settlement.
Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3629(B). Canal argues that Hambelton should not have been
awarded fees because he did not provide an adequate “proof of loss” to trigger
Canal’s duty to respond within ninety days. Absence of a formal “proof of loss,”
however, is not fatal to award of fees under the statute. See Stauth v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 236 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001). Any notice by
an insured provides the insurer sufficient proof of loss if the notice “serves the
ultimate purpose of affording the insurer knowledge that can be acted upon.”
Dixson Produce, LLC v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 99 P.3d 725, 729 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2004) (quotation omitted).
Canal’s policy required Hambelton to give notice of the loss and file “his
sworn proof of loss in such form and including such information as the company
may reasonably require.” Hambelton submitted his loss to his insurance agent,
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who in turn submitted an automobile loss notice to Canal’s general agent. From
that point, Canal investigated Hambelton’s claim without requesting additional
information or requiring the submission of a formal proof of loss.
Association of County Commissioners of Oklahoma v. National American
Insurance Co., 116 P.3d 206 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005), upon which Canal relies, is
readily distinguishable. In that case, an Oklahoma court denied attorneys’ fees
under § 3629(B) because the insured’s notice gave the insurer “no basis on which
to make a settlement offer or reject the claimed loss.” Assoc. of Cnty. Comm’rs
of Okla., 116 P.3d at 212. But it opined that an informal demand or loss notice
could have been sufficient to satisfy § 3629(B) because a “formal proof of loss
form” was not “part of the course of dealing” between the insurer and the insured.
Assoc. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Okla., 116 P.3d at 212. Hambelton did not provide a
formal proof of loss, but he did give Canal sufficient notice to be able to comply
with § 3629(B). Hambelton is not precluded by § 3629(B) from recovering
attorneys’ fees.
C
Pointing out that Hambelton’s breach-of-contract recovery constitutes a
fairly small proportion of the total damages the jury awarded him, Canal asserts
that Hambelton is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 3629(B) because tort
damages, not contract damages, are the “core element” of his case.
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Oklahoma law, however, is clear that recovering attorneys’ fees under
§ 3629(B) does not depend on the insured’s theory of liability, but on whether
“the recovery of the insured loss [is] the prevailing party’s core element of
reparations.” Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 981 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Okla.
1999). “Recovery authorized by § 3629(B) embraces both contract- and
tort-related theories of liability so long as the ‘core element’ of the damages
sought and awarded is composed of the insured loss.” Taylor, 981 P.2d at 1256.
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the “core element
principle” of Taylor precluded attorney fee awards under § 3629(B) in a case
which, “[r]ather than having as its core element the insured loss,” had as its
“primary focus and heart” the insured’s “attempt to recover uninsured financial
losses not covered by the policy of insurance and to recover damages for
embarrassment, and mental pain and suffering.” Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co.,
121 P.3d 1080, 1107 (Okla. 2005).
Unlike the plaintiff in Badillo, recovery under the policy was central to
Hambelton’s case. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that “the
insured loss was a core element of the damages sought and awarded,” even though
“the core turned out to be but a small part of the apple.”
D
Oklahoma requires that attorneys’ fees be “reasonable in light of the
amount sued for and recovered.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Parker Pest Control, Inc.,
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737 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Okla. 1987). Canal claims that Hambelton’s attorneys
failed to demonstrate the prevailing market rate or justify their time expenditure
and that the district court did not provide an adequate explanation of its fee
calculation. The record shows, however, that the district court reviewed the
billing statements of the attorneys, applied prevailing rates, disallowed some of
the attorneys’ listed hours, and reduced others by a general 15%. This is the very
kind of discretionary conclusion properly left to the trial court.
III
In his reply brief, Hambelton asks us to award him the fees he incurred
defending this appeal, citing Oklahoma law that allows such fees. But this appeal
is governed by Fed. R. App. P. 38, which requires this issue to be raised in a
separately filed motion. See, e.g., Peterson v. Saperstein, 267 F. App’x 751, 755
(10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). Because Hambelton has not yet filed such a
motion, we do not rule on the merits of his request.
IV
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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