United States v. Mendoza-Contreras ( 2023 )

Appellate Case: 22-5057 Document: 010110835310 Date Filed: 03/30/2023 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 30, 2023
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 22-5057
v. (D.C. No. 4:15-CR-00046-CVE-1)
(N.D. Okla.)
ERNESTO MENDOZA-CONTRERAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Ernesto Mendoza-Contreras, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
from the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Because Mr. Mendoza-Contreras has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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I. Background
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras pleaded guilty to a federal drug-conspiracy offense in
2015. The district court sentenced him to 156 months’ imprisonment. His projected
release date is July 16, 2026.
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on April 21, 2022, arguing that extraordinary and compelling
reasons warranted a reduction in his sentence to time served. He relied on the
following circumstances: prison conditions related to the spread of COVID-19 at
North Lake CI, his medical conditions that increase his risk of serious illness if he
becomes infected with COVID-19, and a need to care for family members with
serious health conditions. The government filed a response opposing the motion on
May 20, 2022, and the district court denied it on May 27.1
The district court reviewed Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s presentence report,
which states that he had reported that “he is in generally good health and taking
medication for high cholesterol and hypertension.” R., Vol. 3 at 80. At the time he
filed his motion, his prison medical records indicated that he took daily medication
for hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia and that he was not presently being treated
for obesity, bradycardia, or hypertension. He was in his late 40s at the time.
1
On May 31, 2022, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras moved for an extension of time to
file a reply. Because the district court had already ruled on his motion for
compassionate release, it denied his motion for an extension as moot. Unaware of
the district court’s denial of compassionate release, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras filed a
reply on June 9.
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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras was classified as “care level 2 – stable, chronic care, with
follow up care as needed.” Id. He received a COVID-19 vaccination in May 2021
and a COVID-19 booster in December 2021, as well as vaccinations against other
communicable diseases.
The district court also made findings regarding the conditions at
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s prison facility, noting it was “aware that, at North Lake
CI, . . . there are currently no COVID-19 positive inmates.” Id. at 81. The court
stated that “[t]his controlled infection rate suggests that the facility is complying with
the Bureau of Prison[s’] COVID-19 response plan, to include social distancing,
surface sanitation, and availability of the COVID-19 vaccine.” Id. Acknowledging
that the risk of infection is greater in an institutional setting, the court said the issue
was “the likelihood of life-threatening or serious chronic complications should an
inmate become infected.” Id. It stated it “must balance this risk against its
responsibility to uphold the reasons for imposition of an imprisonment sentence.” Id.
The district court concluded:
The record clearly reflects that defendant is not at undue risk. Although
defendant suffers from ailments that, according to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [CDC], may place him at a higher risk of severe
response to COVID-19, the Court finds that defendant is not in jeopardy of
serious complications should he contract the virus.
Id. In making this finding, the court pointed to Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s medical
history, his “comprehensive medical care,” the prescriptions he takes “to reduce risk
factors,” his vaccination status for COVID-19 and other communicable diseases, and
his “imprisonment at a low infection rate institution that is adhering to Bureau of
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Prisons’ COVID-19 abatement protocols.” Id. The district court therefore decided
that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s “medical conditions do not rise to the level of
extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a reduction of sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” Id.Addressing Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s contention that he is needed at home to
care for his chronically ill mother and adult daughter, the district court acknowledged
that the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement does not apply to
compassionate-release motions filed by defendants. It nonetheless noted that
although the current policy statement provides that certain family circumstances may
support a reduced sentence, it specifies the incapacitation of a defendant’s “‘spouse
or registered partner,’” rather than a parent or adult child. Id. at 82 (quoting USSG
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii)). The court found that “disruption of defendant’s life, and
the concomitant difficulties for those who depend on defendant, are inherent in the
punishment of incarceration,” stating that “[f]amily concerns resulting from a
defendant’s imprisonment are not ordinarily a factor to be considered at sentencing.”
Id. It decided that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s family concerns were not “a viable
reason for reduction of sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id.
The district court ultimately found that the factors Mr. Mendoza-Contreras
presented did not rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting
a reduction of his sentence.
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II. Discussion
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended in 2018 by the First Step Act, allows
defendants to move for compassionate release in the district court after exhausting
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) administrative remedies. See United States v. Maumau,
993 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2021). The district court may grant a motion when it
(1) “finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”;
(2) “finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) “considers the factors set forth in
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. at 831; see also
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). “[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when
any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking.” Maumau,
993 F.3d at 831 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court denied
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s compassionate-release motion because he did not satisfy
the first prerequisite: he failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons
warranting a sentence reduction.
A district court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes
“extraordinary and compelling reasons,” although that discretion is circumscribed by
the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. at 834
(internal quotation marks omitted). Currently, there is no policy statement applicable
to motions filed by defendants. Id. at 837. Rather, the Sentencing Commission’s
existing policy statement applies only to motions filed by the BOP; it therefore
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“cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are
extraordinary and compelling” when the motion is filed by a defendant. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate-release motion for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031
(10th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect
conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact[,]” id. (internal quotation
marks omitted), or “when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,” United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1277
(10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We liberally construe
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s pro se filings but we do not take on the role of being his
advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).2
B. Medical Conditions and Prison Conditions
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras challenges the district court’s conclusion that he
failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based upon his
medical conditions and the conditions at his prison facility, North Lake CI. He first
2
On appeal Mr. Mendoza-Contreras references arguments he made in his
reply, some of which he maintains the district court “ignored.” But he does not
expressly challenge the district court’s denial as moot of his motion for an extension
to file a reply. Local district court criminal rules do not provide for the filing of a
reply in support of a motion. See N.D.Okla.LCrR47. Moreover, we have reviewed
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s reply and we find no abuse of discretion or prejudice
resulting from the district court’s ruling on his compassionate-release motion before
the filing of a reply. See Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1994).
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contends the district court reached an “unsupported medical opinion” that he “is
receiving treatment for his underlying medical conditions and is responding to that
treatment.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 9. But his medical records show that he is taking
daily medication for hypothyroidism and hyperlipidemia and that his medical
condition is listed as stable, chronic care. Mr. Mendoza-Contreras argues that no
evidence or caselaw supports the district court’s “conclusion that as long as a person
is receiving treatment for any of the underlying medical conditions and risk factors
identified by the CDC, and is responding to that treatment, he is not in jeopardy of
serious complications should he contract the virus.” Id. at 10. He asserts that the
district court lacks authority to reject the CDC’s guidance by concluding that his
“underlying medical conditions do not place him at an increased risk of serious
illness or death if he is infected with COVID-19,” id., although he acknowledges that
“the district court did find that [his] ailments place him at a higher risk of severe
response to COVID-19,” id. at 11. Mr. Mendoza-Contreras appears to contend that
district courts lack discretion to deny compassionate release to any inmate who has
an underlying medical condition that increases his risk of severe illness from
COVID-19. We reject that proposition as inconsistent with the district court’s broad
discretion to determine what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 834 (“district courts . . . have the
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authority to determine for themselves what constitutes extraordinary and compelling
reasons” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, in finding that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras “is not at undue risk,”
R., Vol. 3 at 81, the district court did not rely solely on his medical treatment and
stable condition. It also cited his overall medical history, his vaccination status, and
the low infection rate at North Lake CI. He contends that COVID-19 vaccinations
and boosters are not 100% effective. But we have recognized that “access to
vaccination” may “weigh against a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.”
United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 939 n.5 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
2742 (2022); see id. at 936 n.2 (noting “a growing consensus that either receiving or
refusing COVID-19 vaccination weighs against a finding of extraordinary and
compelling circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And according to the
CDC, vaccination does lessen the potential for severe illness from COVID-19.3 The
scientific community has struggled in trying to fully and accurately assess the risks
from COVID-19. The decision by the district court in this case ultimately may prove
to be scientifically unsound. But in the present uncertain state of knowledge, we
cannot say that its assessment of the risk to Mr. Mendoza-Contreras was clearly
erroneous.
3
“COVID-19 vaccines help protect against severe illness, hospitalization, and
death. People who are up to date on COVID-19 vaccines are much less likely to
experience severe symptoms than people who are not up to date, if they get infected
with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.”
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/effectiveness/why-measure-
effectiveness/breakthrough-cases.html (last visited March 28, 2023).
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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras argues the district court’s finding regarding the lack
of positive COVID-19 cases at North Lake CI is clearly erroneous because the BOP
website the government cited for this fact does not list any statistics for that prison
facility. See R., Vol. 3 at 51 & n.3. He is correct that the BOP website currently
does not list that prison facility. See
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_statistics.html (last visited March 22,
2023). But he failed to provide any evidence that the website did not include the
relevant statistics as of May 17, 2022, when the government cited it. And his
assertion that “it is highly unlikely that North Lake CI is completely free from
infection,” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 16, does not demonstrate that the district court’s
factual finding is clearly erroneous. Nor did the district court ignore
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s arguments that North Lake CI’s design makes it impossible
to implement CDC guidelines and that the prison facility “completely mishandled the
COVID-19 pandemic,” id. The court found to the contrary that the “controlled
infection rate” at North Lake CI “suggests that the facility is complying with the
Bureau of Prison[s’] COVID-19 response plan.” R., Vol. 3 at 81.
Finally, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras cites an unpublished district-court decision
granting compassionate release to a prisoner housed at North Lake CI in 2020 based
on an underlying medical condition that increased his risk of serious illness from
COVID-19. We are not persuaded that this ruling demonstrates that the district court
abused its discretion by denying Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s motion under different
circumstances in 2022.
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Mr. Mendoza-Contreras fails to show that the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that his medical conditions and the conditions at North Lake
CI do not rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a
reduction in his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
C. Need to Care for Ailing Family Members
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras also challenges the district court’s conclusion that his
asserted need to care for his elderly mother and adult daughter, both of whom have
serious health conditions, does not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting his release. He first argues the district court made a clearly erroneous
factual finding in stating that he cited the policy statement in USSG § 1B1.13 cmt.
n.1(C)(ii) in support of his motion for compassionate release. The district court did
misstate that Mr. Mendoza-Contreras, rather than the government, had cited that
policy statement. See R., Vol. 3 at 82 (stating “Defendant cites” the policy
statement); id. at 52 (government’s brief citing the policy statement). But regardless
of which party cited the policy statement, the question is whether the district court
abused its discretion by considering it.
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras correctly notes that the existing policy statement
regarding compassionate release is not applicable to a motion, like his, filed by the
defendant. See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837. He also acknowledges that the district
court recognized it was not constrained by the existing policy statement. See R.,
Vol. 3 at 82 (district court stating that “the existing policy statements are not
applicable to motions filed directly by defendants”). Nonetheless, he argues that the
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district court improperly limited its discretion by denying his motion based upon
USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(C)(ii). This argument is unfounded. The district court did
note that the policy statement “specifies a spouse or registered partner, not a
defendant’s parent or adult child.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But there
is nothing to suggest that the district court considered itself bound by that policy
statement. And the court did not abuse its discretion by looking to it for guidance.
See Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4 (“[I]t would hardly be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to look to the present policy statement for guidance.”).
Finally, Mr. Mendoza-Contreras cites a district-court order granting a
prisoner’s motion for compassionate release based upon his need to care for his
elderly mother. See Order Granting Compassionate Release, United States v.
Galaz-Felix, No. 1:03-cr-00062-TC-4 (Apr. 5, 2022), ECF No. 879. But the granting
of that prisoner’s motion—which, unlike in this case, was not opposed by the
government, see id. at 1—does not demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in
denying Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s motion.
III. Conclusion
A district court has “substantial discretion” in determining whether to grant
compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4.
Mr. Mendoza-Contreras has not demonstrated any clearly erroneous factual finding
underlying the district court’s decision that affected its ruling. And we do not “have
a definite and firm conviction that the [district] court made a clear error of judgment
or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” United States v.
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Merritt, 961 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2020) (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Mendoza-Contreras’s
motion for compassionate release.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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