United States v. Ochoa-Olivas , 426 F. App'x 612 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 2, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-2250
(D.C. No. 2:10-CR-00049-WJ-1)
v. (D.N.M.)
MARIO OCHOA-OLIVAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, EBEL and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
On the morning trial was set to commence, Mario Ochoa-Olivas pled guilty to one
count of illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). Using the 2009
United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated an advisory guideline
imprisonment range of ninety-two to one hundred and fifteen months. Then, the district
court varied to impose a sentence below that range: eighty months’ imprisonment.
*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties= request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App.
P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Ochoa-Olivas now appeals, arguing that the district court clearly erred by not granting
him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under United States Sentencing
Guideline § 3E1.1. Ochoa-Olivas also argues that the sentence imposed by the district
court is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 27, 2009, U.S. border patrol agents encountered Ochoa-Olivas in
Luna County, New Mexico. Ochoa-Olivas admitted to the agents that he was a Mexican
citizen and that he had no immigration documents that permitted him to be in the United
States legally. Immigration records revealed that Ochoa-Olivas had been deported
previously on December 5, 1988, following a felony conviction for selling marijuana for
which he received eighty-four months’ imprisonment.
A grand jury indicted Ochoa-Olivas with one count of illegal reentry, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). A trial was scheduled to begin on May 3, 2010. On that
morning, the district court assembled the jury venire, but they were dismissed when
Ochoa-Olivas announced that he wanted to plead guilty. After that announcement, the
district court conducted a change-of-plea hearing, and Ochoa-Olivas pled guilty to the
one count charged against him.
In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence report
(PSR), in which she calculated an advisory guideline range of seventy-seven to ninety-six
months’ imprisonment, based on an offense level of twenty-two and a criminal history
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category of V. The probation officer calculated the offense level in the PSR as follows:
The base offense level was eight. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) (2009). Then, the probation
officer added a sixteen-level enhancement because Ochoa-Olivas was previously
deported after a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence
imposed exceeded thirteen months. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). Finally, the
probation officer applied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The probation officer noted that Ochoa-Olivas did not qualify for a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he “did not notify
authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty in a timely manner; thereby causing
the government to prepare for trial and the court to allocate resources.” (Aplt. App., vol.
II at 8.) Thus, the total offense level was twenty-two. The probation officer determined
that Ochoa-Olivas’s criminal history category was V, and Ochoa-Olivas does not
challenge that calculation on appeal.
The United States objected to the probation officer’s recommendation of a two-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The United States argued that it
expended resources in preparing for trial and in providing travel and lodging for
witnesses to attend the trial. Therefore, it argued that Ochoa-Olivas should not be
entitled to any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
The district court agreed and sustained the Government’s objection. It concluded
that “a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility is not appropriate because the
Defendant waited until the morning of trial to plead guilty.” (Aplt. App., vol. I at 35.)
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Therefore, the district court applied an offense level of twenty-four and a criminal history
category of V, which yields an advisory guideline imprisonment range of ninety-two to
one hundred and fifteen months. But at sentencing, the district court varied below that
range and imposed eighty months’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility
We review a district court’s determination not to grant a reduction for acceptance
of responsibility for clear error. United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1032 (10th
Cir. 2009). “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s
acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5 (2009). “For this reason, the
determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.” Id.
Ochoa-Olivas contends that the district court clearly erred because it should have
granted a two-level downward adjustment as he met the criteria for acceptance of
responsibility. The Government counters that the “timing of the decision to plead guilty
is important precisely because the adjustment was meant to expedite resolution of cases,
and thereby to prevent prosecutive and judicial resources from being expended
needlessly.” (Aple. B. at 9.) Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by denying
Ochoa-Olivas this downward adjustment.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err by refusing to grant the two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly allow the district court to consider
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the timeliness of a defendant’s guilty plea. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(h). We caution
that a late decision to plead guilty does not necessarily disqualify a defendant from
receiving a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. But a defendant who
pleads guilty does not necessarily qualify for a downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility either. See id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. It is up to the district court to determine
whether a defendant qualifies for this downward adjustment using the appropriate
considerations. In this case, the district court did just that, and therefore we cannot say
that the district court committed clear error.
B. Reasonableness of the Sentence
We review a district court’s sentence for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Smart,
518 F.3d 800, 802 (10th Cir. 2008).
1. Procedural Reasonableness
“Procedural reasonableness addresses whether the district court incorrectly
calculated or failed to calculate the Guidelines sentence, treated the Guidelines as
mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, relied on clearly erroneous facts, or
failed to adequately explain the sentence.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312,
1317 (10th Cir. 2008).
Ochoa-Olivas argues that the district court miscalculated the advisory guideline
imprisonment range because it failed to apply a two-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility. That argument lacks merit. We concluded that the district
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court did not clearly err by refusing to grant a two-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility, and we need not revisit our reasoning for that conclusion
here. The district court properly calculated both Ochoa-Olivas’s offense level and
criminal history category. Based on those calculations the district court correctly
concluded that the advisory guideline imprisonment range in this case was ninety-two to
one hundred and fifteen months. Therefore, the district court did not impose a
procedurally unreasonable sentence.
2. Substantive Reasonableness
“[S]ubstantive reasonableness addresses whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Huckins, 529 F.3d at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n
many cases there will be a range of possible outcomes the facts and law at issue can fairly
support; rather than pick and choose among them ourselves, we will defer to the district
court’s judgment so long as it falls within the realm of these rationally available choices.”
United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007). On appeal we presume
a sentence within the properly calculated guideline range to be substantively reasonable.
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). “The defendant may rebut
this presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the other
sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Id.
Ochoa-Olivas argues that “[d]ouble counting a single twenty-two year old
marijuana conviction is overly punitive and substantially over-represents Mr. Ochoa-
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Olivas’s criminal history because double-counting his prior marijuana conviction caused
both a 16-level enhancement to his offense level and a three-point addition in
determining his criminal-history category.” (Aplt. B. at 9.) The Sentencing Guidelines,
however, indicate that a conviction taken into account for the purposes of calculating a
defendant’s offense level “is not excluded from consideration of whether that conviction
receives criminal history points.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.6. And this Court previously
held that “double counting” of a conviction to calculate both the offense level and the
criminal history category is permissible. United States v. Ruiz-Terraza, 477 F.3d 1196,
1204 (10th Cir. 2007). We are bound by that precedent and cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion by following that precedent. Thus, the district court did not
impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Ochoa-Olivas’s sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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