Burnett v. Fallin ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     October 22, 2018
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    STEPHEN CRAIG BURNETT,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                       No. 17-6141
    (D.C. No. 5:17-CV-00392-M)
    MARY FALLIN, Governor of Oklahoma,                      (W.D. Okla.)
    in her official capacity, and in her
    individual capacity; PATRICIA HIGH, in
    her individual capacity; ROBERT MACY,
    member of the Pardon and Parole Board, in
    his official capacity, and in his individual
    capacity; THOMAS C. GILLERT, member
    of the Pardon and Parole Board, in his
    official capacity, and in his individual
    capacity; WILLIAM LATIMER, in his
    individual capacity; VANESSA PRICE, in
    her individual capacity; ERIKA DENTON,
    Parole Investigator for Pardon and Parole
    Board, in her official capacity, and in her
    individual capacity C. ALLEN McCALL,
    member of the Pardon and Parole Board, in
    his official capacity; MICHAEL STEELE,
    member of the Pardon and Parole Board, in
    his official capacity; ROBERTA
    FULLERTON, member of the Pardon and
    Parole Board, in her official capacity, ∗
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ∗
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), C. Allen McCall,
    Michael Steele, and Roberta Fullerton, current members of the Oklahoma Pardon and
    Parole Board, are automatically substituted for Patricia High, William Latimer, and
    Vanessa Price in their official capacities as former members of the Oklahoma Pardon
    and Parole Board.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
    _________________________________
    Before BRISCOE, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Stephen Craig Burnett is an Oklahoma prisoner serving a sentence of life with
    the possibility of parole. Mr. Burnett filed a complaint under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    ,
    asserting that changes in Oklahoma’s parole process violated his rights under the Due
    Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Eighth Amendment. The district
    court dismissed Mr. Burnett’s complaint based on a failure to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted and as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994).
    On appeal, Mr. Burnett argues he pleaded sufficient facts to allow the inference that,
    for all intents and purposes, changes in the parole process converted his sentence of
    life with the possibility of parole into a sentence of life without the possibility of
    parole. Mr. Burnett further argues the relief requested in his complaint did not
    include speedier release, thus placing his claims outside the contours of the Heck-bar.
    We conclude Mr. Burnett’s complaint fails to allege facts capable of
    supporting a due process, ex post facto, or Eighth Amendment claim. And because
    Mr. Burnett’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we
    affirm the district court’s judgment without deciding whether Heck bars any of
    Mr. Burnett’s claims.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
    of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
    its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
    Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
    2
    I.     BACKGROUND
    A.   Mr. Burnett’s Imprisonment & the Oklahoma Parole System
    In 1994, Mr. Burnett pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and automobile
    larceny charges. The charges stemmed from Mr. Burnett shooting his wife after he
    learned she was having an affair, placing her body in the trunk of a car, driving the
    car to Texas, and fleeing to the Philippines. In accord with the terms of the plea
    agreement, Mr. Burnett received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole on
    the first-degree murder conviction. 1
    Oklahoma’s parole system is two tiered, with the Pardon and Parole Board
    (“Parole Board”) acting as an initial gatekeeper and the Governor having the ultimate
    authority and responsibility for granting or denying parole relative to those inmates
    for whom the Parole Board issues a favorable recommendation. See 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.16
    . At the time of Mr. Burnett’s offense, the statute establishing parole
    criteria stated, in pertinent part:
    [I]t shall be the duty of the Pardon and Parole Board to cause an
    examination to be made at the penal institution where the person is
    assigned, and to make inquiry into the conduct and the record of the said
    person during his custody in the Department of Corrections, which shall
    be considered as a basis for consideration of said person for
    recommendation to the Governor for parole.
    
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (A) (West 1993). With the exception of prospective
    parolees “convicted of three or more felonies arising out of separate and distinct
    1
    Mr. Burnett received a fifteen-year sentence on the automobile larceny
    conviction, to run consecutively with his sentence on the first-degree murder
    conviction.
    3
    transactions, with three or more incarcerations for such felonies,” the then-governing
    statute was silent as to whether the Parole Board should consider an individual’s
    offense of conviction or criminal history. See 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
     (West 1993).
    As Mr. Burnett committed his offense before July 1, 1998, he became eligible
    for consideration for parole upon the completion of one-third of his sentence. See
    
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (A) (West 2004). Where a defendant is serving a life
    sentence, his sentence is treated as a forty-five-year sentence for purposes of the one-
    third requirement in title 57, section 332.7(A) of the Oklahoma Statutes. See
    Anderson v. State, 
    130 P.3d 273
    , 282 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Okla. Pardon &
    Parole Bd. Policy 004 I.A.3.a.). Thus, the Parole Board deemed Mr. Burnett first
    eligible for parole on his life sentence in 2010. 2 Lisa Reading, a parole investigator,
    drafted a report to the Parole Board that detailed Mr. Burnett’s offense conduct, his
    prison disciplinary record, and his work history. Although Ms. Reading assigned Mr.
    Burnett a “[r]isk score: 1 (Low),” she recommended denying parole based on Mr.
    Burnett’s history of prison misconduct reports. Suppl. ROA at 15. The Parole Board
    adopted the recommendation and denied parole.
    The Parole Board next considered Mr. Burnett for parole in 2013. 3 Erika
    2
    A grant of parole on the life sentence would not have resulted in Mr.
    Burnett’s release; rather, it would have permitted Mr. Burnett to commence service
    on his fifteen-year automobile larceny sentence. See 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (H).
    3
    Subsequent to Mr. Burnett’s offense, the frequency of parole hearings
    changed. Prior to Mr. Burnett’s offense, reconsideration of parole occurred “one year
    from the month of denial, unless directed otherwise by majority vote” with the parole
    board having the authority to “set off reconsideration for a maximum of five years.”
    4
    Denton 4 served as the parole investigator and submitted a report to the Parole Board
    in October 2013. Like the 2010 report, the October 2013 report detailed the facts of
    Mr. Burnett’s offense; outlined Mr. Burnett’s prison disciplinary record, work
    performance in prison, and participation in prison programs; and provided a risk
    assessment. Ms. Denton assigned Mr. Burnett a total risk score of negative 2 and an
    overall risk level of low. Focusing on his recent conduct in prison, Ms. Denton
    recommended parole, stating: “Yes. Parole to the [consecutive sentence] case is
    recommended. Offender has spent 20 years of this sentence and has maintained clear
    conduct for over 3 years. When he was able to work his evaluations were excellent to
    outstanding.” Suppl. ROA at 19; ROA at 12.
    In November 2013, new criteria governing parole took effect. The new criteria
    require the Parole Board to “consider the prior criminal record of inmates under
    consideration for parole recommendation or granting of parole.” 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (I). In December 2013, the Parole Board rejected the favorable
    recommendation in the October 2013 report and denied parole without explanation.
    The Parole Board next considered Mr. Burnett for parole in 2016, with Ms. Denton
    again serving as the parole investigator. Like the previous reports, the 2016 report
    Henderson v. Scott, 
    260 F.3d 1213
    , 1214 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Okla. Pardon
    & Parole Bd., Policy & Procedures Manual, Policy 004(I)(B)(1)(a)). A 1999 statutory
    amendment, however, now precludes reconsideration of parole for at least three years
    from a denial of parole for any person convicted of a violent crime. 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (D)(1) (West 1999). This three-year limitation on the reconsideration of a
    denial of parole remains in effect. 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (D)(1).
    4
    At the time of her October 2013 report, Ms. Denton was Ms. Dunigan.
    5
    detailed the facts of Mr. Burnett’s offense and summarized his prison disciplinary
    record, work performance in prison, and participation in prison programs. Unlike the
    previous reports, however, the 2016 report did not include a risk assessment. And,
    also unlike the previous reports, the recommendation in the 2016 report focused on
    the nature of Mr. Burnett’s offense, not his conduct in prison. Specifically, in
    recommending against parole, Ms. Denton wrote: “No, parole is not recommended
    due to the heinous nature of the crime. Offender not only killed his wife, but put her
    body in the trunk of a car not to be found for days. After the murder, he fled the
    country in hopes of never being caught.” Suppl. ROA at 22; ROA at 12. The Parole
    Board denied parole, again without providing an explanation. Mr. Burnett’s next
    opportunity for parole consideration is scheduled for December 2019.
    B.     Mr. Burnett’s Complaint
    Following the 2016 denial of parole, Mr. Burnett filed a three-count complaint
    pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . Mr. Burnett named Governor Mary Fallin, the five
    members of the Parole Board, and Ms. Denton as defendants. 5 In count one, Mr.
    Burnett raised a procedural and substantive due process claim, alleging the changes
    in the statutory scheme governing the parole process converted his sentence of life
    with the possibility of parole into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
    5
    Mr. Burnett named all defendants in both their individual and official
    capacities.
    6
    and violated the terms of his plea agreement. 6 In count two, Mr. Burnett raised an Ex
    Post Facto Clause challenge to the retroactive application of parole procedures
    adopted after he committed his offense, focusing on an as applied challenge rather
    than a facial challenge. In count three, Mr. Burnett raised an Eighth Amendment
    claim, alleging the denial of parole had a “devastating affect [sic] on his mental state
    of mind” and caused him to suffer depression, severe headaches, loss of sleep, and
    stomach pain. 7 ROA at 16–17. Mr. Burnett sought money damages, declaratory relief
    in the form of an order stating that application of the new parole procedures violated
    his constitutional rights, and injunctive relief requiring the Parole Board to apply the
    1993 procedures at future parole hearings. Mr. Burnett, however, specifically
    disclaimed any attempt to obtain an order from the federal court granting him
    clemency, parole, or release from prison.
    C.     Dismissal of Complaint & Arguments on Appeal
    6
    Although the allegations in support of this claim focused primarily on the
    requirement that the Parole Board must now consider his offense of conviction and
    offense conduct, Mr. Burnett identified seven other changes in the parole process: (1)
    he is no longer permitted to personally appear before the Parole Board; (2) he no
    longer can be transferred to a lower security prison facility; (3) victims are permitted
    to object to parole; (4) he has to prove that he has a job and a place to live upon
    release; (5) the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) no longer maintains
    records on inmate accomplishments; (6) the ODOC no longer conducts a “risk
    assessment” as part of the parole investigation report; and (7) parole hearings occur
    less frequently.
    7
    In the alternative, Mr. Burnett indicated the allegations in count three raised a
    state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    7
    A magistrate judge screened Mr. Burnett’s complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e), 1915A and recommended dismissing all three claims and assigning Mr.
    Burnett a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Relative to the
    issues argued on appeal, the magistrate judge concluded: (1) Heck barred Mr. Burnett
    from recovering money damages on his due process claim; (2) Mr. Burnett failed to
    state a due process claim because there is no Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
    in parole; (3) Mr. Burnett failed to state an ex post facto claim because any increase
    in punishment from the changes in the parole process was “speculative” and
    “attenuated”; and (4) Mr. Burnett failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because
    his allegations were “amorphous” and did not allege a significant risk of harm to
    personal safety. 8 Over Mr. Burnett’s objections, the district court adopted the report
    and recommendations, dismissed Mr. Burnett’s action, and assigned Mr. Burnett a
    strike under the PLRA.
    Through a pro se opening brief, Mr. Burnett challenged the dismissal of each
    of his three claims for relief, as well as the assignment of a strike under the PLRA.
    This court appointed Mr. Burnett counsel. Through counsel, Mr. Burnett argued his
    8
    The magistrate judge also faulted Mr. Burnett for not producing “evidence”
    in support of his ex post facto claim. ROA at 34–36. As the case was only at the
    pleadings stage, Mr. Burnett did not have an opportunity to present evidence, and the
    magistrate judge’s statement on this point was clearly erroneous. Furthermore,
    although Mr. Burnett objected to the magistrate judge’s conclusion on this point, the
    district court did not address this objection and adopted the magistrate judge’s report
    and recommendation without modification and without considering any of Mr.
    Burnett’s other objections. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
     (“A judge of the court shall make a
    de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
    or recommendations to which objection is made.”).
    8
    claims were not barred by Heck and his complaint alleged sufficient facts to advance
    a due process claim and an ex post facto claim. On the sufficiency of the pleadings
    issue, Mr. Burnett argues he has a due process interest in the state abiding by the plea
    agreement and that the changes in the parole process amount to a breach of the plea
    agreement. In response, Appellees (1) argue the plea agreement did not contain a
    promise of a fixed set of parole criteria, only an opportunity to be considered for
    discretionary parole; and (2) repeat the magistrate judge’s conclusion that a prisoner
    does not have a liberty interest in the parole process. Turning to the ex post facto
    claim, Mr. Burnett argues factual development through discovery might result in
    evidence showing that, as applied, the new parole process presents a significant risk
    of increasing the duration of his imprisonment. In response, Appellees argue Mr.
    Burnett cannot show a significant risk of an increased duration of incarceration under
    the new parole process because (1) nothing prevented the Parole Board from
    considering his criminal history under the 1993 statute; (2) a favorable
    recommendation by the Parole Board does not mean Mr. Burnett would be paroled as
    the governor might reject the recommendation; and (3) Mr. Burnett’s complaint
    contains allegations that defeat his claim, in that he alleges the governor would reject
    any favorable recommendation by the Parole Board regardless of the criteria it used.
    II.     DISCUSSION
    A.         Standard of Review
    “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain ‘a
    short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
    9
    Khalik v. United Air Lines, 
    671 F.3d 1188
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2012). “Dismissal for
    failure to state a claim is a legal question we review de novo.” Young v. Davis, 
    554 F.3d 1254
    , 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). This remains the case where the dismissal is the
    result of a district court screening a complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e), 1915A rather than a dismissal following a Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) motion. See 
    id.
     (discussing standard of review in context of
    §§ 1915(e), 1915A dismissal). When reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings for
    purposes of Rule 8(a), “[w]e must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the
    complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
    Id. (quotation marks omitted). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain enough
    allegations of fact . . . ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Khalik,
    671 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)).
    Finally, “we must construe a pro se appellant’s complaint liberally” and “[d]ismissal
    of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious
    that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to
    give him an opportunity to amend.” Kay v. Bemis, 
    500 F.3d 1214
    , 1217, 1218 (10th
    Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
    B.      Due Process Clause Claim
    Mr. Burnett’s complaint can be liberally construed as raising two claims under
    the Due Process Clause: (1) he has a standalone due process right with respect to the
    procedures used at his parole hearings and (2) his due process rights were violated
    10
    because application of the new parole procedures breaches his plea agreement. 9 We
    consider each potential claim in turn. Concluding that neither set of allegations states
    a plausible violation of the Due Process Clause, we affirm the district court’s
    dismissal of count one of Mr. Burnett’s complaint.
    1. Changes in Parole Process
    The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part,
    “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
    process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “‘To determine whether due process
    requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the “weight” but to the
    nature of the interest at stake.’” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
    Complex, 
    442 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1978) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 570–71
    (1972)). In accord with the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[t]he Due
    Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty or
    property.” Malek v. Haun, 
    26 F.3d 1013
    , 1015 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Greenholtz,
    442 U.S. at 7). “A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of
    guarantees implicitly in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation or
    interest created by state laws or policies.” Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 
    582 F.3d 1208
    , 1212 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 
    545 U.S. 209
    , 221 (2005)).
    9
    Although Mr. Burnett’s counsel focuses exclusively on the latter of these two
    Due Process Clause arguments, Mr. Burnett raised the former argument in his pro se
    opening brief. See Pro Se Opening Br. at 7 (“While actually being paroled is
    discretionary, prisoners do have a legal right to be considered for parole, and via a
    scheme that does not violate procedural and/or substantive due process.”). Because
    counsel’s brief is a supplemental opening brief, arguments raised in Mr. Burnett’s pro
    se brief are properly before us.
    11
    “The extent of the due process protection for prisoners . . . is significantly less than
    that guaranteed to free persons.” 
    Id.
    The question of whether a prisoner has a liberty interest in parole is well-
    settled, with courts concluding that a liberty interest generally does not arise. See
    Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
    person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence . . . .
    [T]he conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty
    right. . . .”); id. (“[T]here simply is no constitutional guarantee that all executive
    decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free determinations.”);
    Straley, 
    582 F.3d at 1214
     (“[T]he mere existence of a purely discretionary parole
    authority creates no entitlement and, therefore, no concomitant federal due process
    interest.”); Malek, 
    26 F.3d at 1015
     (“Not only is there no constitutional or inherent
    right to receive parole prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, but, absent state
    standards for the granting of parole, decisions of a parole board do not automatically
    invoke due process protections.” (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7–8)). An exception
    to this general rule against the existence of a liberty interest exists where a state’s
    parole statute “sufficiently limits the discretion of a parole board” such that “a
    prisoner has a legitimate claim of entitlement to [parole].” Straley, 
    582 F.3d at
    1212–
    13. A recognized example of such an exception is when a state statute makes parole
    mandatory rather than discretionary. See 
    id. at 1213
    .
    Here, the 1993 version of title 57, section 332.7 of the Oklahoma Statutes
    established a discretionary parole scheme that did not sufficiently limit the Parole
    12
    Board’s discretion so as to convey upon Mr. Burnett a liberty interest in parole.
    Although the 1993 version of § 332.7 required the Parole Board to consider the
    prospective parolee’s conduct in prison, this consideration was “a basis for
    consideration of said person for recommendation to the Governor for parole.” 
    Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7
    (A) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Based on our construction of
    § 332.7, implicit in the emphasized language was the Parole Board’s ability to, as an
    individual case might warrant, consider other relevant factors. Furthermore, the 1993
    version of § 332.7 placed no limitations on the governor’s exercise of her authority to
    grant or deny parole. Accordingly, where the governing state statute placed no
    meaningful limitations on the Parole Board’s or the governor’s discretion to deny
    parole, Mr. Burnett cannot establish a “legitimate claim of entitlement to [parole],”
    see Straley, 
    582 F.3d at 1213
     (emphasis added), and cannot state a due process claim
    based solely and independently on the changes in the parole process.
    2. Breach of Plea Agreement
    “Interpreting the terms of a plea bargain involves a two-step process. The court
    must first examine the nature of the prosecutor’s promise. Next, the court examines
    this promise based upon the defendant’s reasonable understanding upon entry of the
    guilty plea.” Cunningham v. Diesslin, 
    92 F.3d 1054
    , 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation
    omitted). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of
    the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,
    such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262 (1971).
    “If the government breaches express or implied terms of a plea agreement, a violation
    13
    of due process occurs.” Gibson v. Klinger, 
    232 F.3d 799
    , 803 (10th Cir. 2000)
    (quoting United States v. Martin, 
    25 F.3d 211
    , 217 (4th Cir. 1994)).
    Mr. Burnett’s allegations on this matter boil down to three contentions: (1) he
    entered into a plea for a sentence of life with the possibility of parole; (2) it was his
    understanding, based on the advice of plea counsel, that he would not spend the rest
    of his life in prison; and (3) the changes in parole process greatly diminish his
    prospects for parole such that his sentence is effectively a life without parole
    sentence. For three reasons, Mr. Burnett’s allegations fail to state a plausible due
    process claim based on a breach of his plea agreement.
    First, Mr. Burnett fails to allege his plea agreement promised him a fixed set of
    parole criteria. In this respect, Mr. Burnett’s complaint suffers from the same
    deficiency from which the breach-of-plea claim in Cunningham suffered. There, Mr.
    Cunningham alleged the state breached his plea agreement when the parole board
    reinterpreted state statutes governing parole so as to render parole in his case
    discretionary rather than mandatory. Cunningham, 
    92 F.3d at
    1056–57. As a result,
    rather than automatically being paroled after eight-and-a-half years’ imprisonment,
    Mr. Cunningham gained only parole eligibility and faced the possibility of having to
    serve his full seventeen-year term. See 
    id.
     Although recognizing the gravity of the
    change from mandatory to discretionary parole relative to the execution of
    Mr. Cunningham’s term of imprisonment, this court concluded the state did not
    breach the plea agreement because “mandatory parole was not a part of the plea offer
    [and] [Mr.] Cunningham does not now allege to the contrary.” 
    Id. at 1059
    ; see also
    14
    Lustagarden v. Gunter, 
    966 F.2d 552
    , 554–55 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, Mr. Burnett
    does not allege his plea agreement contained a provision that explicitly promised him
    a fixed set of parole procedures and criteria. And, as this court in Cunningham did
    not read the then-in-effect mandatory parole scheme into Mr. Cunningham’s plea
    agreement despite the grave effect of the change on Mr. Cunningham’s ability to
    obtain parole, we see no reason to read a fixed parole process into Mr. Burnett’s plea
    agreement where the change may have no impact on Mr. Burnett’s ability to obtain
    parole. Thus, any post-plea amendment to § 332.7 did not violate a term of Mr.
    Burnett’s plea agreement.
    Second, in explicitly conceding the discretionary nature of parole in Oklahoma
    and the governor’s crucial role in both appointing members to the Parole Board and
    reviewing any favorable parole recommendations, Mr. Burnett implicitly concedes it
    was foreseeable at the time of his plea that the views of key individuals in the parole
    process might change. Cf. Garner v. Jones, 
    529 U.S. 244
    , 253 (2000) (“[W]e can say
    with some assurance that where parole is concerned[,] discretion, by its very
    definition, is subject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and then
    exercised. The idea of discretion is that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to
    change and adapt based on experience.”). As such, in the absence of the plea
    agreement directly speaking in favor of a fixed parole process, Mr. Burnett cannot
    plausibly allege that he reasonably understood the plea agreement to contain a
    promise of a fixed parole process.
    15
    Third, while Mr. Burnett challenges the applicability of the requirement in
    § 332.7(I) that the Parole Board must consider his offense of conviction, nothing in
    the regulations at the time of plea agreement precluded the Parole Board from
    considering this information. Tellingly, the pre-amendment form of § 332.7(A)
    instructed the Parole Board to examine the prisoner’s conduct during confinement “as
    a basis for consideration,” thereby anticipating that the Parole Board would also
    assess other relevant factors. In fact, although § 332.7(I) did not take effect until
    November 2013, the 2010 and October 2013 parole investigations reports placed
    information about the offense of conviction, as well as Mr. Burnett’s offense
    conduct, in front of the Parole Board. And, where this information was before the
    Parole Board prior to § 332.7(I) taking effect, the Parole Board was aware of and
    able to consider Mr. Burnett’s offense of conviction and offense conduct. Thus, even
    assuming Mr. Burnett believed, when entering his plea agreement, that the parole
    process would remain generally unchanged, it is not apparent from his allegations
    that the addition of § 332.7(I) significantly alters the parole process. This is
    particularly true when considered in light of (1) the consistent practice of informing
    the Parole Board of the offense of conviction and the offense conduct; and (2) the
    two-tiered parole system in Oklahoma, which has never placed limitations on the
    governor’s authority and discretion to approve or deny a favorable recommendation
    by the Parole Board.
    Accordingly, because Mr. Burnett does not allege that his plea agreement
    included an express provision guaranteeing him a fixed set of parole criteria, because
    16
    parole was always discretionary in Oklahoma, and because § 332.7(I) and the other
    changes identified in Mr. Burnett’s complaint do not significantly alter the parole
    process, Mr. Burnett fails to allege a plausible due process claim based on an alleged
    breach of his plea agreement.
    C.     Ex Post Facto Clause Claim
    1. Governing Law
    Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution “forbids . . . the States to
    enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at
    the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then
    prescribed.’” Weaver v. Graham, 
    450 U.S. 24
    , 28 (1981) (emphasis added) (quoting
    Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325–26 (1867)). “[T]wo critical
    elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be
    retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it
    must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” 
    Id. at 29
     (citations omitted). Relative
    to the second part of the analysis, “the question of what legislative adjustments ‘will
    be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the [ex post facto] prohibition’ must
    be a matter of ‘degree.’” Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 
    514 U.S. 499
    , 509 (1995)
    (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 
    269 U.S. 167
    , 171 (1925)). A change in law producing only
    “the most speculative and attenuated possibility” of increasing the length of
    punishment does not violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws. 
    Id.
     Instead, the
    change in law must “produce[] a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of
    punishment.” 
    Id.
     The Supreme Court, however, has affirmatively recognized that
    17
    “[r]etroactive changes in laws governing parole of prisoners, in some instances, may
    be violative of [the ex post facto] precept.” Garner, 
    529 U.S. at 250
    .
    A plaintiff may raise either a facial or an as applied challenge under the Ex
    Post Facto Clause. See 
    id. at 255
     (“When the rule does not by its own terms show a
    significant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s
    practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its
    retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the
    earlier rule.”). “Whether a particular law retroactively increases a criminal
    punishment is often a close question” because whether the risk of increased
    punishment rises to the level of a significant risk, rather than only a speculative and
    attenuated risk, often involves a fact-specific inquiry. Lynce v. Mathis, 
    519 U.S. 433
    ,
    450 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
    Garner, 
    529 U.S. at 250
     (“Whether retroactive application of a particular change in
    parole law respects the prohibition on ex post facto legislation is often a question of
    particular difficulty when the discretion vested in a parole board is taken into
    account.”). To answer this close question, a court should consider “the general
    operation of the . . . parole system.” Garner, 
    529 U.S. at 255
    .
    2. Analysis
    a. Retrospective application
    Mr. Burnett pleaded sufficient facts to satisfy the first element of an ex post
    facto claim. Simply put, the adoption of § 332.7(I) occurred after Mr. Burnett
    committed his offense (and after he pleaded guilty), yet the provision applies to his
    18
    parole consideration. Thus, whether Mr. Burnett pleaded sufficient facts to advance
    an ex post facto claim rises and falls on the second element of that claim.
    b. Sufficient risk of increased punishment
    In his complaint, Mr. Burnett alleged the change in criteria had a clear impact
    on the recommendation in Ms. Denton’s 2016 parole investigation report in that she
    recommended parole prior to the adoption of § 332.7(I) but recommended against
    parole after its adoption. Mr. Burnett further alleged the change in criteria resulted in
    ODOC and the parole investigator no longer including a risk assessment in the report
    to the Parole Board, an assessment favorable to his parole prospects. And a liberal
    construction of Mr. Burnett’s complaint might allow for the inference that, prior to
    the 2013 amendment to § 332.7, the Parole Board’s primary focus in denying or
    recommending parole was on an inmate’s conduct in prison.
    The aforementioned allegations might be sufficient to plead a sufficient risk of
    increased punishment if the Parole Board possessed final authority to grant parole.
    As discussed above, however, Oklahoma’s parole system is two-tiered, with the
    governor having ultimate discretionary authority over whether Mr. Burnett is granted
    parole. And Mr. Burnett’s complaint does not include any allegation that the
    likelihood of the governor granting parole changed as a result of the adoption of
    § 332.7(I) or any other change in the parole procedures.
    To the contrary, Mr. Burnett alleged Governor Fallin “championed a ‘tough on
    crime’ agenda”; “made it clear in public media that she will not sign parole approval
    for any violent offender”; and “appointed members [to] the [Parole] Board who are
    19
    all either former law enforcement officers or a Judge,” all with the goal of limiting
    the prospects of an inmate obtaining parole. ROA at 11. As Governor Fallin
    possesses ultimate discretion to grant or deny parole following a favorable
    recommendation by the Parole Board, these allegations about Governor Fallin
    preclude the inference that there is a sufficient likelihood that a favorable
    recommendation by the Parole Board would result in Mr. Burnett actually receiving
    parole.
    When the complaint is read on the whole and in light of the two-tiered parole
    review system in Oklahoma, Mr. Burnett has not pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly
    allege that the adoption of § 332.7(I), or any other change in the parole process,
    created a sufficient risk of increasing his incarceration on his first-degree murder
    conviction. Rather, taking Mr. Burnett’s allegations as true, Governor Fallin’s views
    on crime and parole are a “but for” cause of Mr. Burnett’s continued incarceration
    regardless of the criteria used by the Parole Board when making parole suitability
    recommendations. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett’s complaint fails to plead facts capable
    of plausibly supporting the second element of his ex post facto claim, and we affirm
    the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
    D.     Eighth Amendment Claim 10
    10
    Although counsel did not advance an argument relative to the dismissal of
    Mr. Burnett’s Eighth Amendment claim, Mr. Burnett challenged the dismissal of this
    claim in his pro se opening brief. Pro Se Opening Br. at 3, 13. Accordingly, we
    consider the matter.
    20
    “Because ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
    Eighth Amendment,’ a prison official must act with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate
    health or safety’ to violate the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Castillo v. Day, 
    790 F.3d 1013
    , 1020 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834
    (1994)). As a result, a claim for “[d]eliberate indifference has both an objective and a
    subjective component.” 
    Id.
     “The objective prong of the deliberate indifference test
    examines whether the prisoner’s medical condition was sufficiently serious to be
    cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Al-Turki v. Robinson,
    
    762 F.3d 1188
    , 1192 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To prevail
    on the subjective component, the prisoner must show that the defendant knew the
    prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk[] by failing to take
    reasonable measures to abate it.” Castillo, 790 F.3d at 1021 (emphasis added)
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Mr. Burnett alleged the denial of parole amounted to deliberate indifference
    because it had a “devastating affect [sic] on his mental state of mind” and caused him
    to suffer depression, severe headaches, loss of sleep, and stomach pain. ROA at 16–
    17. Mr. Burnett’s complaint, however, does not contain any allegations that he
    reported his symptoms to anyone at his facility of confinement, no less any of the
    named defendants. Nor does Mr. Burnett allege that any of the named defendants
    attempted to deny him treatment for his symptoms. Accordingly, even if his alleged
    symptoms amount to a serious medical condition for purposes of the objective
    component of an Eighth Amendment claim, Mr. Burnett fails to plead any allegations
    21
    relative to the subjective component of an Eight Amendment deliberate indifference
    claim. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Burnett’s Eighth
    Amendment claim.
    E.     Assignment of Strike & In Forma Pauperis Status
    Section 1915(g) of Title 28 creates the three-strikes rule for prisoners
    proceeding in forma pauperis and states:
    In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a
    civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or
    more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
    brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
    dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
    claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
    imminent danger of serious physical injury.
    “When an action or appeal is dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to
    state a claim under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B), the dismissal counts as a strike.”
    Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    635 F.3d 1172
    , 1176 (10th Cir. 2011). Whether a
    dismissal for failure to state a claim is with or without prejudice is “immaterial” to
    the three-strikes analysis because the dismissal counts as a strike either way. Childs
    v. Miller, 
    713 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (10th Cir. 2013).
    In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Burnett’s complaint, we must
    affirm the district court’s assignment of a strike. However, after a careful review of
    the arguments on appeal, we conclude that, although Mr. Burnett did not prevail, he
    raised non-frivolous arguments for reversing the district court’s judgment such that
    we do not assign him a strike relative to this appeal. And, because Mr. Burnett raised
    22
    non-frivolous arguments on appeal, we grant his motion to proceed in forma
    pauperis. 11 See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    .
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Burnett’s complaint, under
    
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e), 1915A, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted. We further AFFIRM the district court’s assignment of a strike relative to
    the dismissal of Mr. Burnett’s complaint. Concluding, however, that Mr. Burnett
    raised non-frivolous arguments on appeal, we do not assign Mr. Burnett a strike
    relative to this appeal, and we GRANT his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
    Entered for the Court
    Carolyn B. McHugh
    Circuit Judge
    11
    Although the dismissal of Mr. Burnett’s complaint by the district court will
    be his third strike, this third strike does not preclude the granting of in forma
    pauperis status on appeal because the third strike will not ripen for purposes of
    § 1915(g) until the dismissal becomes final. See Thompson v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 
    492 F.3d 428
    , 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Although section 1915(g) nowhere expressly states
    that dismissals must be final to count as strikes, we think it fairly implied.”); see also
    Smith v. Veterans Admin., 
    636 F.3d 1306
    , 1314 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing ripening
    of strike in terms of when time for appeal expired and judgment became final).
    23