Weikert v. Bigelow , 552 F. App'x 823 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 21, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ROBERT NEIL WEIKERT,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 13-4168
v. (Utah)
CHARLES BIGELOW, Warden, (D.C. No. 2:10-CV-00512-DAK)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant and petitioner, Robert Neil Weikert, a Utah state prisoner
proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to enable him to
appeal the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. Concluding that he has
failed to meet the requirements for issuance of a COA, we deny Mr. Weikert a
COA and dismiss this appeal.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Weikert was convicted, following a bench trial, of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, and he was sentenced to five years to life imprisonment. The
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Weikert,
2008 WL 5257054 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2008 ) (unpublished). The Utah
Supreme Court denied certiorari. State v. Weikert, 207 P.3d 536 (Utah Apr. 21,
2009) (unpublished). Mr. Weikert did not seek review by the United States
Supreme Court.
On June 1, 2010, Mr. Weikert filed the instant petition for habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The state responded that the petition should be
denied because the issues raised were procedurally barred. The district court
denied the petition, finding that Mr. Weikert “raise[d] no valid ground for federal
habeas relief.” Order at 7, R. Vol. IV at 170. In its analysis, the district court
concluded that Mr. Weikert:
did not raise properly exhausted claims. Instead, [Mr. Weikert]
raised several new claims, all of which are “technically exhausted”
because [Mr. Weikert] now has no legal mechanism to raise and
properly exhaust them in Utah courts. Because [Mr. Weikert]’s
federal habeas claims cannot be properly exhausted in state court,
they are procedurally defaulted and barred in federal court.
Id. at 168. The court then determined that Mr. Weikert had shown neither cause
nor prejudice nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice so as to permit review of
his procedurally defaulted claims. As a result, the court dismissed the habeas
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petition. The court did not address the issue of a COA; Mr. Weikert has therefore
applied to this court for a COA.
DISCUSSION
“A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.” Allen v. Zavaras, 568 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); see
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA should issue “only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2); he can do this by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Dodd v. Trammell, 730 F.3d 1177,
1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
An applicant denied habeas relief on procedural grounds “must also show
‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable . . . whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.’” Coppage v. McKune, 534 F.3d 1279, 1281
(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). “Where a plain procedural bar
is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a
reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in
dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed
further.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
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Habeas relief under § 2254 generally will not be granted to a petitioner
unless the petitioner has “exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l) (A). See Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366,
1368 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It has long been clear that a § 2254 petition containing
federal claims which have not been exhausted in state court must be dismissed.”).
The exhaustion requirement is typically satisfied “‘once [a] federal claim has
been fairly presented to the state courts.’” Id. (quoting Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).
Here, Mr. Weikert has not raised issues which he properly exhausted in
state court. Rather, he raises several new claims, including: there were various
instances of ineffective assistance of counsel; there was insufficient evidence; his
right to testify was somehow compromised/improperly waived; his right not to
testify was violated; there was witness tampering; the state used duress to obtain
untruthful victim testimony; witnesses were permitted to view testimony by other
witnesses; and prejudicial physical demonstrations were employed. None of these
issues was actually exhausted in state court.
The exhaustion requirement, however, “refers only to remedies still
available at the time of the federal petition.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-
26 n.28 (1982). No such remedies remain in state court for Mr. Weikert. 1
1
On June 13, 2011, Mr. Weikert filed an untimely petition for post-
conviction relief in Utah Second District Court. The Utah state district court
(continued...)
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Although a timely state post-conviction petition would have given him the
opportunity to attempt to exhaust the federal claims he now raises, Mr. Weikert is
now barred by Utah’s one-year statute of limitations for state post-conviction
relief and he cannot exhaust his new claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107
(2013). He has accordingly “technically” exhausted his claims: “A habeas
petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical
requirements for exhaustion [because] there are no state remedies any longer
available to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991); Parkhurst,
128 F.3d at 1370.
That inability does not, however, permit Mr. Weikert to pursue his claims
in federal court. As the district court determined, “[w]here the reason a petitioner
has exhausted his state remedies is because he has failed to comply with a state
procedural requirement for bringing the claim, there is a further and separate bar
to federal review, namely procedural default.” Parkhurst, 128 F.3d at 1370. A
petitioner can overcome procedural default by showing cause and prejudice. See
Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012). “Cause for a procedural default
exists where ‘something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be
attributed to him[,] . . . impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s
1
(...continued)
ruled on Dec. 14, 2011 that the petition was time-barred and dismissed it with
prejudice. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Weikert v. State, 275 P.3d 1088
(Utah Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished). The Utah Supreme
Court denied Mr. Weikert’s request for certiorari review on June 28, 2012.
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procedural rule.’” Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753). And for a petitioner
to show prejudice, he must show that he suffered “actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Procedural
default can also be overcome if there has been a fundamental miscarriage of
justice—that is, if the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of conviction.
See Black v. Workman, 682 F.3d 880, 915 (10th Cir. 2012).
The district court found that Mr. Weikert “has not explained his failure to
exhaust his claims in Utah courts.” Order at 6, R. Vol. IV at 169. Thus, he has
failed to show cause or prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. We
agree. Mr. Weikert offers no comprehensible explanation for his failure to raise,
in a timely manner in state court, the issues he now attempts to raise before us.
The district court’s explanation for its dismissal of Mr. Weikert’s petition is clear,
precise and complete. No reasonable jurist could debate its propriety.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Weikert a COA and DISMISS
this matter.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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