Waid v. City of Albuquerque ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 17 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOE WAID,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-2322
(D.C. No. CIV-95-247-MV)
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; (D. N.M.)
MARTIN CHAVEZ, Mayor, City of
Albuquerque; LOUIS E. SAAVEDRA,
Former Mayor of the City of
Albuquerque; ARTHUR
BLUMENFELD, Former Chief
Administrative Officer; LAWRENCE
RAEL, Chief Administrative Officer;
CARL P. RODOLPH, Aviation
Director; ROBERT BROWN,
Employee Affairs Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , EBEL , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Joe Waid appeals from an order finding him in contempt of the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. Defendants have
moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We determine that the
contempt order is not final and appealable and accordingly we dismiss the appeal.
Plaintiff initially filed suit against these defendants in a New Mexico state
court. Defendants removed the action to federal court, where some of plaintiff’s
claims were dismissed. Plaintiff then proposed to the federal district court that he
amend his complaint to withdraw his remaining federal claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and Title VII, thus providing grounds for a remand to the state court
because the only remaining claims were state law claims. Defendants objected to
the remand because they feared plaintiff would refile his federal claims in state
court. The federal district court granted plaintiff’s motion for a remand to the
state court, “expressly conditioned, however, on Plaintiff’s compliance with his
stipulation that he [would] not refile his federal claims in federal or state court.”
Appellant’s App. at 179 (September 9, 1996 remand order). On remand to the
state court, plaintiff “filed a Third Amended Complaint . . . adding defendants
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already dismissed by [the federal district court], and re-introducing federal causes
of action which [the federal district court] had dismissed with prejudice.” Id.
at 336 (September 19, 1997 order to show cause). After a hearing, the federal
court found that plaintiff’s third amended complaint filed in state court violated
its previous order by naming individual defendants in their official capacities and
by inserting additional new claims. See id. at 342 (October 1, 1997 order of
contempt). The federal district court found plaintiff in civil contempt and ordered
that Plaintiff may purge himself of contempt by limiting the trial of
this matter in state court to a trial against the City of Albuquerque as
the sole remaining defendant in this Court at the time of remand, and
of those issues which were before this Court as contract claims at the
time that the Court remanded this case to state court for trial, as set
forth above, which are the same matters which this court ordered
would be the only matters contained in Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint.
Id. at 342-43. On October 3, 1997, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the
October 1, 1997 order of contempt. He made no attempt to demonstrate to the
federal district court that he had purged himself of contempt. In the meantime,
the state court litigation was concluded.
The finding of contempt was entered after the case was remanded to the
state court. We have held that “in the postjudgment stage of a case, once the
finding of contempt has been made and a sanction imposed , the order has
acquired all the elements of operativeness and consequence necessary to be
possessed by any judicial order to enable it to have the status of a final decision
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . .” O’Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc. ,
972 F.2d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted) (second emphasis
added). In this case, however, the district court did not impose a sanction. See
Appellant’s App. at 343 (“[I]f plaintiff fails to purge himself of contempt, the
appropriate action, whether civil or criminal, will be considered at that time.”).
Furthermore, the district court did not have an opportunity to determine whether
plaintiff purged himself of contempt.
We are aware of United States v. O’Rourke , 943 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir.
1991), finding appellate jurisdiction of a postjudgment contempt order imposing
a fine of $1,000,000 plus an additional $10,000 per day until compliance with an
earlier order, but leaving an opportunity to purge the contempt. See 943 F.2d at
185-86. There, the court held that “‘[b]eing placed under the threat of future
sanction is a present sanction.’” Id. at 186 (quoting Sizzler Family Steak Houses
v. Western Sizzlin Steak House, Inc. , 793 F.2d 1529, 1533 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986)).
In contrast to both O’Rourke and Sizzler Family Steak Houses , here, the district
court did not impose a fine or other sanction, and did not issue a ruling on
whether plaintiff had purged himself of contempt. Therefore, we hold that the
district court’s contempt order is not final because it did not “impose[] specific,
unavoidable sanctions.” Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc. , 84
F.3d 367 , 370 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Plaintiff argues that even if the contempt order is not final and appealable
under § 1291, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) because the
order is essentially an injunction prohibiting him from pursuing some claims in
state court. Although plaintiff maintains that the contempt order restricted his
state court claims, in fact, his own stipulation was the reason his claims were
restricted. The federal district court’s action restricting plaintiff’s state court
claims was the remand order based on plaintiff’s stipulation, not the order of
contempt. The contempt order merely served to enforce the remand order.
Consequently, § 1292(a) does not provide jurisdiction.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction is
GRANTED. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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