Flores v. Barnhart , 246 F. App'x 540 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 12, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TH ERESA FLO RES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-1150
(D.C. No. 04-cv-2148-LTB)
M ICH AEL J. ASTRU E, * (D . Colo.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT **
Before H E N RY, B AL DOC K , and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.
Theresa Flores appeals from the district court’s order denying her
application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
28 U.S.C. § 2412, following an order that reversed and remanded the
Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), M ichael J. Astrue is substituted for
Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the appellee in this action.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and supplemental security income. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291and affirm.
I.
M s. Flores’s application for benefits, which was based upon claims of
neck and back injuries, depression, and memory problems, was denied
administratively. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found
at step four of the five-step sequential evaluation process that she could perform
her past relevant work as either a teacher’s aide or sales clerk and was not
disabled. W hen the Appeals Council denied her request for review, M s. Flores
appealed, and the district court reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
The district court found two errors in the A LJ’s decision. First, the court
found that the ALJ’s written decision failed “to demonstrate reliance on the
correct legal standard” in evaluating the opinions of M s. Flores’s treating
physicians. Aplt. App. at 528. In particular, the court noted that, although the
ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions were not entitled to controlling weight was
supported by substantial evidence, he failed “to provide specific, legitimate
reasons for the weight he ultimately assigned the opinions.” Id. at 531.
Second, although neither M s. Flores nor her lawyer requested a consultative
examination concerning her alleged mental impairments during the administrative
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proceedings, the district court agreed with her argument on appeal that an
examination would be helpful on remand.
Thereafter, M s. Flores filed her motion for fees under the EA JA. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that the Commissioner’s position,
although ultimately unsuccessful, was reasonable in law and fact, and was
substantially justified.
II.
Under EAJA, a fee award is required if (1) M s. Flores is a prevailing party;
(2) the position of the Commissioner was not substantially justified; and
(3) there are no special circumstances that make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A ); see also Comm’r INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158 (1990). Having
satisfied factors one and three, the only dispute is whether the Commissioner’s
position was substantially justified.
In addition to the position taken by the Commissioner in the district court,
“[w]hether or not the position of the [Commissioner] was substantially justified
shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect
to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based)
which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). See also H ackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172
(10th Cir. 2007).
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The Commissioner “bears the burden of showing that [his] position was
substantially justified.” Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir. 1995).
“The test for substantial justification in this circuit is one of reasonableness in law
and fact. Thus, the government’s position must be justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person. The government’s position can be justified even
though it is not correct.” Hackett, 475 F.3d at 1172 (quotations and citations
omitted). See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (same).
“W e review the district court’s determination that the C ommissioner’s
position was substantially justified for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the district court bases its ruling on an erroneous
conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact findings.” Hackett, 475 F.3d
at 1172 (quotations and citations omitted).
III.
The parties agree that the district court applied the correct legal standard in
assessing M s. Flores’s request for attorney fees under EAJA. Therefore, our
analysis is limited to consideration of whether the court abused its discretion by
way of a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.
According to M s. Flores, the district court abused its discretion “by
misrepresenting or ignoring the medical record,” and “fail[ing] to adequately
discuss how [her] treating physicians’ opinions w ere contrary to the record.” A plt.
Br. at 9. W e disagree. In denying her motion for EAJA fees, the court found that
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the reason for the remand was due to the fact that the ALJ’s “order failed to
demonstrate reliance on the correct legal standard.” Aplt. A pp. at 548.
Specifically, although the ALJ discussed the treating physicians’ opinions in
detail, he failed to specifically mention the factors outlined in Watkins v.
Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003) to determine what, if any,
deference should be accorded their opinions. “The reason for the remand w as the
order’s lack of legal analysis necessary for [the court] to ascertain whether the
ALJ applied the correct legal standard by affording the treating physicians’
opinions deference in the form of the relevant factors in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2).” Aplt. App. at 551.
M s. Flores’s argument might have merit if the A LJ had ignored or
misrepresented the medical record, but these are not the facts of this case. Instead,
the district court found “that there was ample evidence in the record to support the
ALJ’s comprehensive assessment of the treating physician’s [sic] opinions.” Id.Thus, the court’s conclusion that the Commissioner’s position was substantially
justified because it had a reasonable basis in law and fact was not an abuse of
discretion.
The record reveals evidence of a test given to M s. Flores when she was
eleven-years-old that revealed an intelligence quotient of fifty-nine. However,
the record also reveals that she graduated from high school, raised a family, and
worked at least three semi-skilled jobs as an adult. Throughout the administrative
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proceedings, neither she nor her lawyer ever requested a consultative examination
of this mental impairment–instead she raised this issue for the first time on her
appeal to the district court.
Regardless, we do not reach the merits of M s. Flores’s argument because
she has failed to provide any authority that the failure to order a consultative
examination means that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially
justified. A party’s failure to cite any authority “suggests either that there is no
authority to sustain its position or that it expects the court to do its research.”
Rapid Transit Lines, Inc. v. Wichita Developers, Inc., 435 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir.
1970).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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