Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Electric Cooperative, Inc. , 462 F.3d 1244 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 29, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
M A RK FER NA N D EZ; D O N A BREU,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 05-2130
M ORA-SAN M IGUEL ELECTRIC
CO OPERA TIVE, INC .; FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
O FFICE; LU CER O PR OFESSIO NAL
SERVICES, LTD.; CARL ARM IJO , in
his individual and official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
M ORA COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE; ERNESTO GONZA LES;
LEV I A LC ON ; Y V ETTE A LC ON,
Defendants.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1334 RB/W DS)
Submitted on the briefs: *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
(continued...)
M ichael E. M ozes, Law Offices of M ichael E. M ozes, P.C., Albuquerque,
New M exico, for Plaintiff-Appellants.
Jerry A. W alz, W alz and Associates, Cedar Crest, New M exico, for
Defendants-Appellees Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s Office and Carl Armijo.
David A. Rammelkamp, Elizabeth A. Heaphy, Rammelkamp, M uehlenweg &
Cordova, P.A., Albuquerque, New M exico, for Defendant-Appellee Lucero
Professional Services, Ltd.
Before BR ISC OE, M cKA Y, and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
BR ISC OE, Circuit Judge.
M ark Fernandez and Don Abreu appeal the district court’s pre-trial
disposition of certain claims in this suit against polygraph examiner Lucero
Professional Services (LPS), the N ew M exico Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s
Office (DAO), the DAO’s chief inspector Carl Armijo, and Fernandez and
Abreu’s former employer M ora-San M iguel Electric Cooperative, Inc. (the
Co-op). Specifically, both Fernandez and Abreu appeal the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to LPS under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
(EPPA ), 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009. Abreu also appeals (1) the district court’s grant
of judgment on the pleadings to Armijo and the DAO on his state-law tort claim
*
(...continued)
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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of conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and (2) the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the Co-op and Armijo on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that
they violated his constitutional and statutory rights. W e have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM .
I.
Fernandez and Abreu were employed by the Co-op. During the weekend of
April 11-13, 2003, one of the Co-op’s air compressors disappeared. The Co-op
notified the M ora County Sheriff’s Office (M CSO ), and Officer Ray Cordova
began an investigation. Because the air compressor had disappeared from a yard
with a locked gate that was not forced, the investigation focused on the C o-op’s
employees. Near the end of June, the DAO became involved in the investigation.
W hen the investigation failed to yield results, the Co-op decided to have
suspected employees take polygraph tests. In early July, the Co-op’s attorney,
Nicholas Leger, contacted Eric Lucero, the principal of LPS, and requested that
LPS conduct polygraph examinations of some of the Co-op’s employees. Lucero
stated that he could not test employees for the Co-op, but that he would
administer polygraph tests to Co-op employees if requested in conjunction with a
criminal investigation.
W ithin a few days, the DAO’s chief investigator, Carl Armijo, called
Lucero and requested LPS conduct polygraph tests of the Co-op’s employees.
The day before the examinations, Leger sent Lucero a memorandum describing
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the facts known to the Co-op and setting the schedule for the examinations.
Lucero then administered polygraph tests to four Co-op employees, including
Fernandez and Abreu. Fernandez and Abreu failed the examinations.
Lucero sent his report to Armijo and Cordova, and he sent LPS’s bill to
Armijo. Leger contacted Lucero and told him that the DAO would not pay for the
tests. He told Lucero that the Co-op would pay for the tests and that Lucero
should send him an invoice. When Leger asked for the results of the tests, Lucero
told him that he could not disclose the test results to the Co-op. He suggested
that Leger talk to Armijo, because the DAO might release the test results to the
Co-op as a crime victim. The DAO provided the results of the tests to the Co-op,
which then terminated Fernandez and Abreu’s employment.
Fernandez and Abreu sued the Co-op, LPS, Armijo, the DAO, and the
M CSO under the EPPA , 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New M exico state law. The
district court disposed of the majority of the claims prior to trial, dismissing some
and granting summary judgment on others. The EPPA claims against the Co-op
went to trial, and a jury found in favor of Fernandez and Abreu. Fernandez and
Abreu now appeal the pre-trial disposition of their EPPA claims against LPS, and
Abreu appeals the pre-trial disposition of his tort claims against the DAO and
Armijo and his § 1983 conspiracy claim against Armijo and the Co-op.
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II.
A.
First, both Fernandez and Abreu assert that LPS violated the EPPA . The
district court granted summary judgment to LPS on the grounds that the EPPA
only covers “employers” and that LPS w as not an “employer” as defined by that
statute. Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This court reviews “the
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of M ental
Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
“[W]e view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.The EPPA restricts the conduct of, and provides remedies against, an
“employer” regarding the use of lie detector tests. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2005.
The statute defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.”
Id. § 2001(2). Under the regulations, a polygraph examiner generally is not
considered an “employer.” See 29 C.F.R. § 801.2(c) (“A polygraph examiner
either employed for or whose services are retained for the sole purpose of
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administering polygraph tests ordinarily would not be deemed an employer with
respect to the examinees.”). “Ordinarily,” of course, does not mean “never.”
Other courts have adopted the “economic reality” test to determine whether
a polygraph examiner is an “employer” for purposes of the EPPA. This test
focuses on whether “as a matter of economic reality, that person or entity exerts
some degree of control over the employer’s compliance with EPPA .” Rubin v.
Torneau, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 247, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). It stems from cases
interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act, which defines “employer” the same
way as the EPPA. See id. at 252 (“Just as the phrase ‘acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee’ is applied to effect
FLSA’s purpose, so too, . . . must it be applied to effect EPPA’s
purpose— restricting the use of lie detectors in the work place.”). Given
C ongress’s use of the same language in defining the term “employer” in the two
statutes, and because we agree with the reasoning of other courts that have
adopted this test, we approve using the economic reality test in evaluating
w hether a polygraph examiner is an “employer” for purposes of EPPA.
The Fifth Circuit summarized four factors courts have considered in
applying the economic reality test:
[D]istrict courts have considered whether the examiner (1) decided
that a polygraph examination should be administered; (2) decided
which employee would be examined; (3) provided expertise or advice
to the employer regarding compliance with EPPA ’s requirements, or
the employer relied on the examiner to ensure compliance; or
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(4) decided whether the examined employee would be subjected to
disciplinary action, or merely reported the results of the polygraph
examination to the employer.
Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2002).
Like the Fifth Circuit, we “do not, and need not, further define the scope of the
‘economic reality’ test” to consider w hether LPS qualifies as an employer. Id.It is undisputed that LPS had no role in the decision to terminate Fernandez
and Abreu’s employment, so appellants’ arguments focus on the other three
factors. First, appellants argue that, by directing the Co-op how to get the tests
taken, LPS decided that polygraphs should be taken. Appellants’ suggestion is
rather attenuated. The record shows that it was the Co-op, then Armijo, who
contacted LPS about taking polygraphs. This indicates that it was the Co-op
and/or Armijo who decided polygraphs should be taken. This factor does not
support imposing liability on LPS.
Appellants also suggest that LPS advised the Co-op how employees should
be selected for the polygraphs. Again, this inference is too attenuated to support
liability. The record indicates that Lucero stated that he could not test Co-op
employees as Leger originally requested, and that he would perform tests if
requested by law enforcement and the individuals to be tested were identified by
law enforcement. There is no suggestion that Lucero suggested or identified the
specific employees to be tested, directly or indirectly. This situation is
distinguishable from the examiner having a role in selecting the particular
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employees to be tested. Cf. Rubin, 797 F. Supp. at 253 (noting that the examiner
allegedly “represented it would inform [the employer] w hich employees could
be examined law fully”). Thus, this factor also does not support imposing liability
on LPS.
Finally, appellants assert that Lucero advised the Co-op about compliance
with the EPPA and the circumstances under which the Co-op employees should be
polygraphed. In support, they primarily rely on Lucero’s comments to Leger that
the tests would have to be taken in conjunction with a law enforcement
investigation and that the Co-op might be able to get the results of the tests from
the DAO.
W e have found only one case discussing the “advice” factor in any detail.
In Rubin v. Torneau, Inc., the examiner, who was also an investigator, was hired
to investigate missing inventory. 797 F. Supp. at 248. He allegedly assured the
employer he would identify which employees could lawfully be polygraphed and
he would conduct the examinations in compliance with the EPPA. Id. at 248-49,
253. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, the court
determined the examiner might qualify as an employer and declined to dismiss the
case. 1 Id. at 253.
1
Contrary to appellants’ argument, Rubin involved a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not summary judgment.
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The only other case allowing a claim against a polygraph examiner to
proceed because the examiner may have exercised “some degree of control over
the employer’s compliance with the EPPA” does not explain exactly what the
examiner did. James v. Professionals’ Detective Agency, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1013,
1016 (N.D. Ill. 1995). That case involved a motion to dismiss, and the complaint
made the appropriate allegations of employer status. Id. The court suggested
that, if the evidence did not show that the examiner did more than administer the
tests, the examiner should file a motion for summary judgment. Id.In contrast to the situation in Rubin, Lucero did not make any assurances to
the Co-op about EPPA compliance, and LPS was not hired to ensure EPPA
compliance. Notably, Lucero’s contacts with the C o-op were through the C o-op’s
attorney, whose duty it was to advise the Co-op about its legal responsibilities.
See Calbillo, 288 F.3d at 728 n.4 (stating that it was not reasonable to infer that
the employer looked to the polygraph examiner for legal advice, when the
employer had hired attorneys to advise it). Further, the statements were in the
nature of gratuitous comments, not so much about EPPA compliance, as
explanations why LPS w ould not assist the Co-op. In Calbillo, the Fifth Circuit
declined to find employer status for an examiner, despite inferring from the
record that the examiner “may have answered the attorneys’ questions regarding
the technical procedures involved in performing a polygraph examination and he
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might have even discussed some of the general requirements under the EPPA and
the Secretary’s regulations.” 288 F.3d at 728 n.4.
Appellants contend that Lucero should have known the arrangement was a
sham to allow the C o-op to circumvent the EPPA, arguing “from the very
beginning LPS knew that the Cooperative was the driving force behind the
polygraphs. LPS then worked with the C ooperative to satisfy the employer’s
request for these polygraphs.” Aplt. Br. at 17. So long as LPS did not involve
itself sufficiently to be considered an “employer,” however, whether it knew or
should have known that the arrangement was a sham is not relevant to its liability
under the EPPA. Simply put, if LPS is not an “employer,” it is not subject to
EPPA liability. An examiner is not necessarily liable merely because a particular
examination violated the EPPA. See Calbillo, 288 F.3d at 728 (affirming
summary judgment for examiner); Fallin v. M indis M etals, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 834,
840 (N .D. Ga. 1994) (granting summary judgment to examiner).
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to LPS on appellants’ EPPA claims.
B.
Abreu asserted a state-law tort claim that Armijo, the DAO, and the M CSO
conspired to violate his constitutional rights. As relevant on appeal, the district
court granted judgment on the pleadings to Armijo and the DAO, holding that the
state had not waived its sovereign immunity against such claims. Specifically,
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the court determined that the New M exico Tort Claims Act’s (NM TCA) waiver of
sovereign immunity for the actions of a “law enforcement officer” did not apply
to Armijo. This court reviews a defense motion for judgment on the pleadings de
novo. Soc’y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239, 1240-41
(10th Cir. 2005). “As with a ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we uphold a
dismissal only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The NM TCA preserves sovereign immunity against tort claims for state
governmental entities and public employees acting in the scope of their duties,
except as specifically waived. N.M . Stat. § 41-4-4(A). It waives sovereign
immunity for tort claims involving the conduct of a “law enforcement officer.”
Id. § 41-4-12. The statute defines “law enforcement officer” as “a full-time
salaried public employee of a governmental entity whose principal duties under
law are to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain
public order or to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when
called to active duty by the governor.” Id. § 41-4-3(D). Abreu’s claim against
the DAO must rest on its potential liability for Armijo’s conduct, because an
agency cannot be “a full-time salaried public employee” as required by the
definition of “law enforcement officer.” See Dunn v. M cFeeley, 984 P.2d 760,
766 (N.M . Ct. App. 1999).
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Abreu argues that the district court “merely applied a mechanical and stiff
interpretation” of the NM TCA definition, and that “[s]uch an interpretation flies
in the face of the functional approach adopted by the New M exico courts.” Aplt.
Br. at 21. He contends Armijo and the DAO “performed routine, police-like
functions in investigating the missing compressor.” Aplt. Br. at 20.
The New M exico approach pays more deference to the statutory definition
than Abreu implies. The New M exico courts take the definition as their starting
point, examining whether the particular defendant’s primary duties fit into any of
the statutory criteria. In Anchondo v. Corr. Dep’t, 666 P.2d 1255, 1257
(N.M . 1983), the N ew M exico Supreme Court stated, “[i]n determining whether a
person is involved in law enforcement work, this Court has adhered to the concept
of traditional law enforcement activities,” which it indicated “include preserving
the public peace, preventing and quelling public disturbances, [and] enforcing
state laws, including but not limited to the power to make arrests for violation of
state laws.” It is the employee’s primary duties which are the crux of the inquiry.
“The statutory requirement that the defendants be law enforcement officers does
not focus on the defendants’ specific acts at the time of their alleged negligence.
Instead it simply requires that the defendants’ principal duties, those duties to
which they devote a majority of their time, be of a law enforcement nature.”
Weinstein v. City of Santa Fe, 916 P.2d 1313, 1317 (N.M . 1996).
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Further, even if a public employee is authorized to exercise some of the
traditional functions of law enforcement officers, he or she does not necessarily
come under the waiver provision. In Dunn v. New M exico, 859 P.2d 469, 472
(N.M . Ct. App. 1993), the court held the Director of the M otor Vehicle Division
was not a law enforcement officer, even though he was statutorily invested with
the pow er to act as a peace officer to enforce the M otor Vehicle Code, because
his duties primarily involved administrative matters. In Vigil v. M artinez,
832 P.2d 405, 411-12 (N.M . Ct. App. 1992), the court held that probation and
parole officers w ere not “law enforcement officers”; although they occasionally
held persons in custody and had some powers of arrest, neither was a principal
duty.
The New M exico appellate court has held, in other circumstances, that
non-attorney employees of the DAO were not “law enforcement officers.”
See Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Att’y’s Office, 734 P.2d 794, 801
(N.M . Ct. App. 1987) (holding that employees who processed paperwork to notify
detention center of indictment and warrant were not involved in holding accused
persons in custody so as to be considered “law enforcement officers”); see also
Coyazo v. New M exico, 897 P.2d 234, 236 (N.M . Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
“law enforcement officer” does not include “district attorneys in their
prosecutorial role” because they do not engage in traditional law enforcement
activities).
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Looking solely at the pleadings, judgment for appellees was warranted, as
Abreu’s complaint merely states that Armijo is the “chief investigator” for the
DAO. Aplt. App. at 71. It does not allege that Armijo is a “law enforcement
officer” or describe his duties to show that he fits within § 41-4-12’s waiver.
Cf. Dunn v. M cFeeley, 984 P.2d at 767 (“[O]ur appellate courts have repeatedly
found that a connection to law enforcement activity, even being a member of the
law-enforcement team, is insufficient by itself to make one a law enforcement
officer; the person’s duties must directly impact public order.”).
Even if we were to look beyond the pleadings, the record does not indicate
that Armijo is a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of the NM TCA. Armijo
testified that his “main job is to assist the attorneys in preparation for preliminary
hearings, grand juries, trial, assist different agencies with their investigations,
help on search warrants.” Aplt. App. at 448. He supervises the assignments of a
deputy and two investigators. Id. at 449. He also accepts assignments from
district attorneys, the DAO office manager, the director of the pre-prosecution
diversion program, and DAO finance people. Id. These facts do not support an
inference that Armijo’s primary duties are holding persons in custody,
maintaining public order (except in the sense of putting criminals behind bars that
Coyazo rejected, 897 P.2d at 236), or making arrests for crimes.
Armijo’s investigatory duties appear closest to a traditional law
enforcement activity. Looking at the pleadings, such duties arguably were
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invoked by the complaint’s description of Armijo’s position as “chief
investigator.” W e decline to hold, however, that investigations alone are
sufficient to make an employee a “law enforcement officer” for NM TCA
purposes. The statute does not mention a primary duty of investigating crimes,
instead focusing on other duties. M oreover, while criminal investigations are a
duty of police officers, see N.M . Stat. § 29-1-1, they can also be undertaken by
private investigators and other private parties. Thus, investigations qualitatively
differ from the duties described in the statutory definition and the
law-enforcement functions identified by the New M exico courts (i.e., making
arrests, custody of pre-trial detainees), which are generally reserved to police
officers.
Because New M exico has not waived its sovereign immunity, the district
court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings to Armijo and the DAO on
Abreu’s state-law tort claim.
C.
Finally, Abreu asserted that the Co-op and Armijo conspired to take the
polygraphs and thereby violated his constitutional and statutory rights. The
district court granted summary judgment to appellees on this claim. As stated, w e
review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326.
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Abreu argues that the district court erred in stating he had presented
insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Our review
indicates, however, that there was no error in the district court’s evaluation.
Abreu seems to be advocating a “joint action” theory of § 1983 liability. See
Sigmon v. CommunityCare HM O, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000)
(construing conspiracy argument as assertion of a “joint action” theory). “W hen a
plaintiff seeks to prove state action based on a conspiracy theory, a requirement
of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a
comm on, unconstitutional goal.” Id. at 1126 (quotation omitted; ellipsis in
original). Abreu must demonstrate “a single plan, the essential nature and general
scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its
consequences.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 702 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation
and alteration omitted).
On appeal, Abreu provides no record cites for the evidence that he claims
creates a genuine issue of material fact. In addition, he largely relies on a general
statement, saying, “[n]either time nor space allow for a complete rendition of the
facts A breu genuinely disputed and upon which the district court inappropriately
interpreted in granting Armijo summary judgment on the § 1983 conspiracy
claim.” Aplt. Br. at 25. These types of unsupported argument do not justify
reversal. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“W ithout a specific reference, we will not search the record in an effort to
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determine w hether there exists dormant evidence which might require
submission of the case to a jury.” (quotation omitted)).
Even if Abreu had properly supported his argument, the facts do not appear
sufficient for a jury to find a single, unlawful plan. The evidence might establish
a common goal of taking polygraphs, but not necessarily of taking polygraphs for
the Co-op in violation of the EPPA.
III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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