Delfino v. Cameron Moore , 346 F. App'x 321 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    September 21, 2009
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT               Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    In re:
    CAMERON A. MOORE,
    Debtor.
    No. 09-1087
    (D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00868-MSK)
    MICHELANGELO DELFINO;                                (D. Colo.)
    MARY E. DAY,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    CAMERON A. MOORE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    Cameron A. Moore, defendant in this adversary proceeding, appeals the
    district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    judgment to plaintiffs, Michelangelo Delfino and Mary E. Day. 1 Because
    Mr. Moore was found liable to plaintiffs in a California state civil proceeding for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bankruptcy court held that
    Mr. Moore was collaterally estopped from relitigating whether his debt to
    plaintiffs was the result of a willful and malicious injury and thus
    non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The district court, in a thorough
    and well-reasoned oral ruling, affirmed. Mr. Moore appeals, arguing the district
    court erred because it “ignored disputed issues of material fact” and applied
    collateral estoppel to what he characterizes as the California state court’s “default
    judgment,” that “was not based on express findings[.]” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2.
    Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. “We review
    the grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same legal standards as
    those applied by the bankruptcy and district courts, i.e., those set forth in
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Okla. Employment Sec.
    Comm’n (In re Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc.), 
    73 F.3d 1516
    , 1518 (10th Cir. 1996).
    The bankruptcy and district courts provided detailed summaries of the facts
    and procedural history involved in this case, and we need not restate either here.
    Having reviewed the briefs and appendix in light of applicable law and appellate
    1
    Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a suggestion of death with this court advising that
    Mr. Delfino passed away on March 23, 2009. Since then, counsel notified the
    court that an estate has been opened, but that a personal representative has not yet
    been appointed.
    -2-
    standards, we conclude that the district court correctly decided this case.
    Therefore, for substantially the same reasons set out in the district court’s oral
    ruling of January 28, 2009, the judgment of the United States District Court for
    the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    John C. Porfilio
    Circuit Judge
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-1087

Citation Numbers: 346 F. App'x 321

Judges: O'Brien, Porfilio, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 9/21/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023