Matthew John Romero v. Commissioner of Social Security , 686 F. App'x 731 ( 2017 )


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  •            Case: 16-11758   Date Filed: 04/24/2017   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-11758
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-00872-JBT
    MATTHEW JOHN ROMEO,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 24, 2017)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 16-11758     Date Filed: 04/24/2017   Page: 2 of 5
    Matthew Romeo appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of disability insurance benefits, pursuant
    to 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). On appeal, Romeo argues that the ALJ improperly
    discounted the opinions of Dr. Gerald Hodan and Drs. Felix and Milagros Subervi.
    Romeo argues that their opinions are fully supported by the record, including
    Romeo’s self-reported problems and observations by professionals. He contends
    that the record clearly demonstrates that he is not able to maintain employment on
    a regular basis and that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s denial of
    benefits. After a review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
    affirm.
    In social security appeals, we review the decision of an ALJ as the
    Commissioner’s final decision when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals
    Council denies review of the ALJ’s decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 
    245 F.3d 1274
    ,
    1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review de novo the legal principles upon which the
    ALJ’s decision is based, but the ALJ’s factual findings are conclusive if supported
    by substantial evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    496 F.3d 1253
    , 1260
    (11th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla and is such relevant
    evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1158 (11th Cir.
    2004) (quotation omitted). Even if the evidence preponderates against the factual
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    findings made by the Commissioner, we must affirm if the decision reached is
    supported by substantial evidence. Ingram, 
    496 F.3d at 1260
    . We will not decide
    facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
    Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 
    395 F.3d 1206
    , 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
    The ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical
    opinions and the reasons therefor. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). The ALJ must give the medical opinions of treating
    physicians substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the
    contrary. Id.; see also Sharfarz v. Bowen, 
    825 F.2d 278
    , 280 (11th Cir. 1987)
    (stating that the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a
    contrary finding). Good cause exists when: (1) the opinion was not bolstered by
    the evidence; (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion was
    conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Winschel, 
    631 F.3d at 1179
    . An ALJ must generally give more weight to the opinion of a doctor
    who has examined a claimant, and the longer a treating source has treated a
    claimant, the more weight their opinion is given. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c)(1), (2).
    A doctor who examines a claimant only once is not considered a treating
    physician. McSwain v. Bowen, 
    814 F.2d 617
    , 619 (11th Cir. 1987).
    An ALJ must consider the opinions of non-examining physicians, including
    state agency psychological consultants. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (e)(2). The
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    Case: 16-11758     Date Filed: 04/24/2017    Page: 4 of 5
    weight to be given to a non-examining physician’s opinion depends, among other
    things, on the extent to which it is consistent with other evidence. See 
    id.
    § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii); see also Crawford, 
    363 F.3d at 1158, 1160
     (holding that the
    ALJ did not err in relying on a consulting physician’s opinion where it was
    consistent with the medical evidence and findings of the examining physician).
    The opinions of non-examining physicians are entitled to little weight when
    compared to examining physicians, however. Sharfarz, 
    825 F.2d at 280
    . The
    more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, the more
    weight is given to that opinion. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (c)(3).
    A medical opinion that a claimant is disabled constitutes an opinion on an
    issue reserved to the Commissioner and is not controlling. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(1). Factors that an ALJ considers in evaluating a medical opinion
    include whether the physician examined or treated the claimant, the length of the
    treatment relationship, the frequency of examination, and the supportability and
    consistency of the opinion. 
    Id.
     § 404.1527(c).
    A claimant’s daily activities may be considered in evaluating and
    discrediting complaints of disabling pain. Harwell v. Heckler, 
    735 F.2d 1292
    ,
    1293 (11th Cir. 1984). In Harwell, we held that the ALJ properly considered the
    claimant’s use of pain medication and his daily activities in finding that his
    allegation of constant and severe pain was outweighed by other evidence. 
    Id.
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    Case: 16-11758     Date Filed: 04/24/2017   Page: 5 of 5
    The ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discounting the opinions of Dr.
    Hodan and Drs. Subervi and Subervi because she stated with particularity the
    weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons why some were given
    more weight than others, as required. Winschel, 
    631 F.3d at 1179
    . Moreover,
    none of these doctors were treating physicians because they each only saw Romeo
    once. McSwain, 
    814 F.2d at 619
    . Even if they were treating physicians, the ALJ
    established good cause for discounting their opinions because their reported
    observations from examining Romeo contradicted their determinations that Romeo
    was markedly impaired. As to the final conclusion from Drs. Subervi and Subervi
    that Romeo would find it difficult to hold a full-time job, that issue is reserved to
    the Commissioner and was not entitled to any weight. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (d)(1).
    Moreover, the remainder of the record evidence did not support the marked
    limitations found by Dr. Hodan and Drs. Subervi and Subervi. Particularly,
    Romeo made multiple visits to Directions for Mental Health, whose records
    indicated that despite his diagnoses, his behavior and affect were evaluated as
    essentially normal each time and his global assessment of functioning score
    improved with consistent medication.
    AFFIRMED.
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