James Eric Jones v. Warden, FCC Coleman - USP I , 598 F. App'x 678 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11182
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00307-WTH-PRL
JAMES ERIC JONES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - USP I,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 29, 2015)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 2 of 8
James Eric Jones, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
After a thorough review, we conclude that Jones has not shown his petition
satisfies the requirements of the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and we
therefore affirm.
I.
The procedural history of this case can be briefly summarized as follows: In
2007, Jones was convicted, after a jury trial, for being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and
924(e).1 Based on his prior criminal history, including South Carolina convictions
for strong-arm robbery, burglary, and attempted burglary, Jones was subject to an
enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e). Although initially sentenced to 520 months’ imprisonment, the district
court later reduced Jones’s sentence to a 456-month term pursuant to
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). His conviction and ACCA-enhanced sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal. United States v. Jones, 312 F. App’x 559, 560 (4th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished).
1
Jones was convicted and sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina,
but he is currently incarcerated at a federal penitentiary in Coleman, Florida. Thus, Jones
properly filed his instant § 2241 petition in the Middle District of Florida. See Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443-44 (2004) (noting that a § 2241 petition by a federal prisoner must be
brought in the district where the inmate is incarcerated).
2
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 3 of 8
In 2010, Jones filed a motion to vacate his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging multiple errors, including that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his attorney failed to challenge his burglary conviction at
sentencing. The district court denied his § 2255 motion and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. See Jones v. United States, 419 F. App’x 365 (4th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished).
In June 2012, Jones filed the instant § 2241 petition, arguing that, pursuant
to Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2267 (2011), his two prior
convictions for burglary and attempted burglary no longer qualified as predicate
offenses for the ACCA enhancement. As such, Jones asserted that his 456-month
sentence, which exceeded the applicable 10-year statutory maximum under
§ 922(g)(1), violated due process and he was “actually innocent” of the ACCA
enhancement. He maintained that his § 2241 petition satisfied the requirements of
the savings clause because his claim had been previously foreclosed by then-
existing Fourth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 266
(4th Cir. 2010) (holding that second-degree burglary as defined by S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-11-312(A) constituted a violent felony under the ACCA).
The district court dismissed Jones’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction
because he had failed to establish the necessary conditions to satisfy the savings
clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), so that his claims might be considered in a § 2241
3
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 4 of 8
petition. Specifically, the court found no merit to Jones’s argument that he was
entitled to relief because of “circuit busting precedent,” and Jones could, and did,
raise the same claims in his unsuccessful § 2255 motion. Jones then filed a motion
for reconsideration, reiterating many of his previous arguments, and also asserting
that his burglary conviction no longer qualified as a predicate offense under the
ACCA based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013). The district court denied his motion for
reconsideration. The instant appeal followed.
II.
“Whether a prisoner may bring a [] § 2241 petition under the savings clause
of § 2255(e) is a question of law we review de novo.” Williams v. Warden, Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 52(2014). Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a federal conviction or
sentence must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003). The “savings clause” of § 2255(e), however, permits
a federal prisoner, under very limited circumstances, to file a habeas petition
pursuant to § 2241. Id.
Under the savings clause, a court may entertain a § 2241 petition attacking
custody resulting from a federally imposed sentence if the petitioner establishes
that the remedy provided for under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the
4
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 5 of 8
legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). The applicability of § 2255(e)’s
savings clause is a threshold issue, which imposes a subject-matter jurisdictional
limit on § 2241 petitions. See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1337-38. Accordingly, before
we may reach the substantive claims raised by Jones, we must determine whether
the savings clause of § 2255(e) permits him to seek relief through a § 2241
petition.
The restriction against second and successive § 2255 motions, standing
alone, cannot render § 2255’s remedy inadequate or ineffective under the savings
clause in § 2255(e). Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2011)
(en banc). Rather, we have explained that a petitioner can use the savings clause to
“open the portal” to § 2241 only where he shows that: (1) throughout his
sentencing, direct appeal, and original § 2255 proceeding, his claim was squarely
foreclosed by binding precedent; (2) his current claim is based on a Supreme Court
decision that overturned the precedent that had foreclosed his claim; (3) that
Supreme Court decision is retroactively applicable on collateral review; (4) as a
result of the application of the new rule, his sentence exceeds the applicable
statutory maximum penalties; and (5) the savings clause reaches his pure-Begay2
error claim of illegal detention above the statutory maximum penalty. Bryant v.
Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013).
2
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
5
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 6 of 8
III.
Here, we reject Jones’s claim that his sentence was erroneously enhanced
based on his prior convictions for burglary and attempted burglary or that the
district court erred in dismissing his § 2241 petition. As the record shows, Jones’s
petition fails to satisfy the first two elements of the Bryant test. First, Jones has
failed to show that binding Fourth Circuit precedent squarely foreclosed his
claim—that his prior convictions for burglary and attempted burglary under
§ 16-11-312(A) no longer qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA—during his
sentencing or direct appeal. The Fourth Circuit did not hold that a conviction
under § 16-11-312(A) constituted a violent felony under the ACCA until February
3, 2010, well after Jones’s sentencing in 2008 and direct appeal in 2009. See
Wright, 594 F.3d at 266. Although the Wright decision had come out by the time
Jones filed his § 2255 motion on February 18, 2010, he still had multiple
procedural opportunities, including at sentencing and on appeal, to assert his
§ 924(e) claim. In fact, Jones unsuccessfully argued in his direct appeal that his
prior convictions for burglary and attempted burglary did not qualify as ACCA
predicate offenses. Jones, 419 F. App’x at 365; see also Williams, 713 F.3d at
1348 (noting that “simply because a procedurally adequate test may get the answer
wrong . . . cannot mean that a petitioner is entitled to utilize the savings clause to
have his claim reevaluated”).
6
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 7 of 8
Jones argues that, prior to his indictment, the Fourth Circuit held that
burglary constituted a qualifying predicate offense under the ACCA. See United
States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that a burglary
conviction under a North Carolina “breaking or entering” statute qualified as
“generic burglary” under the ACCA and justified a sentencing enhancement). But
Bowden addressed a North Carolina statute, not the South Carolina burglary statute
at issue in Jones’s case, and thus could not have squarely foreclosed Jones’s claim
throughout his sentencing, direct appeal, and first § 2255 proceeding.
Next, Jones failed to identify a Supreme Court decision overturning any
precedent from the Fourth Circuit that purportedly squarely foreclosed his claim.
Because there was no binding precedent that foreclosed his § 924(e) argument
during his sentencing and direct appeal, it follows that no Supreme Court ruling
could have overturned precedent foreclosing his claim. As such, Jones’s reliance
on Sykes and Descamps is unavailing.
In short, Jones has failed to satisfy the first two elements of the Bryant test,
and the remedy under § 2255 was not “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.” Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1274.3 Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Jones’s § 2241 petition.
3
Because Jones’s § 2241 petition does not fall within the savings clause of § 2255(e), we need
not address the issue of whether a district court within the Eleventh Circuit has the power to
reduce a sentence imposed by a district court within the Fourth Circuit.
7
Case: 14-11182 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 Page: 8 of 8
AFFIRMED.
8