United States v. Julio Ramirez-Ramirez , 594 F. App'x 590 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-13291 Date Filed: 02/09/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13291
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00398-WCO-ECS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
versus
JULIO RAMIREZ-RAMIREZ,
Defendant – Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 9, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Julio Ramirez-Ramirez (“Ramirez”) appeals his sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment, imposed after the revocation of his supervised release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Ramirez raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues his
sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it exceeded the statutory
maximum sentence available upon revocation of a class E felony, and his original
indictment failed to allege the facts necessary to support a conviction for a class C
felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Second, he contends his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because it was excessive in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. Upon review, we affirm. 1
We conclude Ramirez’s claim for procedural unreasonableness fails because
a defendant facing incarceration upon the revocation of supervised release may not
challenge the validity of his original sentence during the revocation proceedings.
See United States v. White, 416 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] defendant
may not challenge, for the first time on appeal from the revocation of supervised
release, his sentence for the underlying offense.”); United States v. Almand, 992
F.2d 316, 317 (11th Cir. 1993) (“A sentence is presumed valid until vacated under
[28 U.S.C.] § 2255.”).
1
We review Ramirez’s procedural unreasonableness claim for plain error because he did
not raise it in district court. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).
We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for reasonableness,
id., applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007).
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We also hold Ramirez’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable
because the district court imposed it after properly considering the relevant 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the need for deterrence. See United States v.
Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be accorded any given
§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district
court . . . .” (quotation omitted)). The district court acted well within its discretion
in fashioning the 24-month sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ramirez’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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