United States v. Frank Defilippo , 596 F. App'x 849 ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 12-16526    Date Filed: 01/07/2015   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-16526
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:11-cr-80157-KLR-4
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    FRANK DEFILIPPO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 7, 2015)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Frank Defilippo appeals his 151-month sentence, imposed after he pled
    Case: 12-16526      Date Filed: 01/07/2015    Page: 2 of 6
    guilty without a plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and
    wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. On appeal, Defilippo argues that the
    district court clearly erred in assigning him a four-level enhancement for being an
    organizer of the scheme because the district court relied solely on Defilippo’s
    factual proffer. He further contends that his sentence was substantively
    unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately address his background
    and mental health factors when imposing sentence and also because his sentence
    was disparate from his co-conspirators’ sentences.
    I.
    We review a district court’s factual finding of the defendant’s role for clear
    error to determine if the enhancement under § 3B1.1 was applied appropriately.
    United States v. De Varon, 
    175 F.3d 930
    , 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). “A
    factual finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the reviewing court . . . is left with the
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
    Gupta, 
    572 F.3d 878
    , 887 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). There is no clear
    error in cases where the record supports the district court’s findings. United States
    v. Petrie, 
    302 F.3d 1280
    , 1290 (11th Cir. 2002).
    “The burden of establishing evidence of the facts necessary to support a
    sentencing enhancement falls on the government, and it must do so by a
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    preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 
    479 F.3d 779
    ,
    783 (11th Cir. 2007). Findings of fact by a sentencing court may be based on,
    among other things, “facts admitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty . . . .” United
    States v. Wilson, 
    884 F.2d 1355
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 1989); see also United States v.
    Smith, 
    480 F.3d 1277
    , 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (facts contained in a government
    proffer not objected to at a plea colloquy are deemed admitted and may be used to
    enhance a sentence).
    Section 3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant
    was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more
    participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In assessing a
    defendant’s role in the offense, the factors the courts should consider include:
    the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation
    in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the
    claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
    participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and
    scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority
    exercised over others.
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; United States v. Esquenazi, 
    752 F.3d 912
    , 938 (11th
    Cir. 2014). More than one person can qualify as an organizer or leader of a
    criminal conspiracy. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; 
    Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 938
    .
    The district court did not clearly err in applying a § 3B1.1(a) role
    enhancement to Defilippo. Unobjected-to facts in the factual proffer established
    that Defilippo, with another conspirator, Tim Owens, organized and operated the
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    boiler room scheme, which was at all times under their control, that they split
    between them the greater share of the profits from the scheme, and that Defilippo
    directly recruited others into the scheme to solicit victims. That Defilippo shared
    the role of leader in the conspiracy with Owens does not shield him from the
    leader/organizer enhancement. See 
    Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 938
    . Accordingly, the
    record supports the district court’s decision to apply an enhancement under
    § 3B1.1(a) for playing a leader or organizer role in the conspiracy. 
    Petrie, 302 F.3d at 1290
    .
    II.
    The district court must issue a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
    necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a). These purposes include the need for a sentence to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for
    the offender, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal
    conduct. 
    Id. § 3553(a)(2).
    Additional considerations include the nature and
    circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
    applicable guideline range, and the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
    Commission. 
    Id. § 3553(a)(1),
    (3)–(7).
    Section 3553(a)(6) provides that one factor a district court is to consider in
    imposing sentence is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
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    defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). For a substantive unreasonableness claim based on a
    sentencing disparity, we require that the defendant raising the claim be similarly
    situated to those who received lesser sentences. United States v. Docampo, 
    573 F.3d 1091
    , 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). Defendants who cooperate with the government
    are not similarly situated to those who do not. See 
    id. When reviewing
    for substantive reasonableness, we consider the totality of
    the facts and circumstances in evaluating whether the sentence lies outside the
    range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. United States v.
    Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1189-1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The weight to be
    accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion
    of the district court. United States v. Amedeo, 
    487 F.3d 823
    , 832 (11th Cir. 2007).
    Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the guideline range
    to be reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United
    States v. Hunt, 
    526 F.3d 739
    , 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence well below the
    statutory maximum sentence also signals reasonableness. See United States v.
    Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
    Defilippo was a leader and organizer of the conspiracy, and his 151-month
    sentence is at the lowest end of his advisory guidelines range and well below the
    20-year statutory maximum. See 
    Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746
    ; 
    Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 5
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    1324. The district court considered Defilippo’s service as a police officer, his
    service-related trauma, and his post-traumatic stress disorder, but nevertheless
    concluded that under the circumstances and given the nature and circumstances of
    the offense—a well-planned scheme targeting vulnerable victims—a guidelines-
    range sentence was appropriate. In light of the totality of the circumstances,
    Defilippo has not met his burden of showing that his 151-month, low guidelines
    sentence represents a clear error of judgment and is outside the range of reasonable
    sentences. See Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1189-1190
    . Nor is the disparity between his and his
    co-conspirators’ sentences unwarranted because he was not similarly situated to
    them. Docampo, 573 at 1101. Defilippo was the organizer of the scheme, and
    unlike his co-conspirators, he took the greater share of the profits, was involved in
    the scheme for its entire duration, and was responsible for the scheme’s entire loss.
    Furthermore, Defilippo did not provide substantial assistance to the government, as
    did some of his co-conspirators, and therefore he is not similar enough to them that
    the differences in their sentences are unwarranted. See 
    id. Upon review
    of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED. 1
    1
    Defilippo’s motion to file reply brief out of time is GRANTED.
    6