William Carman v. Department of Corrections , 598 F. App'x 706 ( 2015 )

Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 1 of 17
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13731
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cv-00255-RH-CAS
WILLIAM CARMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 4, 2015)
Before HULL, WILLIAM PRYOR and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 2 of 17
William Carman, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carman argues that a state trial court
violated his right to due process as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing sua sponte to conduct a hearing to determine whether he was competent to
stand trial. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836 (1966). The district
court ruled that it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law for a Florida appellate court to reject Carman’s argument.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We divide the background of this appeal in three parts. First, we discuss
Carman’s trial and post-trial proceedings. Second, we discuss Carman’s direct
appeal. Third, we discuss Carman’s federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
A. Carman’s Conviction and the Denial of his Motion for a New Trial
In 2005, Carman was charged in a Florida court for abusing two minors.
Carman’s second amended information alleged that he had sexually battered S.M.,
a child under the age of 12, Fla. Stat. § 794.011(2)(a), and had twice touched G.C.,
a child under the age of 12, in a lewd or lascivious manner, id. § 800.04(5)(b).
Carman moved to sever the charges.
On the first day of trial, August 18, 2005, defense counsel announced that he
was abandoning the motion to sever, and the trial court questioned Carman about
2
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 3 of 17
the matter. The trial court asked Carman if he thought that it was in his best interest
to dismiss the motion, and Carman responded affirmatively. The trial court also
asked Carman if he had been coerced or enticed to dismiss the motion, and Carman
responded negatively to both inquiries. Finally, the trial court asked Carman if he
was satisfied with his trial attorney’s advice and Carman responded, “Yes, sir.”
Defense counsel reported that Carman had “taken some prescription
medication” and that it might affect his ability to “assist . . . properly in his
defense.” Defense counsel stated that Carman’s family had complained that
morning that Carman was “seeing double and could not wake up and [was] not
acting himself.” Counsel also said that he had talked to Carman, he was acting
differently, and he had “taken some prescription [nerve] medication” that counsel
had “asked . . . [Carman] at some point in the past to wean himself off of.”
According to counsel, Carman had taken “one [pill] after midnight” to help him
sleep. The trial court remarked that Carman “seems to be okay . . . just looking at
him” and based on “the questions . . . [being] asked . . . .” But defense counsel
countered that he “had to hold [Carman] up in the street . . . [to] talk[] to him” and
that his “investigator, who . . . knows [Carman], has noticed that his heart is racing,
although he looks fairly composed on the outside.” Counsel insisted that Carman
was not “responding . . . the way [he] f[elt] like [Carman] should be.”
3
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 4 of 17
The trial court questioned Carman to ensure that he understood what had
transpired so far. The trial court asked Carman “how [he] [was] feeling today,” and
Carman responded, “I’m kind of groggy, a little bit groggy.” In response to being
asked if he could “hear all right,” Carman stated, “Yes, I can hear.” And Carman
responded affirmatively to being asked if he comprehended “[t]he questions [that
he was] just asked . . . about the severance motion.” When asked if he understood
“that [he] [had] the right to theoretically have two trials; . . . one on the one alleged
victim and one on the other alleged victim,” Carman replied, “Right.” Carman
acknowledged that he had talked to his attorney about the motion to sever, and then
Carman explained that “we want to do them together.” The trial court remarked
that “the same evidence would come in probably on both the trials, or could come
in on both trials anyway if you had two,” to which Carman responded, “Right.”
Carman confirmed that he had ingested a prescription medicine during the
previous evening. The trial court asked if Carman had “taken any medication
today,” and Carman responded, “Today, no. Not this morning. This was earlier.”
And when asked if he had taken anything “since [he] woke up this morning,”
Carman answered, “Not since I woke up, no.” Carman said that he had ingested the
medicine “about midnight,” and that it worked “like an antidepressant. It helps you
sleep.” Carman said that he was “not sure” of the name of the medication or its
4
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 5 of 17
dosage, but he knew that “it [was] small pills, about that size” that had been
prescribed by “Dr. Whiddon.”
Carman stated that he took the medicine occasionally and that it did not
affect his cognitive abilities. When asked if he had been “taking [the medicine] for
awhile now,” Carman responded, “Just off and on when there’s anxiety. I don’t
take them all the time.” The trial court asked if Carman had “take[n] them the other
day for jury selection,” and he said, “Actually, I didn’t take them before then, no.”
Carman acknowledged that, “if [he] [got] anxious or nervous or something, [he]
t[ook] them and they tend[ed] to calm [him] down” and that the medicine
“[n]ormally” did not affect his reasoning. When asked if he could complete a
crossword puzzle, Carman answered, “It might take me a little longer, but I can do
it.” And Carman affirmed that he was “able to assist [his attorney],” who Carman
acknowledged would need his “input on certain things with witnesses and what
they say or . . . what they might not say.” The trial court asked Carman if he had
“any more of the medicine with [him],” and Carman responded, “No,” and then he
interrupted the trial court to say, “In fact, I don’t have any more at all now.” When
asked if he “took the last one last night,” Carman replied, “This is over with.”
The trial court assured Carman that he could request a recess, if one was
needed. The trial court asked for an “assur[ance] . . . [from Carman] that if [he]
need[ed] a break, [he] [could] tell [his attorney] and [the court would] take a
5
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 6 of 17
break,” and Carman replied, “Okay.” The trial court also instructed Carman that “if
things start going too fast, [he could] stop and . . . tell [his attorney] and [the court
would] take a break,” and Carman responded, “Yes, sir.” Carman also responded
affirmatively when he was told that he “need[ed] to know what’s going on here
today and . . . need[ed] to be able to help” his attorney because a trial “is kind of a
team thing.” And Carman agreed “that if [he] g[ot] confused or something that
[he’d] stop and tell [his attorney], and [the trial court] would take a recess . . . [or]
take a break if that’s necessary.”
After a brief conference with Carman, defense counsel moved for a
continuance on the ground that Carman “c[ould] [not] assist . . . today.” The
prosecutor responded that Carman “m[ight] be a little wobbly on his pins,” but that
a continuance was unnecessary in the light of the “inquir[ies]” made and Carman’s
“ab[ility] to understand all the questions that the Court gave[ and to] make
intelligent, rational responses.”
The trial court denied Carman’s motion, but it reminded Carman that he
could request a recess at any time. The trial court explained that it “had a fairly
extensive colloquy with Mr. Carman, and [was] convinced that he understands
what’s going on” despite his consumption of “some medication last night that’s
prescription medication that he takes for nerves and so forth.” The trial court
acknowledged that it “would feel the same way . . . if [it] was sitting in [Carman’s]
6
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 7 of 17
chair,” but that it “th[ought] [Carman] [was] competent to go forward today.” The
trial court assured Carman that “if things are starting to go too fast for him, or he is
confused as to what’s going on, that he needs to tell [his attorney], . . . [who] can
ask . . . [for] a recess to make sure that he’s able to assist his lawyer.” And Carman
responded affirmatively to a reminder that he had “promised . . . that if things go
out of hand, as far as [his] ability to keep up with things, [he] would tell [his]
lawyer to stop the trial . . . .” The trial court was confident that Carman would “be
all right” because “as the day [went] on, and this medication that [he] took last
night . . . w[ore] off, [he] w[ould] probably feel better and better.” Carman would
be capable of assisting his attorney, the trial court opined, because “the first
witness is probably not going to be called for about an hour. And that . . . w[ould]
assist [him] in getting [his] sea legs under [him] . . . .”
Carman “ma[de] gestures to the jury in reaction to things” that were said by
the prosecutor during the opening statements. During a recess, the prosecutor asked
the trial court to “admonish[]” Carman for “trying to communicate with the jury by
nodding [his] head[] and making gestures.” The trial court remarked that it was
“counter productive for anybody to do that” and agreed to “admonish everyone not
to do that.”
On August 19, 2005, the jury returned its verdicts. The jury found Carman
guilty of the sexual battery of S.M. and of two counts of battering G.C., as lesser-
7
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 8 of 17
included offenses of the two charges of touching G.C. in a lewd and lascivious
manner.
On August 29, 2005, Carman moved for a new trial. Carman argued that he
had been entitled to a continuance because “he was incapable of assisting his own
counsel in his defense at all stages of his trial on August 18–19, 2005.” Carman
alleged that, in addition to the evidence in the trial transcript about his mental state,
he had been “pale, nearly ashen in complexion” when his trial commenced; he had
been “unsteady on his feet and used walls, chairs, and counsel table for balance”;
he had “said nothing to counsel and wrote no notes to counsel” when the first
victim and a second prosecution witness testified; he had “continued to appear
ashen and disoriented” throughout the morning; he “beg[a]n to write notes and
communicate with counsel” after the second victim testified; his counsel had
realized that his condition had been “much more apparent and serious [after]
[being] provided with an apparent suicide letter that was found in [Carman’s] room
after the trial”; and he had “ingested far more Lorazepam than he disclosed to the
Court.”
The trial court held a hearing on Carman’s motion. Carman testified that he
consumed between four and eight pills of Lorazepam in an attempt to commit
suicide. Carman also presented testimony from Dr. Darren Rothschild, a forensic
psychiatrist, that Carman had to have been intoxicated on the morning of trial
8
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 9 of 17
because his previous ingestion of only one pill had “knocked [him] out” and that,
“due to [his] intoxication[,] . . . he was not competent to stand trial[] because he
was unable to adequately assist in his defense.” The doctor opined that, in the
morning, Carman would have been “confus[ed]” and “sedat[ed],” had “difficulty
processing information,” and had a “memory [that was] impaired,” and “by the
afternoon, he [w]ould have been coming to a little bit and [could] . . . pay
attention.” Dr. Rothschild testified that Carman “would have been . . .[un]abl[e] to
pay attention” and that his statements before trial were not credible because, “while
intoxicated, people can say all types of things” and are “[un]ihibit[ed]” and, “if
asked superficial questions, . . . [are] likely to comply yes or no and may . . .
respond[] to part of the question . . . not understanding [its] full magnitude . . . .”
The trial court questioned defense counsel, who acknowledged that he had
not requested a recess. Counsel had deposed the victims and had discussed the
depositions with Carman before trial and the victims testified consistent with their
depositions. Defense counsel stated that, after the trial commenced, he had been
“engaged in defending [Carman] and not monitoring his progress . . . .”
At the beginning of Carman’s sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
Carman’s motion for a new trial. The trial court “t[ook] [Carman] at his word” that
he had taken some medicine and had determined that a continuance was
unnecessary because he did not appear intoxicated and “answered all the questions
9
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 10 of 17
appropriately.” Carman’s argument that he was intoxicated, the trial court
reasoned, was “belied” by the fact that neither Carman nor his attorney requested a
recess. Even if Carman had been intoxicated, the trial court reasoned, no new trial
was necessary because Carman had not proved that he had been prejudiced. The
trial court found that defense counsel had time but failed to confer with Carman
about the victims’ testimonies; it would have questioned Carman’s competence
“had those witnesses testimonies been exceedingly different than what they said at
their deposition”; and it was equally plausible that Carman chose not to make notes
because the victims’ testimonies did not differ. The trial court sentenced Carman to
a mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole for the sexual battery of
S.M. and to two terms of 95 days in the county jail for battering G.C. that would
run concurrently with each other and to Carman’s life sentence.
B. Carman’s Direct Appeal
Carman argued, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court sua sponte
should have conducted a competency hearing. Carman argued that a hearing
should have been held because there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that he
was not competent to stand trial. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b). Carman also argued
that the trial court had violated his right to procedural due process by failing, on its
own initiative, to hold a competency hearing. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
10Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 11 of 17
437, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); Pate, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836. The First District
Court of Appeals affirmed summarily Carman’s convictions and sentences.
C. Carman’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief
Carman filed in the district court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
alleged the violation of his right to procedural due process. The state answered that
Carman was relying “on a factual basis not fairly presented to the trial court at the
time a continuance was requested” and Carman’s Pate argument was unexhausted.
The state also answered that Carman’s behavior before and during trial “failed to
raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency to proceed” because he “had no
history of incompetency or mental illness”; “[h]is dosage had not been deliberately
increased”; and “nothing happened during the morning session, in particular, to
raise a doubt about [his] competency.”
The district court denied Carman’s petition. The district court ruled that
“Carman ha[d] failed to demonstrate [that] the state court’s rejection of []his claim
relied upon an unreasonable determination of the facts or constituted an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” The district court
determined that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in denying [Carman’s]
request for a continuance.” The district court also determined that “the trial court
did not err in failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation” because “[t]he
record support[ed]” its “implicit[], if not explicit[], f[inding that there were] no
11
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 12 of 17
reasonable grounds to suggest that Carman was not competent or [that] a bona fide
doubt necessitat[ed] a competency hearing.”
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a petitioner is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus only if the state court reached a decision that was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The
decision of a state court involves an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law ‘if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.’” Greene
v. Upton, 644 F.3d 1145, 1154 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 407, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1520 (2000)). We presume that the findings of fact
by the state court are correct so long as they are supported by the record. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1569 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987).
III. DISCUSSION
Our discussion is divided in two parts. First, we address the argument of the
State that Carman failed to exhaust his claim. Second, because we conclude that
12
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 13 of 17
Carman exhausted his claim, we address whether the decision of the state court
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
A. Carman Exhausted His Claim for Purposes of Federal Review.
Carman properly presented his Pate argument to the Florida courts. Before
trial, defense counsel expressed reservations about Carman’s ability to “assist in
his defense,” and after the trial court found that Carman was competent to proceed,
defense counsel moved, unsuccessfully, for a continuance. Carman was not
required, as the State argues, to request that the trial court conduct a competence
hearing. See Wright v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1249, 1253
(11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that, although the petitioner “never requested that the
trial court conduct a hearing on . . . whether [he] was mentally competent to stand
trial,” his “mental incompetency procedural due process claim . . . was timely
raised on direct appeal and rejected on the merits without discussion by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal”). It is not as though defense counsel failed to broach the
subject of Carman’s competency and, even if that were the case, that would “not
[be] dispositive . . . [and would serve as] evidence that [Carman’s] competency
was not really in doubt.” Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996).
A “Pate claim[] can . . . be raised on direct appeal,” James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d
1562, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992), and Carman argued to the Florida appellate court that
the trial court violated his right to due process by ignoring objective information
13
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 14 of 17
that created a bona fide doubt about his competency to stand trial, see Pate, 383
U.S. at 384–86, 86 S. Ct. at 841–42. The decision of the state court to reject
Carman’s argument summarily qualifies as an adjudication on the merits and is
entitled to deference on habeas corpus review. Wright, 278 F.3d at 1253–54.
B. The Florida Appellate Court Did Not Unreasonably Apply Clearly Established
Federal Law.
“The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right
not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due
process right to a fair trial.” Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568. To be incompetent, the
defendant must lack the “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ or ‘a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Watts, 87 F.3d at 1286 (quoting
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789 (1960)). A
defendant’s right to due process is violated when the trial court fails sua sponte to
conduct a competency hearing when it has before it evidence that creates a bona
fide doubt about the defendant’s competency to proceed with his trial. Pate, 383
U.S. at 384–86, 86 S. Ct. at 841–42. The “petitioner shoulders the burden of
proving that objective facts known to the trial court were sufficient to raise a bona
fide doubt as to [his] competency.” McNair v. Dugger, 866 F.2d 399, 401 (11th
Cir. 1989).
14
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 15 of 17
To determine whether there existed a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s
competency, a reviewing court must “focus on what the trial court did in light of
what it then knew.” Fallada, 819 F.2d at 1568. Evidence about the defendant’s
mental condition, any irrational behavior on his part, and his demeanor at trial are
all relevant, “but ‘there are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which
invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed.’”
Watts, 87 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct.
896, 908 (1975)). The defendant’s use of drugs is not accorded any special
treatment; it is just another “relevant factor” in the analysis. Fallada, 819 F.2d at
1569.
The Florida appellate court determined that the trial court did not violate
Carman’s right to due process, and that decision is not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The objective facts
known to the trial court did not create a bona fide doubt about Carman’s
competency to stand trial. Despite the assertions made by defense counsel and
Carman’s family before trial that Carman was unable to assist in his defense,
Carman’s colloquy with the trial court reflects that he was coherent, articulate, and
understood the seriousness of his trial.
None of the information presented to the trial court suggested that Carman
was unable to consult with his counsel or failed to understand his criminal
15
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 16 of 17
proceedings. Carman engaged in an “intelligent colloquy” with the trial court about
his decision to abandon his motion to sever and about the effect of the prescription
medication that he had consumed. See Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1519 (11th
Cir. 1990). Carman reported that he had taken one dose of an anti-anxiety
medication to help him sleep and, although it made him “groggy,” it did not affect
his lucidity. When Carman stated that the medicine “might” have slowed his
reaction time, the trial court compensated for the alleged difficulty by granting
Carman an unqualified right to obtain a recess. Neither Carman nor his counsel
asked for a recess. And counsel, who was “in the best position to . . . [assess]
Carman’s competency,” never complained during trial that Carman was not
assisting in his defense. See Watts, 87 F.3d at 1288. The trial court, which had
“pa[id] close attention to Mr. Carman . . . and . . . noticed [that] he was making
notes and so forth during the course of the trial,” found that Carman “ha[d] been
able to help” in his defense, and defense counsel did not dispute that finding.
Immediately thereafter, Carman acknowledged that he was “feeling better.”
Carman argues that other evidence created a bona fide doubt as to his
competency, but we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the state court to reach
a contrary conclusion. Carman argues that his gestures to the jury suggested that he
was incompetent, but it is equally plausible that Carman reacted to the accusations
being leveled against him by vigorously denying any wrongdoing. See Dusky, 362
16
Case: 13-13731 Date Filed: 02/04/2015 Page: 17 of 17
U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789. And even if we were to assume that Carman’s
gestures amounted to “bizarre . . . [or] irrational behavior[,] . . . [that was not
enough to] be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial.” See Medina v.
Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995). Carman contends that the
evidence about his attempted suicide suggested that he was incompetent, but we
“may consider only the information before the trial court before and during trial.”
James, 957 F.2d at 1572.
The Florida appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established
federal law when it determined that the trial court afforded Carman all the process
required to ensure that he was competent to stand trial. See Watts, 87 F.3d at 1290.
The trial court accepted Carman’s representation that he had taken medicine
several hours before his trial, but the trial court did not have any evidence before it
to suggest that Carman could not understand his criminal proceedings and assist in
his defense. And Carman failed to establish that the trial court failed to account for
any evidence that would have created a bona fide doubt about his competency to
stand trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of Carman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
17