Merlin Aracely Mejia-Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2021 )


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  •         USCA11 Case: 20-14215    Date Filed: 08/25/2021      Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-14215
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A099-677-985
    MERLIN ARACELY MEJIA-GARCIA,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (August 25, 2021)
    Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    USCA11 Case: 20-14215      Date Filed: 08/25/2021   Page: 2 of 9
    Merlin Mejia-Garcia petitions for review of an order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing an appeal from the Immigration Judge’s
    (IJ) denial of a motion to sua sponte reopen her May 2007 in absentia removal
    order. The record shows that Mejia-Garcia filed her motion to reopen twelve years
    after she was ordered removed—far after the 180-day deadline set forth in INA §
    240(b)(5)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). Mejia-Garcia has failed to raise any
    statutory or regulatory exceptions that would justify reopening the removal order,
    and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen the
    removal order. Therefore, we deny the petition in part and dismiss the petition in
    part.
    We begin by recounting the relevant facts. Mejia-Garcia is a native and
    citizen of Honduras. She first entered the United States in April 2006 as a sixteen-
    year-old unaccompanied minor. Several weeks after her entry into the United
    States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Mejia-Garcia with a
    Notice to Appear, charging her as removable pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the United States without being
    admitted or paroled. Mejia-Garcia was ordered removed in absentia in January
    2007. After she timely moved to reopen the case, the January 2007 removal order
    was rescinded. But in May 2007, Mejia-Garcia was again ordered removed in
    absentia after she failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. In November 2010,
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    Mejia-Garcia moved to reopen the May 2007 removal order. The IJ denied the
    motion, finding that she failed to appear for the May 2007 hearing despite having
    had knowledge of its time, date, and place.
    In 2013, Mejia-Garcia married a legal permanent resident of the United
    States. Her husband later filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on her behalf in
    July 2016. Three years later, on July 10, 2019, Mejia-Garcia and her husband
    attended an in-person interview for the petition. At that time, Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement arrested Mejia-Garcia due to the outstanding removal order
    from May 2007. On the same day, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
    approved the I-130 petition.
    On July 18, 2019, Mejia-Garcia filed a motion with the immigration court
    seeking sua sponte reopening of the May 2007 order and a stay of removal. She
    asserted that she failed to appear at the May 2007 hearing because she was
    unaware of the court date. Mejia-Garcia contended that her removal would cause
    extreme hardship because she was active in her community and had a strong
    relationship with her husband. She also argued that her removal should be stayed.
    Mejia-Garcia’s motion included numerous supporting documents, but the evidence
    did not address her knowledge of the May 2007 hearing. The IJ granted
    Mejia-Garcia’s motion for stay of removal on July 19, 2019. Her motion to sua
    sponte reopen the May 2007 removal order remained pending.
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    Shortly after, DHS removed Mejia-Garcia to Honduras despite the IJ’s stay
    of removal. DHS thereafter agreed to facilitate Mejia-Garcia’s return, and, on
    December 5, 2019, she was paroled into the United States. Mejia-Garcia then filed
    supplemental information for the pending motion to reopen. She stated that “due
    to [her] parole, she [became] eligible for Adjustment of Status based on her
    approved Form I-130.”
    The IJ found that the motion was both time-barred and number-barred, and
    that no statutory or regulatory exception applied. Mejia-Garcia’s motion was
    therefore due to be denied unless she established that her case justified sua sponte
    reopening. The IJ found that sua sponte reopening was unwarranted for two
    reasons. First, although Mejia-Garcia was the beneficiary of an approved I-130
    petition, she had not submitted with her motion to reopen a Form I-485,
    Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.1 Second, the fact
    that she was now eligible for a status adjustment was not an exceptional situation,
    as it was “commonplace . . . to become eligible for relief many years after
    disregarding an obligation to depart the country.” Therefore, the IJ denied
    Mejia-Garcia’s motion to reopen.
    1
    When an individual is seeking to procure an immigrant visa as the spouse of a United States
    citizen, the spouse must first file a Form I-130 to establish his or her relationship with the
    individual seeking the visa. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1154
    (a)(1)(A)(i). Then, the individual must file
    a Form I-485 to apply for permanent residence or adjustment of status. See United States v.
    Russell, 
    957 F.3d 1249
    , 1251 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020).
    4
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    Mejia-Garcia appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ erred because her case
    presented an exceptional situation. Specifically, she argued that she could obtain
    relief through her marriage to her husband. She also contended that she should not
    be faulted for failing to attach the I-485 application to her initial motion to reopen
    because she did not become eligible for adjustment of status until after submitting
    the initial motion.
    The BIA dismissed Mejia-Garcia’s appeal, finding that the IJ correctly
    denied her motion to sua sponte reopen. It found that Mejia-Garcia had not
    established that she lacked notice of the May 2007 removal hearing and that her
    motion was untimely for the purpose of showing exceptional circumstances.
    Further, it found that Mejia-Garcia’s case did not present an exceptional situation
    because her eligibility for a status adjustment—based on her marriage to a
    permanent resident—did not arise until years after entry of the removal order.
    Finally, the BIA denied Mejia-Garcia’s motion to remand the case to the IJ.
    Mejia-Garcia timely petitioned for review.
    We review de novo our subject matter jurisdiction. Martinez v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1219
    , 1221 (11th Cir. 2006). We review for abuse of discretion the
    denial of a statutory motion to reopen. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    568 F.3d 1252
    ,
    1256 (11th Cir. 2009). In doing so, we consider whether the decision was
    “arbitrary or capricious”; we will reverse if the BIA “misapplies the law in
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    reaching its decision” or fails to follow its own precedents “without providing a
    reasoned explanation for doing so.” Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    714 F.3d 1240
    ,
    1243 (11th Cir. 2013).
    Under the INA, we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of
    removal. See INA § 242(a)(1), (b)(9), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), (b)(9); Jaggernauth
    v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    432 F.3d 1346
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We review
    only the decision of the BIA, “unless the BIA has expressly adopted the IJ’s
    opinion or reasoning.” Jiang, 
    568 F.3d at 1256
    . “[A]dministrative findings of fact
    are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
    to the contrary.” INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    After the entry of a final order of removal, a petitioner may file a statutory
    motion to reopen removal proceedings. Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    827 F.3d 1278
    ,
    1283 (11th Cir. 2016). In the case of an in absentia removal order, the statutory
    motion to reopen must be filed (1) “within 180 days after the date of the order of
    removal” upon a showing that “the failure to appear was because of exceptional
    circumstances” or (2) at any time upon a showing that the petitioner did not receive
    notice of the hearing. INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i)–
    (ii). Exceptional circumstances include those that are “beyond the control” of the
    petitioner, such as “battery or extreme cruelty” to the petitioner, serious illness, or
    6
    USCA11 Case: 20-14215       Date Filed: 08/25/2021   Page: 7 of 9
    serious illness or death of a spouse, child, or parent. INA § 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1229a(e)(1).
    By regulation, the BIA and the IJ may also reopen removal proceedings or
    earlier decisions pursuant to their sua sponte authority. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2
    (a),
    1003.23(b). They have the “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party
    moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (a); see also
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(3) (same). Sua sponte reopening is warranted only in
    exceptional circumstances, but it may occur at any time. Butka, 827 F.3d at 1283.
    We lack jurisdiction to review a decision not to sua sponte reopen because
    the decision is committed to agency discretion, which is so wide and standardless
    that it is not reviewable. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    525 F.3d 1291
    , 1293–94 (11th
    Cir. 2008). For the same reason, we lack jurisdiction to review legal claims related
    to the BIA’s denial of a motion to sua sponte reopen proceedings. Butka, 827 F.3d
    at 1285–86. We have expressly left open the question of whether we may exercise
    jurisdiction over colorable constitutional claims related to an underlying request
    for sua sponte reopening. Id. at 1284; Lenis, 
    525 F.3d at
    1294 (citing Tamenut v.
    Mukasey, 
    521 F.3d 1000
    , 1005 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam)).
    This petition requires us to answer two central questions. The first is
    whether the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Mejia-Garcia’s motion to
    reopen pursuant to statutory or regulatory exceptions. The second question is—
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    USCA11 Case: 20-14215            Date Filed: 08/25/2021       Page: 8 of 9
    assuming we can exercise jurisdiction over colorable constitutional claims related
    to the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen—did Mejia-Garcia assert any such
    claims? If so, we would also have to address whether sua sponte reopening was
    warranted.
    Starting with the first question, to the extent that the BIA construed
    Mejia-Garcia’s motion as a statutory motion to reopen and denied her relief on
    these grounds, it did not abuse its discretion because her motion was untimely, and
    she did not establish that she lacked notice of the May 2007 hearing at which she
    was ordered removed in absentia. Accordingly, we deny the petition in part. 2
    As to the second question, even assuming we would have jurisdiction to
    review the BIA’s denial of Mejia-Garcia’s motion to sua sponte reopen if she
    raised a colorable constitutional claim, she has not done so. Mejia-Garcia asserts
    violations of her constitutional right to due process under the Fifth Amendment
    and her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the
    denial of her motion to sua sponte reopen cannot support a due process claim
    because she has no protected liberty or property interest in such relief. See
    2
    To the extent that Mejia-Garcia challenges the IJ’s additional findings that her motion to reopen
    was number-barred and that she failed to initially submit her I-485 application with her motion to
    reopen, those findings are not properly before us because the BIA did not adopt those findings in
    denying her motion to reopen, and, thus, they are not part of the final agency order under review.
    Moreover, Mejia-Garcia has abandoned any claim that the BIA erred by denying her motion to
    remand by not arguing it in her brief. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    , 1228 n.2
    (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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    USCA11 Case: 20-14215      Date Filed: 08/25/2021   Page: 9 of 9
    Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    513 F.3d 1244
    , 1253 (11th Cir. 2008). Nor does
    Mejia-Garcia indicate specifically how the BIA and IJ violated her equal protection
    rights. Because she has not identified any similarly situated group that was treated
    differently from her, her equal protection argument is not colorable. See Dawson v.
    Scott, 
    50 F.3d 884
    , 892 (11th Cir. 1995).
    Mejia-Garcia’s arguments that “denial of [her] request to reopen her case
    impedes on her due process rights” and infringes her “absolute right to reopen her
    case” are merely abuse-of-discretion arguments dressed in constitutional language.
    She disagrees with the BIA’s determination not to reopen, but she has not raised a
    cognizable constitutional claim. Therefore, we dismiss the petition for lack of
    jurisdiction to the extent Mejia-Garcia challenges the BIA’s decision not to sua
    sponte reopen the March 2007 order. See Butka, 827 F.3d at 1286.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
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