Edward Eaves v. Work Force Central Florida , 623 F. App'x 955 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13511
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-01065-ACC-KRS
EDWARD EAVES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WORK FORCE CENTRAL FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 16, 2015)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Edward Eaves appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Workforce Central Florida (“WCF”) in his employment discrimination
and retaliation suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2 and 2000e–3. After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.
I.
Eaves began working for WCF in October 2011 as a “Re-Employment
Connection Intern” (“Intern”) at one of WCF’s offices in Orlando. WCF is a
private, non-profit company providing job placement and career services to
employers and job seekers throughout Central Florida. Kevin Neal was WCF’s
Chief Operating Officer and interim Chief Executive Officer at the time of the
events giving rise to this action. Joyce Hinton was the Office Manager of the
location at which Eaves worked. She was also Eaves’s immediate supervisor.
Like other Interns, Eaves went through a two-week training program.
During the first week, Interns worked in a computer lab to learn about the services
offered by WCF while working one-on-one with WCF clients. During the second
week, Interns worked in the “resource room,” a faster-paced environment where
they shadow senior employees assisting WCF clients with a variety of employment
needs. Eaves completed his training and worked for WCF until December 21,
2011, when he was fired.
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Eaves later filed suit in federal court, contending that he had been
discriminated against by WCF based on his gender and retaliated against for filing
charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Regarding his claims of gender discrimination, he alleged the
following: (1) he was denied the opportunity to apply for a Re-employment
Specialist position in November 2011; (2) he was denied the opportunity to work
in the computer lab after his training period—having been told by Hinton that
“only women are allowed to work in the computer room”; (3) he was not provided
certain job resources or amenities that were given to other female employees, such
as his own telephone extension or a uniform; (4) he was treated differently than
female employees in terms of leave and attendance policies; and (5) he was not
informed of available positions and opportunities that were communicated to
female Interns.
As for his retaliation claims, Eaves alleged that (1) he was fired on
December 21, 2011, two days after informing WCF that he had filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC on December 7, 2011; and he was told by a manager
that he had been fired because of the EEOC complaint (retaliatory firing); and
(2) he applied for several available positions in March 2012, but WCF did not
interview him or even respond to his applications and requests for updates
(retaliatory failure-to-hire).
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WCF moved for summary judgment on all claims. Along with its summary-
judgment motion, WCF submitted, among other materials, affidavits by Hinton and
Neal, respectively. In her affidavit, Hinton stated that WCF had no record of
Eaves having applied in November 2011 for the Re-employment Specialist
position, which was not filled in 2011; that the only specific work-assignment
request that Eaves made was to remain in the computer lab after the first week of
training, which was denied because all Interns were required to complete training
in the resource room; that Eaves was not given a dedicated phone line due simply
to a lack of resources; and that on “multiple occasions” during his service as an
Intern, “Eaves exhibited angry, hostile and unprofessional behavior toward [her],
ultimately causing [her] to be fearful in his presence.”
In his affidavit, Neal stated that WCF’s Equal Employment Opportunity
officer, Willie Cooper, met with Eaves on December 21, 2011, to discuss his
EEOC charge. Neal “learned that during the meeting, Mr. Eaves accused Mr.
Cooper of being ‘condescending’ and ‘bias’ [sic] and exhibited angry, hostile and
unprofessional behavior toward Mr. Cooper.” According to Neal, he had also
learned that Eaves had engaged in similar behavior toward Hinton, “causing her to
be fearful in his presence,” and he fired Eaves based on this pattern of behavior.
Eaves responded in opposition to WCF’s motion for summary judgment. He
contended that Hinton’s and Neal’s affidavits were false, and he presented several
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personal affidavits on various matters. In one affidavit, Eaves contended that the
alleged fear of him was fabricated and was a pretext for discrimination.
The district court granted summary judgment to WCF. The court concluded
that the discrimination claims failed because Eaves had not shown that he was
qualified for the Re-employment Specialist position or that his remaining
allegations about various disparities in the workplace constituted a material change
in the terms and conditions of employment. The court also found that Eaves’s
retaliation claims failed because he could not demonstrate that WCF’s reasons for
firing him were pretextual and because he did not administratively exhaust his
retaliatory failure-to-hire claim.
After the court entered judgment, Eaves filed a motion for reconsideration
and several related motions, which largely attacked the district court’s exhaustion
determination and the admissibility of the affidavits from Neal and Hinton. The
district court denied these motions. Eaves now appeals.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
all reasonable inferences and reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review an order denying a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594
F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010); Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.
2007).
We liberally construe the pleadings and briefs of pro se parties. Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
874 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se
litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
III.
Eaves contends that WCF and its counsel engaged in fraudulent and
deceptive actions, including covering up evidence, altering testimony, procuring
false testimony, and otherwise acting in bad faith. He asserts that the district court
knew of these actions, but granted summary judgment, anyway, due primarily to
Eaves’s pro se status, in violation of Eaves’s due-process rights. Eaves presents
two principal arguments in his appellate brief: (1) the district court erred in finding
that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his retaliatory failure-to-
hire claim concerning several positions he applied for in March 2012; and (2) the
court improperly relied on Neal’s and Hinton’s affidavits in granting summary
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judgment because the affidavits were false, were not in compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and contained hearsay. 1
A.
In its summary-judgment order, and later in its order denying Eaves’s
motion for reconsideration, the district court addressed and rejected Eaves’s
contention that he had exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his
retaliatory failure-to-hire claim. We therefore review the facts pertinent to this
issue.
Eaves dual-filed his initial charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) in December 2011. In March
2012, Eaves amended this charge to include his termination on December 21,
2011. 2 In June 2012, Eaves received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC relating
to the first and amended charges.
Eaves then filed suit in federal court. After several amendments, in October
2012 he filed the operative complaint, which contains the retaliatory failure-to-hire
allegations. After the district court denied WCF’s motion to dismiss, Eaves,
according to the court, “realized that his claim regarding the March 2012
1
Eaves’s brief expressly lists three issues, but Issue One and Issue Three both relate to
whether the district court properly found that Eaves did not exhaust his administrative remedies
for his retaliatory failure-to-hire claim. Therefore, we jointly address these arguments.
2
As the district court did, we reject WCF’s contention that Eaves’s amended EEOC
charge was insufficient to exhaust his retaliatory-firing claim.
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applications was not properly based in a charge of discrimination,” so he “set out
on a course to belatedly cure his failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to
his retaliatory failure to hire claim.” On February 26, 2013, Eaves emailed the
FCHR requesting to file a formal complaint regarding the March 2012
applications, and on March 19, 2013, he filed a formal complaint with the FCHR
(“Third Charge”). In April 2013, WCF submitted a “Statement of Position” to the
FCHR stating that the claims in Eaves’s Third Charge were not properly before the
FCHR because Eaves had filed a civil lawsuit in federal district court covering
those same claims. On September 4, 2013, the FCHR issued a determination of
“no jurisdiction” as to the Third Charge.
On December 2, 2013, the district court granted summary judgment to WCF,
concluding in part that Eaves did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies
with respect to the Third Charge. The court found that Eaves had not filed a
charge of retaliatory failure to hire with the EEOC, and that the charge that he did
file with the FCHR was not filed before he brought suit in federal court.
To bring suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must first exhaust administrative
remedies by filing a timely discrimination charge with the EEOC. Wilkerson v.
Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Gregory v. Ga.
Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Prior to filing a Title
VII action, however, a plaintiff first must file a charge of discrimination with the
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EEOC.”). Consequently, a plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of
the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination. Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280.
Eaves’s arguments as to why the district court erred in finding a lack of
exhaustion are unavailing. First, Eaves asserts that his Third Charge was timely
filed on February 26, 2013, within one year of the alleged discriminatory act, but
the district court did not determine that the Third Charge was filed outside of the
applicable limitation period. Rather, the court concluded that Eaves had failed to
file his charge prior to filing his suit in court. So it does not matter to the district
court’s reasoning whether the Third Charge was filed on February 26 or
March 19—both dates fall after Eaves filed suit in court.
Second, Eaves contends that WCF’s counsel fraudulently represented to the
FCHR that it did not have jurisdiction over Eaves’s Third Charge. But nor did the
district court rely upon the FCHR’s finding of “no jurisdiction” in its exhaustion
determination. In short, Eaves’s arguments on appeal do not undermine the district
court’s stated reasons for finding a lack of exhaustion.
Eaves did not assert that he filed a charge with the EEOC alleging retaliatory
failure-to-hire, nor was that claim within the scope of his previous EEOC filings.
See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279-80; Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317. Accordingly, the
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district court properly found that Eaves did not exhaust his administrative remedies
as to his retaliatory failure-to-hire claim.
B.
Eaves also argues on appeal, as he did in a motion for reconsideration before
the district court, that the court abused its discretion when it granted summary
judgment in favor of WCF despite knowing that the affidavits of Neal and Hinton
were not in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were not sworn
to under penalty of perjury, and were notarized by Neal’s employee. Eaves asserts
that the affidavits contained fraudulent statements and hearsay evidence and that
the affidavits allowed WCF to argue that Eaves’s alleged unprofessional behavior
was its reason for firing him, when WCF had not previously raised any issue about
Eaves’s behavior.
Generally, evidentiary rulings, including decisions about whether to strike an
affidavit, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and are subject to reversal only
where substantial prejudice exists. Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255,
1259 (11th Cir. 2004). In the absence of a timely objection, however, formal
defects in the affidavit ordinarily are waived. Auto Drive-Away Co. of Hialeah,
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Inc. v. I. C. C., 360 F.2d 446, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1966).3 In addition, post-judgment
motions generally should not be used to raise arguments or present evidence that
could have been raised before the entry of judgment. Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343;
Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 667 (11th Cir. 1990).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to strike the
Neal and Hinton affidavits. Eaves could have challenged any alleged hearsay in
Neal’s affidavit before the district court granted summary judgment, but he did not.
Instead, Eaves did not contest the affidavits’ validity until after summary judgment
had been entered and therefore likely waived any defects in the affidavits. Even if
waiver did not apply, though, it was within the district court’s discretion not to
reconsider its summary-judgment order, given that Eaves could have challenged
any formal defects in the affidavits before the entry of judgment.
Alternatively, the district court thoroughly analyzed the merits of Eaves’s
challenges to the affidavits, and we discern no error in the district court’s
determination that there were no grounds to strike. We agree with the district court
that Neal’s recounting of his conversation with Cooper, WCF’s Equal Employment
Opportunity officer, was not hearsay, but rather was offered for its effect on the
listener, Neal, concerning his reasons for deciding to terminate Eaves’s
3
Pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), opinions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit.
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employment. See United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Generally, an out-of-court statement admitted to show its effect on the hearer is
not hearsay.”). In short, the district court did not err in declining to strike the Neal
and Hinton affidavits.
C.
Finally, Eaves’s brief contains allegations that the district court denied him
due process based on his pro se status. After reviewing the record of proceedings
in this case, which spanned nearly two years, and which included multiple
amended complaints and voluminous motions practice, we are unpersuaded that
Eaves did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims or that the
court penalized him because he was proceeding pro se.
IV.
Although Eaves arguably did not expressly challenge the reasons relied upon
by the district court in granting summary judgment, “[w]e read liberally briefs filed
pro se.” Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n.3; see also Finch v. City of
Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1989). A review of Eaves’s second
issue and the supporting argument shows that, while Eaves may not have artfully
stated that he was appealing the district court’s conclusion that no material issue of
fact existed regarding pretext for WCF’s firing of Eaves, he clearly made
arguments in his brief that he thought were to this effect, writing, for example,
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ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO CREATE A
MATERIAL ISSUE FALSELY PURPORTING TO THE
COURT IN TWO FRAUDULENT AFFIDAVITS
PLAINTIFF WAS FIRED DECEMBER 21, 2011, FOR
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE. DEFENDANT DID NOT
PROVIDE A REBUTTAL STATEMENT TO “EEOC”
WHICH NEITHER STATES THE ARGUMENT THAT
PLAINTIFF COMMITTED TO WORK PLACE
VIOLENCE. NOR DOES DEFENDANT MENTION
THIS ARGUMENT IN THEIR REBUTTAL TO EEOC.
SUBSEQUENTLY, DEFENDANT WAS CONTACTED
BY THE FLORIDA DIVISION OF
UNEMPLOYMENT. DEFENDANT WAS
REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A STATEMENT
OCONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION.
DEFENDANT REFUSED. PLAINTIFF WAS
AWARDED HIS UNEMPLOYMENT. DEFENDANT
CREATED A MATERIAL ISSUE TO ATTAIN
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
[Sic]. In view of these arguments and Eaves’s pro se status, we find Eaves’s brief
sufficient to present the question of whether the district court erred in finding no
genuine issue of material fact with respect to his retaliatory-firing claim. 4 See
Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. And, after careful review, we vacate and remand as to
this claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Eaves was
fired in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint earlier in December 2011.
4
We note that our consideration of this issue will not prejudice WCF, given that it has
addressed the merits of the district court’s summary-judgment order, including the retaliatory-
firing claim, in its response brief. However, we consider all other challenges to the district
court’s orders not otherwise addressed in this opinion to have been abandoned because they were
not presented in Eaves’s appellate brief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874 (holding that “issues not
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned”).
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To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show the following: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a
materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506
F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007). “The burden of causation can be met by
showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and
the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1364. “But mere temporal proximity,
without more, must be very close.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse
action. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975-76 (11th Cir. 2008). Once the
employer does so, the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that the employer’s
stated reason was pretext for retaliation. Id. The court’s role at the pretext stage is
“to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient
doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
were not what actually motivated its conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We assume, as the district court did, that Eaves has made out a prima facie
case of retaliation on this issue. However, we respectfully disagree with the
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district court’s determination that, in view of all the evidence, Eaves has not cast
sufficient doubt on WCF’s proffered reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the reasons for his termination were pretextual.
Here, WCF asserted, referring to Hinton’s and Neal’s affidavits, that Eaves
was fired because of his angry, hostile, and unprofessional behavior toward Cooper
and Hinton. Neal’s affidavit also states that he was the sole decision-maker in
firing Eaves. But, in Eaves’s deposition, which was submitted with WCF’s motion
for summary judgment 5, Eaves testified that Jennifer Wilson, whom Eaves
identified as the manager of his program (presumably the Re-Employment
Connection Program), was involved in the discussions leading to Eaves’s
termination, which appear to have occurred within two days of Eaves’s notification
of WCF that he had filed an EEOC charge. Specifically, Eaves testified that he
met with Cooper, WCF’s Equal Employment Opportunity officer, on December
21, 2011 (the day he was fired), to discuss his EEOC charge, and when Eaves
refused Cooper’s request to drop his EEOC charge, Cooper called Wilson. A little
while later, a conference call was held involving Hinton, Cooper, Wilson, Neal,
and a human resources director. According to Eaves, after the conference call,
Wilson told Eaves that “[he] was being relieved from [his] position because of the
5
Similar allegations are included elsewhere in the record, including an affidavit that
Eaves submitted in opposition to summary judgment.
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issues and the allegations that [he] filed against their company.” (Doc. 145–3 at
21-22).
Drawing all reasonable inferences and reviewing all evidence in the light
most favorable to Eaves, as we must at the summary-judgment stage, see Moton v.
Cowart, 631 F.3d at 1341, this evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
disbelieve WCF’s reason for Eaves’s termination and instead to conclude that
Eaves was fired in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
and refusing to drop his allegations of discrimination. In other words, a reasonable
jury could infer from these facts that Wilson was involved in the discussions
regarding Eaves’s termination; that, even if she did not have decision-making
authority, she knew why WCF had decided to fire Eaves; and that the reason was
actually retaliatory.
V.
In sum, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to WCF on
Eaves’s Title VII retaliation claim based on his termination on December 21, 2011,
and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. We affirm
the district court’s judgment in all other respects.
VACATED and REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
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