Larry Rumbough v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. , 626 F. App'x 224 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 14-10534   Date Filed: 09/03/2015   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10534
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-00811-ACC-DAB
    LARRY RUMBOUGH,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,
    LEXISNEXIS RISK DATA RETRIEVAL SERVICES, LLC,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 3, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
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    Larry Rumbough, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment in favor of Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Experian) and
    LexisNexis Risk Data Retrieval Services, LLC (LexisNexis) on his claims arising
    under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. Rumbough
    contends (1) the district court erred by concluding most of his claims against
    Experian were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) the district court erred by
    granting summary judgment to Experian on his claim that Experian violated 15
    U.S.C. § 1681b by providing his consumer report to certain entities for
    impermissible purposes; (3) the district court incorrectly concluded Rumbough
    failed to present sufficient evidence to show that any alleged FCRA violation
    caused his purported damages; and (4) the district court erred by granting summary
    judgment to LexisNexis on his claim that LexisNexis violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2
    by failing to furnish and verify accurate information for his credit report.
    The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will not recount them. After
    careful consideration, we affirm.
    1. Res Judicata
    The district court correctly determined that, with the exception of
    Rumbough’s impermissible purposes claim, Rumbough’s claims were barred by
    res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a claim is barred by prior
    litigation if: “(1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was
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    rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity
    with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is involved
    in both cases.” See Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 
    193 F.3d 1235
    , 1238 (11th Cir.
    1999).
    Rumbough does not dispute that the first three prongs of the res judicata test
    are satisfied—in 2007, he filed an action (Rumbough I) 1 that (1) was adjudicated
    on the merits (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction and (3) both he and Experian
    were named parties. Rather, Rumbough asserts the claims he raised in Rumbough I
    were distinct from the claims he raises in this action. We disagree. The
    complaints in both actions allege identical claims against Experian. Moreover, a
    review of the relevant documents from Rumbough I shows both actions were based
    upon the same nucleus of operative fact, i.e., Experian’s inaccurate reporting of a
    federal tax lien’s location in the Orange County Circuit Court, as opposed to the
    Orange County Comptroller’s office, and the denial of Rumbough’s mortgage loan
    application purportedly as a result of the inaccurate reporting. See 
    id. at 1238-39
    (“[I]f a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the
    same factual predicate, as a former action, . . . the two cases are really the same
    ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ for purposes of res judicata.” (quotation omitted)).
    1
    Rumbough v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al., Case No. 6:07-cv-1136-Orl-
    18GJK.
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    Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding Rumbough’s claims, with
    the exception of his impermissible purposes claim, were barred by res judicata.
    2. Impermissible Purposes
    With respect to Rumbough’s newly-added impermissible purposes claim (to
    which the district court did not apply res judicata) the district court nonetheless
    properly granted summary judgment to Experian. The FCRA describes certain
    permissible purposes for furnishing consumer reports, including to a person who
    “has a legitimate business need for the information—(i) in connection with a
    business transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or (ii) to review an account
    to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.”
    15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F). Furnishing a consumer report to a person who intends
    to use the information for the “extension of credit” or the “collection of an
    account” is also permissible. 
    Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
    Rumbough claims Experian violated § 1681b by furnishing his credit report
    to four entities without a permissible purpose: Bank of America, Chase, Oliphant
    Financial Corp., and Phillips & Cohen. Rumbough has presented no evidence,
    however, that Experian issued Rumbough’s report for any purpose not permitted
    by § 1681b. To the contrary, Rumbough testified he received letters from Oliphant
    Financial Corp. and Phillips & Cohen regarding debt collection, which is a
    permissible use for consumer reports. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).
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    Rumbough also testified he had credit cards and bank accounts with both Chase
    and Bank of America. Because Rumbough was a current account holder, these
    entities were permitted to use his report to ensure that he “continue[d] to meet the
    terms of [his] account.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F). Rumbough’s conclusory
    allegations that Experian furnished his report for an impermissible purpose are
    insufficient to create a material issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323-24 (“[T]he nonmoving party [must] go beyond the pleadings and . . .
    designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”); Ellis v.
    England, 
    432 F.3d 1321
    , 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[M]ere conclusions and
    unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary
    judgment motion.”). The district court therefore correctly granted summary
    judgment to Experian on Rumbough’s impermissible purposes claim.
    3. Damages
    Additionally, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to
    Experian because Rumbough cannot show any alleged FCRA violations caused his
    purported damages. See Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    936 F.2d 1151
    ,
    1161 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining, in an FCRA case, the plaintiff has an
    “affirmative duty” to “com[e] forward with evidence supporting his claim that
    [the] alleged inaccurate report caused him harm.”). Rumbough presented no
    evidence that Experian’s allegedly inaccurate reporting of the location of the
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    federal tax lien caused Rumbough’s mortgage denial. Rather, the handwritten note
    on the mortgage application indicated the denial was based on the fact the lien was
    unpaid, not where the lien was located. See 
    id. Furthermore, there
    is no evidence
    Experian acted with the intent necessary to award statutory damages, which are
    available only for “willfully fail[ing] to comply” with FCRA. See 15 U.S.C.
    § 1681n. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Experian on
    Rumbough’s damages claims.
    4. LexisNexis
    The district court likewise correctly granted summary judgment to
    LexisNexis. Rumbough claims LexisNexis violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 by
    knowingly misreporting the filing location of the federal tax lien. See 15 U.S.C.
    § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (“A person shall not furnish any information relating to a
    consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable
    cause to believe that the information is inaccurate.”). As discussed above,
    however, Rumbough presented no evidence that the inaccuracy of the location of
    the lien on his consumer report caused the denial of his mortgage application.
    Rather, the evidence showed his mortgage application was denied because the
    federal tax lien existed, not because notice of the lien was filed in a particular
    location. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in
    favor of LexisNexis. See Nagle v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 
    297 F.3d 1305
    ,
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    1307 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he failure to produce evidence of damage resulting
    from a FCRA violation mandates summary judgment.”); 
    Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1161
    (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff’s FCRA claim because plaintiff
    failed to establish the “inaccurate information on th[e] report was the cause of
    [plaintiff’s] denial of credit”).
    *     *      *
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgments in favor of
    LexisNexis and Experian are AFFIRMED.
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