Jason F. McGee v. The Honorable Carlton L. Kell , 335 F. App'x 3 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 8, 2009
No. 08-17063 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-01433-CV-TWT-1
JASON F. MCGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE HONORABLE CARLTON L. KELL,
Superior Court Judge, Cobb County,
Georgia,
Defendant,
MELVIN DRUKMAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 8, 2009)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jason F. McGee, acting without the benefit of counsel, brought this action in
district court seeking a declaratory judgment and other equitable relief from certain
orders entered by Judge Carlton L. Kell of the Superior Court of Cobb County,
Georgia. McGee alleged that these orders, which found that McGee was in
contempt of the state court’s order for child support and ordered McGee to pay the
unpaid support and to make payments necessary to clear title on certain real
property, were invalid because they were based upon unsworn statements and did
not properly set forth the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
district court dismissed McGee’s complaint, finding that it “lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to review and reverse state court orders and judgments” under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1986).
McGee appeals, asserting that the district court erred in finding that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider his complaint. We disagree. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine recognizes that federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, do not have
jurisdiction to review final state court decisions. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. More
recently, the Supreme Court instructed that the doctrine applies only to “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
2
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
The instant case fits squarely within the admittedly narrow confines of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. McGee was a “state-court loser” in his divorce
proceeding and child custody dispute who is now “complaining of injuries caused
by” the allegedly improper state court contempt orders entered by Judge Kell. See
id. The district court, therefore, properly found that it had no jurisdiction to
consider McGee’s claims. For this reason, we AFFIRM.
3