Michael David Denney v. Cynthia Nelson , 304 F. App'x 860 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
January 6, 2009
No. 08-10391 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00172-CV-WLS-1
MICHAEL DAVID DENNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CYNTHIA NELSON,
Warden,
JOHN DOES,
C.E.R.T. Officers at Autry State Prison,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(January 6, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael David Denney appeals the dismissal of his complaint that Cynthia
Nelson, the warden of Autry State Prison, and Nelson’s employees denied Denney
his right of access to the courts when they confiscated Denney’s legal materials.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We vacate in part, remand in part, and affirm in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Michael David Denney is a Georgia state prisoner who was formerly
incarcerated at Autry State Prison. On August 4, 2006, four unknown correctional
officers who worked on an emergency response team searched Denney’s cell and
confiscated Denney’s personal property, including legal research materials, key
pieces of evidence, pleadings from his state criminal cases, and a federal petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. In December 2006, Denney filed a complaint against
Warden Nelson and four unnamed correction employees and alleged that the
confiscation deprived him of his right of access to the courts in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court ordered Denney to supplement his complaint with
information about which legal actions the confiscation affected. Denney
complained that the employees confiscated exculpatory evidence in his state
criminal case, records of a federal habeas petition, copies of an application to file a
second or successive habeas petition, and pleadings and documents relevant to a
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federal case and a federal appeal. Nelson moved to dismiss Denney’s complaint
for failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Nelson argued that Denney’s complaint failed to state a claim because Denney
alleged no legal action that was hindered by the confiscation. Nelson presented
evidence that the litigation to which Denney referred had been resolved and that
Denney had no other pending litigation.
While Nelson’s motion was pending, Denney moved to compel Nelson to
answer interrogatories and a document request. Nelson moved for a protective
order and a stay of discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, and
Denney requested a hearing on the motion for a protective order and stay. Denney
also requested leave to supplement his complaint with evidence that he had
exhausted his administrative remedies, and Denney sought discovery and a hearing
or pretrial conference.
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant Nelson’s
motion to dismiss because Denney had neither challenged Nelson’s argument that
Denney had no pending litigation when his materials were confiscated nor proved
that the confiscation prevented him from timely pursuing other litigation. The
magistrate judge denied the other pending motions as moot. Denney objected to
the recommendation of the magistrate judge. Denney argued that the confiscation
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deprived him of materials he needed to “attack his sentences,” he had a pending
state habeas petition, and his request for a new trial had been denied because the
exculpatory evidence he needed to support it had been confiscated. Denney also
objected to the denial of his motion to compel discovery and request for a hearing.
The district court accepted the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The
district court determined that the litigation to which Denney referred “w[as]
concluded prior to the confiscation of his legal materials,” and that Denney failed
to allege that he suffered an actual injury. Denney filed a motion for
reconsideration and argued that he had a pending state court case and appeal, the
district court erred when it denied him discovery and leave to amend his complaint,
and he supported his allegations with facts and evidence. Denney appealed to this
Court.
The district court later denied his motion for reconsideration and gave two
reasons for denying Denney leave to amend his complaint. First, the district court
stated that it denied Denney leave because Denney made his request after Nelson
had moved to dismiss, and the district court considered Nelson’s motion a
responsive pleading. Second, the district court stated that it denied leave because
the amendment Denney sought, the inclusion of evidence that he exhausted his
administrative remedies, would not have affected the decision to dismiss the
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complaint.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,
and we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th
Cir. 1999). We review for abuse of discretion a denial of a motion to amend a
complaint, Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001), a denial of a
motion to compel discovery, Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837
(11th Cir. 2006), and a decision to rule on a motion to dismiss without an
evidentiary hearing, Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners, 412 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
Denney argues that his complaint stated a valid claim for denial of access to
the courts, and the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
leave to amend his complaint, his motion to compel discovery, and his request for a
hearing. Denney’s first two arguments are meritorious, but his third argument
fails. We discuss each argument in turn.
The district court erred when it dismissed Denney’s complaint because
Denney adequately alleged an injury to his right of access to the courts. Prisoners
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have a right to access to the courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wilson v.
Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998). “The doctrine of standing
requires that an inmate alleging a violation of the right of access to the courts must
show an actual injury” to that right. Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 349–51, 116 S. Ct. 2174,
2177, 2179–80 (1996)). An inmate must prove that the defendants’ actions
hindered or frustrated his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous direct criminal appeal,
habeas petition, or civil rights action. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, 116 S. Ct. at2181–82. Examples of actual injury include “missing filing deadlines or being
prevented from presenting claims.” Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290 n.10.
Denney established that the confiscation of his legal papers caused him
actual injury. Denny alleged that he intended but was unable to file a timely
habeas petition because he had been denied access to relevant legal materials.
Denney’s state conviction became final on March 1, 2006, and he had until March
1, 2007, to file a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Denney’s legal
materials were confiscated on August 4, 2006, and he filed his complaint on
December 20, 2006. In his supplement to the complaint, Denney complained that
the confiscation “hindered [his] filing of his habeas corpus petition in a timely
manner.” Because the confiscation of Denney’s materials allegedly hindered the
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timely filing of a habeas petition, Denney alleged an actual injury to his right of
access to the courts.
The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Denney leave to
amend his complaint to establish that he had exhausted his administrative remedies
on the grounds that Nelson had already filed a responsive pleading and the
amendment was futile. Denney was entitled to amend his complaint as a matter of
course. A plaintiff may amend his complaint “once as a matter of course” before a
responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Nelson’s motion to
dismiss did not terminate Denney’s entitlement to amend his complaint because the
motion was not a responsive pleading: “[T]he term ‘responsive pleading’ does not
include such filings as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.”
Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000).
Neither did the alleged futility of Denney’s amendment terminate his entitlement to
file it. “When the plaintiff has the right to file an amended complaint as a matter of
course . . . the plain language of Rule 15(a) shows that the court lacks the
discretion to reject the amended complaint based on its alleged futility.” Williams
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1292 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court did not have the discretion to deny Denney leave to amend his
complaint.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Denney’s
motion to compel discovery and denied Denney a hearing. Although neither
discovery nor a hearing are ordinarily necessary to resolve a motion to dismiss
because the allegations in the complaint are taken as true, Chudasama v. Mazda
Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997), the district court engaged in
limited discovery to determine whether Denney alleged an actual injury to his right
of access to the courts. Although Denney argues that he needed to present
evidence in response to Nelson’s motion to dismiss, the evidence he wanted to
present—that he exhausted his administrative remedies—was not relevant to the
question whether he had alleged an actual injury. The district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Denney’s requests for discovery and a hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE the dismissal of Denney’s complaint and denial of leave to
amend that complaint and REMAND for further proceedings. We AFFIRM the
denial of Denney’s requests for discovery and a hearing.
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