Cindy Laine Franklin v. Chris Curry , 738 F.3d 1246 ( 2013 )

Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 1 of 13
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-10129
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-03646-AKK
CINDY LAINE FRANKLIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHRIS CURRY,
individually,
JOHN SAMANIEGO,
individually, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 23, 2013)
Before MARCUS, BLACK and RIPPLE,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
*
The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 2 of 13
This case arises from Cindy Laine Franklin’s allegation that Michael Keith
Gay, a corrections officer at the Shelby County Jail, sexually assaulted her, and
Franklin’s ensuing lawsuit against Gay and various other officers at the jail. The
officers other than Gay (Appellants or the Supervisory Defendants) moved for
dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion,
and this interlocutory appeal followed. Upon review, we hold that Franklin has
failed to plead a constitutional violation and that Appellants are therefore entitled
to qualified immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
We begin with a recitation of the facts as drawn from Franklin’s complaint.
Although the complaint provides little information concerning the sequence and
temporal relation of events, we must accept Franklin’s well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Keating v. City of Miami,
598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). 1
As alleged in the complaint, on October 19, 2010, Franklin was transferred
to Shelby County Jail as a pretrial detainee. During the ensuing booking
procedure, Gay said to Franklin, “I want to see your rug.” Franklin responded that
Gay “would get in trouble,” to which Gay replied, “there is nothing you can do.”
1
However, we afford no presumption of truth to legal conclusions and recitations of the
basic elements of a cause of action. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009); Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011).
2
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 3 of 13
As Gay took Franklin’s fingerprints, he placed her hand on his genitals, causing
Franklin to object and tell Gay to leave her alone.
Some time later, as Franklin slept in her cell, Gay jolted her awake by
getting on top of her with his pants unzipped. Gay forced his penis into Franklin’s
mouth as she resisted. Franklin told her boyfriend and her parole officer about the
incident, after which John Samaniego, a chief deputy at the jail, came to speak with
her. 2 The Alabama Bureau of Investigation obtained a statement from Franklin
and commenced a formal investigation of her claims. Franklin spoke with other
female detainees who told her that Gay had sexually abused another female inmate
and engaged in sex with another. Gay eventually resigned.
Franklin commenced the instant action against Gay, Chris Curry, Sheriff of
Shelby County, and five other prison officials: Samaniego, the chief deputy who
spoke with her about the assault; Chris George, Division Commander of
Investigations; Chris Corbell, Division Commander of Uniform; Jay Fondren,
Division Commander of Corrections; and Ken Burchfield, Division Commander of
Administration. Franklin asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against all of the officers in their individual capacities. The Supervisory
Defendants—Curry, Samaniego, George, Corbell, Fondren, and Burchfield—
2
Franklin’s complaint does not indicate the duration of her stay at the Shelby County
Jail. However, counsel have stated in filings before the district court and in their brief on appeal
that she was only there “a very short time.”
3
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 4 of 13
moved to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. 3 The district court denied the
motion, finding that Franklin had asserted a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right by alleging that she had been harmed by the Supervisory
Defendants’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The
Supervisory Defendants now appeal the district court’s denial of their motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss is an
appealable order that we review de novo. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837 n.5
(11th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Qualified immunity shields government officials acting within their
discretionary authority from liability unless the officials “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738
(1982). The parties do not dispute that the Supervisory Defendants are government
officials who were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority. Thus,
to evaluate their entitlement to qualified immunity, we ask whether Franklin has
alleged a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, whether the constitutional
right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. Keating, 598
3
Franklin’s claims against Gay are not a part of this appeal.
4
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 5 of 13
F.3d at 762. We hold that Franklin failed to allege a violation of a constitutional
right and thus falls short of this standard.
In determining whether Franklin alleged a constitutional violation, the
district court made two related errors. First, it applied an incorrect legal standard.
Second, the district court allowed Franklin to satisfy the standard it applied with
conclusory allegations. We address each error in turn.
A. The Legal Standard for Deliberate Indifference
In analyzing Franklin’s claims against the Supervisory Defendants, the
district court erred by finding allegations that they “knew or should have known”
of a substantial risk of serious harm sufficient to state a deliberate indifference
claim. Deliberate indifference requires more than constructive knowledge.
The district court began its analysis correctly, stating that, “to establish
supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the supervisor
personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a
causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” D. Ct. Order at 6 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
The district court then explained that a plaintiff can show a causal connection, inter
alia, when “the supervisor’s policy or custom resulted in deliberate indifference.”
D. Ct. Order at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). To this point, the district
5
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 6 of 13
court’s analysis was sound. However, the court then went astray when it
concluded that Franklin had alleged a causal connection, stating:
Franklin alleges that a causal connection exists because Sheriff Curry
was on notice of Officer Gay’s alleged conduct and the need to correct
this practice, but failed to do so, and because Sheriff Curry’s policy or
custom resulted in deliberate indifference,
and
[w]ith respect to Officers Samaniego, Burchfield, Fondren, Corbell
and George, Franklin alleges that they too knew or should have known
of Officer Gay’s pattern of inappropriate conduct with female
detainees and inmates but “were deliberately indifferent . . . .”
D. Ct. Order at 7 (emphasis added). In reaching these conclusions, the district
court neglected to analyze whether Franklin had properly alleged deliberate
indifference. In fact, the elements of deliberate indifference do not appear
anywhere in the district court’s order.4
Its first step should have been to identify the precise constitutional violation
charged—in this case, deliberate indifference—and to explain what the violation
requires. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2692 (1979)
(before discussing liability in a § 1983 suit, “it is necessary to isolate the precise
constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged”). Had the district
4
We do not suggest that district courts must recite a specific set of words in evaluating a
claim, but without setting out even the basic contours of deliberate indifference, the district court
was unable to properly analyze the sufficiency of Franklin’s allegations.
6
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 7 of 13
court done so, Franklin’s failure to allege the required elements would have been
apparent.
Deliberate indifference requires the following: “(1) subjective knowledge of
a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than
gross negligence.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 (11th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Franklin’s allegations that the
Supervisory Defendants “knew or should have known” of a substantial risk clearly
fall short of this standard. “Were we to accept that theory of liability, the
deliberate indifference standard would be silently metamorphosed into a font of
tort law—a brand of negligence redux—which the Supreme Court has made
abundantly clear it is not.” Id. at 1334. As we have stated, “[t]o be deliberately
indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Id. at 1332 (internal quotation marks omitted). Franklin
failed to allege the Supervisory Defendants actually knew of the serious risk Gay
posed even in the most conclusory fashion. Because of this failure, Franklin did
not allege a constitutional violation, and Appellants were entitled to qualified
immunity.
7
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 8 of 13
B. Franklin’s Factual Allegations
The district court’s second error was finding purely conclusory allegations—
i.e., a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”—sufficient to
satisfy the standard it applied. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is important that
defendants be apprised of the conduct that forms the basis of the charges against
them. Conclusory allegations fail to apprise defendants of the factual basis of the
plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a
pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specifically, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met only where the facts
alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s allegations must establish
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Mere
“labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do,” and a plaintiff cannot rely on “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration
8
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 9 of 13
omitted); see also id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.”); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying the
standards described in Iqbal to a § 1983 case involving defendants asserting
qualified immunity in place of the heightened pleading standard applied in prior
cases).
Franklin’s repeated allegations the Supervisory Defendants were deliberately
indifferent or their actions constituted or resulted in deliberate indifference carry
no weight. Similarly, by alleging Appellants “knew or should have known” of a
risk, Franklin has merely recited an element of a claim without providing the facts
from which one could draw such a conclusion. The district court found these
allegations sufficient. Had the district court followed the Supreme Court’s “two-
pronged approach” of first separating out the complaint’s conclusory legal
allegations and then determining whether the remaining well-pleaded factual
allegations, accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,” the
insufficiency of Franklin’s allegations would have been obvious. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also Randall, 610 F.3d at 709-10 (“A district
court considering a motion to dismiss shall begin by identifying conclusory
allegations that are not entitled to an assumption of truth—legal conclusions must
9
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 10 of 13
be supported by factual allegations.”); accord Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 82 (1st
Cir. 2012).
Stripping away Franklin’s conclusory allegations leaves only a handful of
properly pleaded facts—specifically, (1) that Gay verbally harassed Franklin and
told her “there is nothing you can do,” (2) that Gay sexually assaulted Franklin,
(3) that Gay had previously sexually assaulted another female detainee, and (4) that
Gay had previously had sexual relations with a third female detainee. Given only
these facts, Franklin’s complaint is insufficient to state a plausible claim that each
of the Supervisory Defendants should have known of a substantial risk that Gay
would sexually assault Franklin, much less that each defendant was subjectively
aware of the risk and knowingly disregarded it. Franklin states that Sheriff Curry
“failed to promulgate, to adopt, to implement or to enforce policies, rules, or
regulations to safeguard female inmates,” but she does not describe any of the
policies that were in place, the sort of policies that should have been in place, or
how those policies could have prevented Gay’s harassment. Similarly, Franklin
alleges the names and titles of the other Supervisory Defendants 5 but alleges
5
Appellants point to a related problem of Franklin grouping defendants together in a
manner that makes it impossible to determine the unconstitutional conduct attributed to each one
individually. Our conclusions about the insufficiency of Franklin’s allegations generally render
analysis of this particular deficiency unnecessary except to emphasize the requirement that
Franklin allege each Supervisory Defendant’s subjective awareness of the risk of harm and that
each of them exhibited deliberate indifference through his own actions. Meeting these
requirements without any individualized allegations other than Appellants’ names and titles is
unlikely.
10
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 11 of 13
nothing about the significance of their titles, their individual roles in the jail, their
personal interactions or familiarity with Gay, their length of service, their
management policies, or any other characteristics that would bear on whether they
knew about but were deliberately indifferent to Gay’s conduct and the risk he
posed. 6 From Franklin’s allegations, a finder of fact could not even conclude that
all of the Defendants were ever in the jail, much less that each of their individual
actions constituted deliberate indifference to the risk Gay would abuse Franklin.
Subjecting Appellants to the full “panoply of expensive and time-consuming
pretrial discovery devices,” Nero Trading, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 570 F.3d
1244, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009), and forcing them to defend this action based on
Franklin’s inadequate allegations not only runs counter to the general rules of
pleading, it also undermines qualified immunity’s fundamental purpose of
protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
6
Before the district court and in her appellate briefs, Franklin essentially conceded that
her allegations concerning the Supervisory Defendants other than Curry were insufficient and
attempted to excuse her lack of specificity by admitting that she simply does not know the details
about the Supervisory Defendants’ responsibilities at this stage. Far from excusing her
insufficient pleadings, this admission only reinforces our conclusion that her complaint was due
to be dismissed. In any event, Franklin cites no legal basis for her contention that her lack of
knowledge should relax the pleading standard to which she is held. Cf. DM Research, Inc. v.
Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he discovery process is not
available where, at the complaint stage, a plaintiff has nothing more than unlikely speculations.
While this may mean that a civil plaintiff must do more detective work in advance, the reason is
to protect society from the costs of highly unpromising litigation.”).
11
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 12 of 13
law” from the costs of suit. Aschroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
2085 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If anything, Franklin’s allegations suggest that the policy of the jail was to
promptly investigate claims of sexual harassment. She alleges that shortly after
she reported Gay’s conduct to her parole officer, a prison official discussed the
attack with her, and an investigation commenced. Ultimately, the officer alleged to
have engaged in wrongdoing resigned. In this way, Franklin’s own allegations
undercut the legal conclusions she asks us to draw from them and fail to allow a
court “to draw [a] reasonable inference that the [Appellants are] liable for the
misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Thus, even under the relaxed standard the district court applied, Franklin’s
conclusory allegations are insufficient to allege a constitutional violation. This
provides an additional basis for Appellants’ entitlement to qualified immunity. 7
IV. CONCLUSION
7
As part of their appeal, Appellants argue that under Iqbal supervisors can only be liable
for constitutional violations if a plaintiff alleges purposeful and intentional conduct. We reject
this argument. Appellants ignore the Iqbal Court’s caution that “[t]he factors necessary to
establish a [claim] will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.
Ct. at 1948. The discussion of purposeful intent in Iqbal pertained to claims of invidious
discrimination, not deliberate indifference. See id. Nothing in Iqbal suggests that supervisors
cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference toward risks posed by their subordinates or that
such liability requires a higher mens rea than any other deliberate indifference claim. So long as
a supervisor’s own conduct—and not that of his subordinate—constitutes deliberate indifference,
his status as a supervisor changes nothing. See id.
12
Case: 13-10129 Date Filed: 12/23/2013 Page: 13 of 13
In light of the foregoing, Franklin failed to allege a constitutional violation,
and the district court erred in denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss.
REVERSED.
13