Mario Jimenez v. Karen Wizel , 644 F. App'x 868 ( 2016 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11861
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-20821-UU
MARIO JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KAREN WIZEL,
Mother; and in re: the support and welfare of Mario
Simon Jimenez-Wizel and Karen Nicole Jimenez-Wizel,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (DCF),
THEREZA HERNENDEZ,
DCF Investigator,
MELYSSA LOPEZ,
DCF Case Coordinator,
YVETTE B. REYES MILLER, ESQ., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 17, 2016)
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Before HULL, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mario Jimenez, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his complaint for failure to state a claim. Jimenez filed this suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, requesting removal of a state court child
custody dispute between him and his ex-wife, Karen Wizel. Jimenez alleged (1)
that the state court violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his
religion and his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in parenting his two
children when it ordered he could only have supervised visitation based on
Jimenez’s religious practices and beliefs; and (2) the state court violated his due
process rights by failing to give him an opportunity to contest the allegations
against him or adequate notice of the hearing. The district court initially dismissed
his complaint for failure to state a claim but provided Jimenez with an opportunity
to amend. In his amended complaint, Jimenez more specifically raised claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that various parties to the state
custody action, as well as Wizel, conspired to violate these same constitutional
rights.
The district court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the state court
proceedings because child custody disputes are not within the federal courts’
original jurisdiction, and it dismissed the remainder of Jimenez’s amended
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complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Jimenez argues that the district
court erred in both determinations. After a thorough review of Jimenez’s amended
complaint and brief, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible
error. Therefore, we affirm.
I
At every stage in the proceeding, we review de novo the jurisdiction of not
only our court but also the district court. See Castleberry v. Goldome Credit
Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 779–80 (11th Cir. 2005).
Those matters over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction may
be removed from state court to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The federal
courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over federal questions. 28 U.S.C. §
1331. In addition, those matters regarding enforcement of constitutional rights
related to equality may properly be removed to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1443. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1443 to apply “only to rights that are
granted in terms of [racial] equality and not to the whole gamut of constitutional
rights.” Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 1790 (1966);
accord Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
These rights are distinguishable from those vindicated by the due process clause
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “confer equal rights in the sense . . . of bestowing
them upon all.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792, 86 S. Ct. at 1790 (internal quotation
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marks omitted). Rachel set out a two-pronged test to determine whether removal is
proper under § 1443(1): “First, the petitioner must show that the right upon which
the petitioner relies arises under a federal law providing for specific civil rights
stated in terms of racial equality. Second, the petitioner must show that he has
been denied or cannot enforce that right in the state courts.” See Conley, 245 F.3d
at 1295 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Jimenez sought to remove to federal court a child custody dispute still
pending in Florida state court, citing, inter alia, to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and
1443 as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. The district court held it
lacked jurisdiction to review the state court action. We hold that the district court
was correct in ruling that removal of the child custody dispute was improper under
§§ 1441 or 1443.
The child custody dispute is not a matter arising under the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts because it is not an action “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Though Jimenez asserts that he is not seeking modification of a child custody
degree, the violations he alleges stem in whole from the ongoing state court’s
adjudication of the dispute between him and his wife regarding the forthcoming
custody arrangement. Therefore, removal under § 1441 would be improper. See
also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703–04, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (1992)
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(holding that the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction divests
federal courts of jurisdiction to review child custody orders under § 1332, as well).
Further, the state court case that Jimenez wishes to remove to federal court
does not implicate equality-based rights cognizable under § 1443. It is not clear
whether Jimenez sought to remove under § 1443(1) or § 1443(2), but removal is
improper under either provision. For purposes of § 1443(1), Jimenez only alleged
violations of his rights to due process, free exercise of religion, and Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest as a parent, which are “broad constitutional
guarantee[s] of general application,” rather than rights implicating racial equality. 1
See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792, 86 S. Ct. at 1790. Thus, he fails to satisfy the first
prong of Rachel. See Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295–96. Separately, removal under §
1443(2) would be improper because Jimenez is not a federal officer or agent. See
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 823–24, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 1809–10
(1966).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in
concluding it lacked jurisdiction over the pending state court child custody
1
We have assumed, without ever holding, that § 1985(3) qualifies as an equal rights statute
for purposes of § 1443(1). See Conley, 245 F.3d at 1296. However, Jimenez has not provided
sufficient allegations to make facially plausible that he cannot pursue this claim in state court,
thus failing the second part of the Rachel test. See id. Accordingly, we need not address today
whether § 1985(3) definitively qualifies as an equal rights statute for purposes of § 1443(1).
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dispute.2 Separately, we agree that the district court had jurisdiction over those
claims Jimenez raised under §§ 1983 and 1985, because these are federal statutes
providing federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1977).
We next determine whether Jimenez properly stated a claim for relief under
either federal cause of action.
II
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
“[N]aked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” or “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted). In
reviewing whether a complaint meets the pleading requirements, “[p]ro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
2
To the extent Jimenez seeks injunctive relief from the state court’s order granting the
emergency motion suspending time-sharing with his children, we cannot provide such relief.
The state judicial proceedings remain ongoing, implicate important state interests in the family,
and there remains adequate opportunity for Jimenez to raise his constitutional challenges
throughout the ongoing proceedings as well as the state appellate courts. See Middlesex Cty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 2521 (1982); 31
Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2003).
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and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cty. Pub.
Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009).
A
In his amended complaint, Jimenez seeks to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against several actors: Wizel, the mother of his children; Florida Department
of Children and Families (DCF); DCF investigator Thereza Hernandez; DCF case
coordinator Melyssa Lopez; attorneys Yvette B. Reyes Miller, Ana C. Morales,
Margarita Arango Moore, and Sabrina Salomon; Reyes & Arango Moore, P.L.
(R&AM) and the Legal Defense Firm of South Dade, P.L. (LDF); Vanessa L.
Archer; Archer Psychological Services P.A. (APS); guardian ad litem Anastacia
Garcia; and the Law Office of Anastasia M. Garcia, P.A. (LOAG) (collectively, the
Defendants). He alleges that the Defendants violated his First Amendment rights,
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and other unidentified federal rights.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an act or
omission committed by a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
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States. See Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). A
person acts under color of law when he or she is “acting with power possessed by
virtue of the defendant’s employment with the state.” See Edwards v. Wallace
Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1995). Although state employment is
“generally sufficient” to make a person a state actor, “[n]ot all actions by state
employees are acts under color of law.” Id. at 1523. A private party may be held
liable as a state actor in only three circumstances:
(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly
encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution
(“State compulsion test”); (2) the private parties
performed a public function that was traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State (“public function
test”); or (3) the State had so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the private parties that it
was a joint participant in the enterprise (“nexus/joint
action test”).
See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted).
The district court did not err in dismissing Jimenez’s § 1983 claim against
Wizel, Reyes Miller, Morales, Arango Moore, Salomon, Archer, Garcia, LDF,
R&AM, LOAG, and APS because they are private parties, and Jimenez did not
properly plead any allegations that the circumstances satisfy one of the three tests
to transform them into state actors. See id.; see also Higdon v. Smith, 565 F. App’x
791, 793 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining that guardian ad litem was not a
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state actor under any of the three tests set forth in Rayburn). In addition, the
district court did not err in ruling that Jimenez failed to state a claim against DCF.
If DCF is a state agency, then it is entitled to sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. See Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d
1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1983). Even if it is not a state agency, though, Jimenez’s
claim still fails because the only allegation he raised was that DCF is liable for the
actions of its agents, and “[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach
under § 1983.” See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197,
1203 (1989).
Lastly, Jimenez failed to state a claim against Hernandez and Lopez.
Accepting the facts in the light most favorable to Jimenez, Hernandez and Lopez
may be considered state actors by virtue of their alleged employment at DCF.
Jimenez argues that Hernandez and Lopez violated his parental right to make
decisions pertaining to “the care, custody, and control” of his children, see Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000) (plurality opinion),
without due process when they interviewed his minor children without receiving
his consent or providing him notice, and then gave a copy of the resulting report to
Wizel’s attorneys without providing him an opportunity to object to any
conclusions in the report. Even accepting these allegations as true, Jimenez has not
stated a plausible claim for relief under § 1983.
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There are instances in which the First Amendment’s freedom of religion
intersects with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections of parental
rights, and a parent’s interest subsequently sounds under both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–66, 64
S. Ct. 438, 441–42 (1944). However, the fact that religious convictions underpin a
parent’s interest in raising his children does not insulate him from some
governmental interference in the family relationship. See id. at 166, 64 S. Ct. at
442; Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1996). The constitutional
guarantee to due process requires that a parent receive “timely notice, in advance
of a hearing in which parents’ rights to custody are at stake.” Dykes v. Hosemann,
743 F.2d 1488, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984). The plaintiff-parent must adequately allege
that his constitutional right was deprived without adequate process. See, e.g.,
Novak v. Cobb Cty.-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1567 (N.D. Ga.
1994).
Here, Jimenez did not properly allege that the relevant state actors denied
him adequate process. Although Jimenez alleges that interviewing the minor
children without his consent or notice is a deprivation of due process, we disagree.
The alleged interview arose in the middle of an ongoing child custody dispute,
amidst allegations that Jimenez was mistreating his children, and Jimenez failed to
plead any connection between the interview and the purported deprivation of his
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constitutional parental rights. Further, the alleged provision to Wizel’s attorneys of
a copy of a report generated from that interview, without first allowing Jimenez to
preemptively “correct” it, is not a deprivation of due process. In the absence of
additional, plausible, factual allegations tying a lack of process to the alleged
deprivation of a constitutional right, Jimenez’s complaint fails to assert a claim
against Hernandez and Lopez under § 1983. Therefore, we affirm the order of the
district court as to Jimenez’s § 1983 claim.
B
Jimenez also alleges that the Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights
and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3). We address each claim in turn.
Section 1985(2) provides a cause of action for two types of conspiracies: “[T]he
first four clauses of [§] 1985(2) refer to conspiracies that are designed to obstruct
the course of justice in any court of the United States” while “the last two clauses
of [§] 1985(2) refer to conspiracies designed to deny or interfere with equal
protection rights.” See Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.
1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 To state a claim under § 1985(2), then,
the plaintiff must either “show a nexus between the alleged conspiracy and a
proceeding in federal court” or “show a racial or otherwise class-based
3
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding
that all decisions of the “old Fifth” Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on
September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
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discriminatory animus.” Id.; cf. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 726, 103 S. Ct.
1483, 1488 (1983) (no requirement to show class-based animus when plaintiff
alleges a violation of the first part of § 1985(2)). Irrespective of the type of
conspiracy alleged, the plaintiff must provide sufficient allegations to make
plausible that there was a “meeting of the minds between two or more persons to
accomplish [the] common and unlawful plan.” See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The district court concluded that Jimenez failed to state a claim under §
1985(2) because he provided insufficient allegations that any conspiracy that
occurred was premised on class-based animus. However, in so ruling, the district
court misunderstood claims under § 1985(2) to always require evidence of class-
based animus. Contrary to the district court’s reading, Jimenez’s complaint
attempts to allege both types of § 1985(2) conspiracies, only one of which requires
sufficient allegations of class-based animus. We conclude that the district court’s
error was harmless, however, because Jimenez failed to state a claim premised on
either type of conspiracy recognized under § 1985(2).
Jimenez’s complaint first alleges that Reyes and Morales conspired with
Wizel to violate Jimenez’s civil rights by procuring an emergency hearing based
on an “inaccurate and misleading document[]” and without providing Jimenez
proper notice, because notice was sent to the wrong address. This type of
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allegation sounds more in the first type of conspiracy recognized under § 1985(2)
because it involves a judicial proceeding. However, the type of proceeding
allegedly involved was one in state court, not federal court; this is not an allegation
that properly forms a basis for relief under § 1985(2). See Bradt, 634 F.2d at 800
(describing the first type of conspiracy recognized under § 1985(2) as one
pertaining to obstructions of justice in federal courts); McAndrew, 206 F.3d at
1035 n.2.
Separately, Jimenez alleges that several different actors conspired to violate
his civil rights and discriminated against him on the basis of his Christian faith.
This allegation sounds under the second half of § 1985(2). However, even
assuming that discrimination on the basis of identification with a particular
religious group could form the basis of a claim under § 1985(2), Jimenez’s
allegations prove conclusory in nature. For example, his complaint alleges that Dr.
Archer conspired with persons unnamed to violate his civil rights by making a
false DCF accusation pertaining to the burning of his daughter’s legs with an iron,
and that Dr. Archer’s report, upon which the state court relied, falsely determined
his religious beliefs to be “fanatical” in nature. Jimenez provides no statements
connecting these two allegations, or otherwise indicating that Archer intended to
discriminate against Jimenez on the basis of his religion. Moreover, Jimenez
provides no statements indicating that the existence of a conspiracy is factually
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plausible. Rather, Jimenez provides only “naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement,” which is not enough. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted).
Jimenez also seeks relief under § 1985(3). To state a claim for relief under §
1985(3), a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts reflecting
(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges
and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is
either injured in his person or property or deprived of any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
See Childree v. UAP/GA CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (11th Cir. 1996).
For purposes of the second element, the plaintiff must properly plead an allegation
that “some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus [lay] behind the conspirators’ action.” See id. at 1147 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although other circuits have recognized that a religious group may serve as
a protected class for purposes of the second element of a § 1985(3) claim, 4 this
circuit has not done so. However, even assuming that being a member of a
particular religious group provides a basis for a § 1985(3) claim, Jimenez’s
complaint still fails to state a claim because, as noted above, he provides no
4
Cf., e.g., Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130–31 (2d Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Gilmartin,
686 F.2d 1346, 1357–58 (10th Cir. 1982); Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 48 (4th Cir. 1981).
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allegations that any two individuals conspired to deprive him of equal protection of
the laws due to his religious beliefs. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d
1033, 1039–40 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing basic elements of a conspiracy); see
also Childree, 92 F.3d at 1146–47 (listing the first two elements of a claim under §
1985(3) to be evidence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection
of the law).
Therefore, the district court did not err in ruling that Jimenez failed to state
a claim under § 1985(3).
III
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Jimenez
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
AFFIRMED.
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