T. Patton Youngblood, Jr. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company , 638 F. App'x 837 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11214
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-02607-RAL-EAJ
T. PATTON YOUNGBLOOD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(December 28, 2015)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
T. Patton Youngblood, Jr., appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(“State Farm”), on Youngblood’s lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment and
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damages for breach of contract, which was filed in state court and then removed to
federal court by State Farm. The lawsuit stems from an accident that occurred on
December 24, 2002, involving a 1996 Lexus LS400 that was titled to
Youngblood’s ex-wife, Angela Youngblood (“Angela”), and that resulted in the
death of the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident. About one month
earlier, Youngblood had brought the Lexus to a used car dealership, Extreme Auto
Sales (“Extreme”), to be sold on his behalf. At the time of the accident, the Lexus
was being driven by an Extreme employee, who had taken the car home for the
night. In a separate lawsuit brought by the estate of the driver of the other vehicle,
Youngblood was found vicariously liable for over $100,000 in damages.
At the time of the accident, Youngblood had an insurance policy with State
Farm that covered his 2001 GMC Yukon (“the insurance policy”). In the district
court, Youngblood maintained that, on December 24, 2002, the Lexus was covered
under the “newly acquired car” provision of the insurance policy, which provided
automatic coverage for a newly acquired car for 31 days after its “delivery to you
or your spouse.” Youngblood contended that, pursuant to the terms of his marital
settlement agreement with Angela, he did not acquire use and possession rights in
the Lexus until December 22, 2002, and thus “delivery” did not occur until that
date, rendering the Lexus covered under the newly acquired car provision on
December 24, 2002. The district court disagreed, concluding that the Lexus had
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been delivered to Youngblood on November 5, 2002, when he took possession of it
from Angela, and that the newly acquired car coverage expired on the
thirty-second day thereafter, December 7, 2002. On appeal, Youngblood contends
that the district court erred by treating the word “delivery” in the newly acquired
car provision as unambiguous, and he maintains that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to when the delivery occurred. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all the evidence and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318, 1321
(11th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The interpretation of a provision in an insurance contract is a
question of law, which we review de novo. Stephens, 749 F.3d at 1321.
The parties do not dispute that, in this diversity case, Florida law governs the
interpretation of the insurance policy. See Sphinx Int’l Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 412 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Florida
law, if the terms of an insurance contract are clear and unambiguous, a court must
interpret the contract in accordance with its plain meaning, and, unless an
ambiguity exists, the court should not resort to outside evidence or complex rules
of construction. Key v. Allstate Ins. Co., 90 F.3d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1996)
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(citing, inter alia, Rigel v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 76 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1954); Old
Dominion Ins. Co. v. Elysee, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1 DCA 1992); and
Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Lehrman, 443 So. 2d 408, 408-09 (Fla. 4 DCA
1984)). In deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, words should be given their
natural, ordinary meaning. Id. Ambiguity does not exist simply because a contract
requires interpretation or fails to define a term. Id. When interpreting insurance
contracts, a court may “consult references commonly relied upon to supply the
accepted meanings of words,” such as dictionaries. Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 969
So. 2d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 2007).
Here, the district court noted that the term “delivery” was not defined in the
insurance policy, so it looked to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary for
the plain and common meaning of the word, which included “transfer of the body
or substance of a thing.” Applying that definition to the newly acquired car
provision in the insurance policy, the district court concluded that “delivery of the
car to you” meant transfer of the physical car to Youngblood. 1 The district court
did not err in concluding that the term “delivery” was unambiguous and in giving
that word its plain and common meaning. See Key, 90 F.3d at 1549; Garcia,
969 So. 2d at 291-92; see also Dixie Ins. Co. v. Detamore, 515 So. 2d 1390, 1392
1
Consistently, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “delivery” as “[t]he act of giving
up possession of; surrender” and “[t]he action of handing over, or conveying into the hands of
another,” both of which suggest the transfer of a physical object. Delivery, Oxford English
Dictionary (Sept. 2015).
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(Fla. 5 DCA 1987) (concluding that automatic coverage for a newly acquired car
began when the insured took control and possession of the car, not on the earlier
date when she had paid for it, or on the later date when she received the title).
Nor did the district court err in holding that delivery occurred on November
5, 2002. In making that determination, the district court relied on the undisputed
facts that, in November 2002, Youngblood and Angela were in the process of
dissolving their marriage. During the marriage, Angela had driven the Lexus, and
had insured the Lexus with State Farm. While the title was solely in Angela’s
name, Youngblood and Angela had originally purchased the Lexus with a loan, on
which Youngblood was the sole obligor. When Youngblood brought the Lexus to
Extreme in mid-November 2002, he still owed $16,500 on the loan. As she and
Youngblood were dissolving the marriage, Angela decided to buy a less expensive
vehicle that would be safer for her and Youngblood’s young daughter. On
November 5, 2002, Angela purchased a 1999 Isuzu Rodeo from a car dealership.
That same day, Youngblood met Angela at the dealership, where he picked up the
Lexus. Angela never again took possession of the Lexus, and transferred her
insurance policy with State Farm to the Isuzu. These undisputed facts support the
district court’s conclusion that Youngblood took physical possession of the Lexus
on November 5, 2002, and that the “delivery” occurred on that day.
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Youngblood argues that the term “delivery” could reasonably be construed
to have occurred, instead, when he became the legal owner of the Lexus, upon his
receipt of exclusive use and possession rights in the vehicle. He bases his
argument on the terms of his marital settlement agreement with Angela, which
provided that:
[Angela] will transfer all of her right, title and interest in [the Lexus]
to [Youngblood] and [Youngblood] will pay all future payments
relating to the aforesaid Lexus, promptly when due, until the
promissory note is paid in full. However, [Angela] shall be entitled to
the use and possession of said vehicle until thirty (30) days following
receipt of the One Hundred Seventy Five [Thousand] Dollars and
No/100 ($175,000.00) from [Youngblood] in accordance with this
Agreement in order for her to obtain appropriate transportation for
herself and the minor child. During the remainder period of the
aforesaid term of payment of the promissory note on the Lexus,
[Youngblood] shall have exclusive use and possession of the said
Lexus and [Youngblood] shall be solely responsible for any insurance,
maintenance and other expenses.
We are unpersuaded. It is undisputed that Angela received the $175,000
from Youngblood on November 21, 2002. Youngblood maintains that, reading the
insurance policy in concert with the marital settlement agreement, “delivery” could
reasonably be interpreted to have occurred on the thirty-first day thereafter,
December 22, 2002, when Youngblood obtained exclusive use and possession
rights in the Lexus. However, the district court correctly determined that, because
the term “delivery” in the insurance policy was unambiguous, there was no need to
refer to extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning. See Key, 90 F.3d at 1549.
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Moreover, Youngblood’s interpretation of “delivery” is contrary to the plain and
common meaning of the word, in that, on December 22, 2002, the “substance or
body” of the Lexus was not transferred in any way. See Taurus Holdings, Inc. v.
U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (“courts may not rewrite
contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the
intentions of the parties”) (quotation omitted). Instead, the Lexus remained at
Extreme, where Youngblood had earlier brought it to be sold on his behalf.
Youngblood also argues that, because the insurance policy defines a newly
acquired car to include “an added car purchased by or leased to you or your
spouse,” the newly acquired car provision is most reasonably read as providing
automatic coverage when an insured acquires the legal right to use and possess the
added car, which did not occur in this case until December 22, 2002. Again,
Youngblood’s interpretation of the meaning of “delivery” is contrary to the plain
and common meaning of that word. Additionally, the undisputed facts show that
Youngblood, in fact, had use and possession of the Lexus on November 5, 2002,
and that Angela had ceded use and possession on that date.
Finally, Youngblood points to the deposition testimony of State Farm
Corporate Representative Kenneth Lee White that, to insure a vehicle, one must
have an ownership interest in the vehicle, with Youngblood arguing that, prior to
December 22, 2002, he had no insurable interest in the Lexus. Youngblood’s
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argument is contrary to Florida law, which provides that a person has an insurable
interest in property, even if he does not have an ownership interest in it, if he has
an “actual, lawful, and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of
the subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage or
impairment.” Overton v. Progressive Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 4 DCA
1991) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.405(2)) (quotation omitted). The undisputed facts
show that, on November 5, 2002, Youngblood owed at least $16,500 on the
promissory note for the Lexus. Moreover, in mid-November 2002, he brought the
Lexus to Extreme to be sold on his behalf, and he expected to obtain ownership
and exclusive use and possession rights in the vehicle pursuant to the terms of the
marital settlement agreement. Based on these facts, Youngblood had a substantial
economic interest in the preservation of the Lexus, which was insurable under
Florida law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for State Farm.
AFFIRMED.
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