In re: Anthony Johnson , 810 F.3d 1247 ( 2016 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-10011
________________________
IN RE: ANTHONY JOHNSON,
Petitioner.
__________________________
Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)
_________________________
(January 20, 2016)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
MARTIN, Circuit Judge:
Anthony Johnson has filed a pro se application for authorization to file a
second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
federal sentence. We can authorize such a filing only if we certify that the second
or successive motion is based on either:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would
have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
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on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). It is Mr. Johnson’s duty to “make[] a prima facie showing
that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(C).
Mr. Johnson’s application relies in part on Johnson v. United States, __ U.S.
__, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in
Welch v. United States, No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 90594 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2016), to
decide “[w]hether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), announced a
new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that
are on collateral review.” Pet. for Writ of Cert. at i, Welch v. United States, No.
15-6418, 2015 WL 9666637 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2015). Because Mr. Johnson’s petition
raises the question that will be decided in Welch, we hold his case in abeyance
until the Supreme Court decides Welch.
We recognize that it will likely take the Supreme Court longer than 30 days
from now to decide Welch. This means that we may not rule on Mr. Johnson’s
application within the 30-day timeframe specified by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)
(“The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or
successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.”). This
Court has never decided if this 30-day timeframe is mandatory. All eight of the
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Courts of Appeals that have decided this question in a published opinion have said
it is not. 1 We agree with those courts.
I.
We do not read the language of § 2244(b)(3)(D) to make the 30-day
timeframe mandatory. It’s true that the statute says a court “shall grant or deny”
applications like Mr. Johnson’s “not later than 30 days” after filing. But the statute
makes no provision for what happens when compliance with this timeline isn’t
practical. The law is well-established that “[a] statutory time period is not
mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public official to act
within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply
1
See Rodriguez v. Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1998); Word v. Lord,
648 F.3d 129, 129 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[W]here an issue requires a published
opinion that cannot reasonably be prepared in [] time [] we may exceed the thirty-day time
limit.” (quotation omitted)); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (noting
that “the importance of the issue presented justified” exceeding “the 30–day time limitation
established by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(3)(D)”); In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 334–35 (6th Cir.
1997) (“[F]ailure to comply with the thirty-day provision does not deprive this Court of the
power to grant or deny a motion under § 2244(b)(3)(A),” “[b]ecause the provision is hortatory or
advisory rather than mandatory.”); Gray-Bey v. United States, 201 F.3d 866, 867 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“We agree with our sister circuits . . . that the 30–day period may be extended for those few
cases which require reasoned adjudication and cannot be resolved within the statutory period.”);
Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We agree with the majority of our
sister circuits and hold that when a § 2255(h) motion presents a complex issue, we may exceed
§ 2244(b)(3)(D)’s thirty-day time limit.”); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“[W]e agree with other circuits that the time limit in section 2244(b)(3)(D) is
hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory.” (quotation omitted)).
The Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do not appear to have ruled on this question. And
though the Fifth Circuit has said it is “statutorily required” to rule within 30 days, In re White,
602 F. App'x 954, 956 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished), it does not appear to have published an
opinion addressing the question.
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with the provision.” Fort Worth Nat. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 469
F.2d 47, 58 (5th Cir. 1972)2 (emphasis added). See also Gray-Bey, 201 F.3d at
868 (noting that interpreting the 30-day timeframe as hortatory rather than
mandatory “reflects a reconciliation between the commands of legislation and the
exigencies of judicial decisionmaking that is well grounded in the law”).
The principle is especially compelling when a statutory timeframe is
directed at the judiciary. This kind of timeframe implicates a court’s power to hold
proceedings in abeyance, and “[a]n appellate court’s power to hold an order in
abeyance . . . has been described as ‘inherent,’ preserved in the grant of authority
to federal courts to ‘issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law,’ All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426–27, 129 S.
Ct. 1749, 1756–57 (2009). “A reviewing court must bring considered judgment to
bear on the matter before it, but that cannot always be done quickly enough to
afford relief to the party aggrieved by the order under review. The choice for a
reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly or participation in what
may be an ‘idle ceremony.’” Id. at 427, 129 S. Ct. 1257. Here too, we see no
reason to perform the idle ceremony of answering a question that the Supreme
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding all decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
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Court plans to answer soon.
The rule that Congress must be explicit when it tries to restrict jurisdiction
based on a deadline is additionally important here because this is a habeas case. In
habeas cases, this rule finds further support in “the fact that equitable principles
have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas corpus.” Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560, (2010) (quotation omitted).
That being the case, “we will not construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional
equitable authority absent the clearest command.” Id. (quotation omitted). See
also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (“[H]abeas corpus
is, at its core, an equitable remedy.”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83
S. Ct. 373 (1963) (“[Habeas corpus] never has been a static, narrow, formalistic
remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose”). Our traditional
equitable authority includes the power to make adjustments “that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication.” R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S. Ct.
643, 645 (1941).
Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) established certain procedural limits on the scope of habeas review
(including the gatekeeping procedure at issue in this case), it did so “without
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undermining basic habeas corpus principles and while seeking to harmonize the
new statute with prior law.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649, 130 S. Ct. at 2562. See also
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (“AEDPA’s present
provisions [] incorporate earlier habeas corpus principles.”). The Supreme Court
has told us that AEDPA’s “purposes, and the practical effects of our holdings,
should be considered when interpreting AEDPA. This is particularly so when
petitioners ‘run the risk’ under the proposed interpretation of ‘forever losing their
opportunity for any federal review.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945–
46, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2854 (2007) (quoting Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275,
125 S. Ct. 1528, 1533 (2005)).
There is another reason to join the view of the other Courts of Appeals on
this question: “when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to
adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of
them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—
whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before
the Court.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81, 125 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2005).
Here, interpreting § 2244(b)(3)(D) as precluding a Court of Appeals from holding
a second or successive application in abeyance raises substantial constitutional
questions. Specifically, it may interfere with the judiciary’s ability to grant
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effective habeas relief, implicating both the Due Process Clause and the
Suspension Clause.
“Congress knows the difference between encouraging and mandating
specific conduct, and knows how to impose binding obligations on courts when it
wishes to do so.” Siggers, 132 F.3d at 336. Congress chose not to include
language in AEDPA that would have made the 30-day timeframe mandatory. And
“we resist[] an interpretation of the statute that would ‘produce troublesome
results,’ ‘create procedural anomalies,’ and ‘close our doors to a class of habeas
petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress’
intent.’” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 946, 127 S. Ct. at 2854. We are thus convinced that
we have jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s application beyond § 2244(b)(3)(D)’s 30-
day timeframe. 3
II.
Our ruling today follows how we have long treated § 2244(b). This isn’t the
first time we have recognized that the § 2244(b)(3)(D) timeframe can be exceeded
3
The exact mechanism used to ensure time for proper consideration of a case can vary.
In Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit dealt with the 30-
day timeframe “by denying the motion within thirty days’ and “then stay[ing] [the] mandate and
order[ing] briefing on the question of whether or not it was appropriate to reconsider that
decision.” Id. at 367. Of course, whether a court proceeds through the steps taken in Triestman
or the more straightforward one of simply holding a case in abeyance beyond the time limit, the
outcome is the same. Although we see no problem with the Triestman approach, we also don’t
believe that the statute requires it.
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when proper handling of a case requires more than 30 days. In the past, we have
scheduled briefing and oral argument beyond the 30-day timeframe. See In re
Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Mr. Davis filed an application
to file a second or successive habeas petition on October 22, 2008. See CMS
Docket, In re Davis, No. 08-16009. The panel ordered briefing, entered a
conditional stay, allowed the filing of amicus briefs, and heard oral argument. Id.
The panel then denied the application six months after the original application had
been filed. Id. We expect that Mr. Johnson’s application will take less time than
that. All we need to know to rule here is whether the Supreme Court has made
Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review. This is a yes-or-no question, and
Welch is unlikely to leave any doubt about the answer.
Our Court has also recognized our power to sua sponte order rehearing of an
application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See In re Lambrix, 776
F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Rehearing under these circumstances
is likely to extend the resolution of an application well beyond the 30-day
timeframe. Also, rehearing could implicate the same question raised in another
pending application, especially when the retroactivity of a recent Supreme Court
case is at stake. When this circumstance arises, it makes no sense to treat the
timeframe as mandatory for one application but not another. That would result in
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two applications which are identical on the merits having opposite outcomes based
on the date each application was filed. And the same would be true when a Court
of Appeals certifies to the Supreme Court a question that would decide an
application to file a second or successive motion. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 667 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2341–42 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). In these cases,
the unique procedural posture of an application might make it impractical to
properly decide an issue in 30 days. In the same way, it makes no sense here to
dispose of Mr. Johnson’s case when the Supreme Court is about to answer the very
question he has raised.
III.
We are aware of this Court’s recent suggestion that “this Court necessarily
must apply § 2244(b)(2) under a tight time limit in all cases, since the statute
expressly requires us to resolve this application within 30 days, no matter the
case.” In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1157 n.9 (11th Cir. 2014). Anything Henry
said about § 2244(b)(3)(D) is dicta because it was not necessary to decide the
issues then before the Court. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10
(11th Cir. 2009) (“As our cases frequently have observed, dicta is defined as those
portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.”
(quotation omitted)).
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Mr. Henry was a death row inmate who filed a request for stay of execution
just four days before his scheduled execution, along with an emergency application
for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b). Henry, 757 F.3d at 1152–53. Mr. Henry expressly requested
“expedited consideration of” his application to file a second or successive motion
based on the then-recent decision in Hall v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014). He emphasized that his application would be “moot if not ruled on” before
his scheduled execution. Notably, Mr. Henry’s application did not ask for full
briefing or oral argument. Rather, he requested a prompt ruling and an “order
authorizing the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to
consider a second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus raising a claim
of intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia,” as well as a stay of execution
pending the outcome of the second or successive habeas proceedings in the District
Court.
Three days after Mr. Henry filed his emergency application, our Court
denied it “for two independent reasons: first, the rule enunciated in Hall v. Florida
ha[d] not been made retroactive by the United States Supreme Court; moreover,
even if it had been, [Mr. Henry] ha[d] not shown a reasonable likelihood that he
would benefit from the rule in Hall.” 757 F.3d at 1153. This Court also denied
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Mr. Henry a stay because he had not established any likelihood of success on the
merits. Id. at 1163. Given that the Court denied Mr. Henry’s emergency motion
on the merits three days after it was filed, that Mr. Henry had requested expedited
consideration, and that the 30-day timeframe was not at issue in the case, it is safe
to say that anything Henry said about the 30-day timeframe was dicta, not holding.
See Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1253 n.10.
IV.
The federal courts have already failed Mr. Johnson once. We know from
Johnson that the statute that required Mr. Johnson’s mandatory minimum 15-year
sentence violates the Due Process Clause. We also know that the government has
long conceded that the Supreme Court made Johnson retroactive to cases on
collateral review. And we know that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Welch to resolve the circuit conflict on whether Johnson applies retroactively to
cases like this one. We will soon know from Welch whether Mr. Johnson’s § 2255
motion can proceed. It’s simply a matter of time.
Unfortunately, time is the one thing Mr. Johnson (and every other prisoner
in the Eleventh Circuit who is in his position) does not have. The Supreme Court
decided Johnson on June 26, 2015. That means (as far as we can tell now, and
without deciding the question) that the deadline for Johnson-based applications is
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June 26, 2016, regardless of when Welch is decided. See Dodd v. United States,
545 U.S. 353, 358–59, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2482–83 (2005) (holding that the one-year
statute of limitations for both “initial [§ 2255] motions as well as second or
successive ones” begins to run on the date the Supreme Court initially recognizes a
new rule, not the date it makes the rule retroactive). In order to ensure that Mr.
Johnson isn’t condemned to an unlawful prison sentence solely based on our
mistake of law, we hold his application in abeyance until the Supreme Court
decides Welch.
APPLICATION HELD IN ABEYANCE.
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