United States v. Edgar Alexander Pirela Pirela , 809 F.3d 1195 ( 2015 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________
No. 14-13767
__________________________________
D.C. Docket No.: 1:14-cr-20099-CMA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDGAR ALEXANDER PIRELA PIRELA,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
___________________________________
(December 22, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN, Circuit Judge, and WALTER, *
District Judge.
*
Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
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WALTER, District Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Edgar Alexander Pirela Pirela (“Pirela Pirela”) appeals
the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on his conviction for fraud and
misuse of a visa, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). Pirela Pirela’s appeal turns on
the meaning of the phrase “procured by means of,” as it is used in the first
paragraph of section 1546(a). Following a review of the record and with the benefit
of oral argument, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts.
On February 18, 2014, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of
Florida indicted Pirela Pirela for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), specifically
alleging that, on February 7, 2014, Pirela Pirela “did knowingly possess, use, and
attempt to use a document prescribed by statute and regulation for entry into the
United States, that is, a United States visa, which the defendant knew was
procured by means of a false claim and false statement, and to have been
otherwise procured by fraud, and unlawfully obtained[.]” (emphasis added).
The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts, as well as the exhibits
offered in support of the United States of America’s (“the Government’s”) case.
Pirela Pirela is a citizen and national of Venezuela with no legal status in the
United States. In 2006, Pirela Pirela was arrested in Venezuela for “serious
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intentional injuries, misuse of [a] weapon, unlawful arm bearing, and unlawful
deprivation of freedom.” On January 6, 2011, Pirela Pirela signed and submitted a
DS-160 online application for a United States visa, in which he answered “No” to
the following question: “Have you ever been arrested or convicted for any offense
or crime, even though the subject of a pardon, amnesty, or other similar action?”
On January 12, 2011, the United States Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, issued
Pirela Pirela a B1/B2, or non-immigrant, visa, with an expiration date of January
10, 2021.
On February 7, 2014, Pirela Pirela arrived at Miami International Airport
(“MIA”), from Maracaibo, Venezuela, and presented his Venezuelan passports and
B1/B2 visa to United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers for
examination and entry into the United States.1 Pirela Pirela was referred to a
passport control secondary examination. During the examination, a CBP officer
conducted an internet search of Pirela Pirela’s full name, which revealed a
document reflective of a prior court proceeding and prompted the officer to
question Pirela Pirela’s criminal history. The CBP officer then retrieved a copy of
Pirela Pirela’s visa application from the records of the United States Department of
State, reviewed the application, and proceeded to question Pirela Pirela regarding
1
Pirela Pirela presented two passports at MIA: an expired Venezuelan passport, containing the
B1/B2 visa at issue; and a current Venezuelan passport.
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the contents thereof. In a sworn statement, taken by the CBP officer, Pirela Pirela
acknowledged his prior arrest in Venezuela; his guilty plea to, and conviction of, a
lesser charge; and his failure to disclose this information on the visa application
because he was afraid his visa would be refused.
B. Relevant Procedural History.
Pirela Pirela entered a plea of not guilty and waived his right to a trial by
jury. A bench trial commenced on April 8, 2014, at which time the Government
moved to admit the joint stipulations of fact and exhibits. The Government then
declined to present three law enforcement witnesses, who were present and
prepared to testify, believing that the joint submissions obviated the need for the
witnesses’ testimony. Prior to resting, the Government argued that it had
established a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), as charged, based on the joint
submissions and Pirela Pirela’s admission to having made a false statement on his
visa application because he was afraid that a truthful response would result in his
application being denied. At the close of the Government’s case, Pirela Pirela
moved for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
29, arguing that the Government had failed to prove that Pirela Pirela’s visa was
procured by means of a false statement. While admitting that his negative response
to the visa application question regarding his criminal history was indeed a false
statement, Pirela Pirela argued that the phrase “procured by means of” involved a
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heightened materiality requirement. In other words, Pirela Pirela argued that the
Government had failed to prove that answering the question truthfully would have
rendered Pirela Pirela statutorily ineligible for a visa. Pirela Pirela contended that
this failure of proof was fatal to the Government’s case, relying on judicial
interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), which prohibits unlawful procurement of
citizenship or naturalization. The district court reserved ruling and, prior to
adjourning, ordered Pirela Pirela to file a written motion for a judgment of
acquittal, to which the Government would then have an opportunity to respond.
On July 15, 2014, the district court issued an order, with written reasons,
denying Pirela Pirela’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The court disagreed with
Pirela Pirela’s proposed meaning of “procured by means of” in section 1546(a) and
adopted the Government’s position that it need only prove that the false statement
had a natural tendency to influence agency action or was capable of influencing
agency action. In doing so, the court found section 1546 more analogous to a
customs enforcement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 542, which prohibits the entry of goods
by means of false statements, than to the naturalization statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1425(a). Additionally, the court acknowledged that the natural tendency standard
had been applied to section 1546(a)’s fourth paragraph but the heightened
materiality standard urged by Pirela Pirela had never been applied to any portion
thereof. Accordingly, the district court found that the evidence of record at that
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point, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to
convict Pirela Pirela under the natural tendency standard. The court nevertheless
granted the Government’s request to re-open the case to allow for a more complete
record.
On August 21, 2014, the bench trial resumed, and the Government presented
two witnesses: CBP Officer Ericson Santiago and Special Agent Bryan Baer from
the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (“DSS”). Officer
Santiago, who was the officer responsible for Pirela Pirela’s secondary
examination at MIA, testified regarding Pirela Pirela’s nervous behavior during the
examination. That behavior prompted Officer Santiago’s internet search and
resultant discovery of Pirela Pirela’s undisclosed criminal history, which led to
further questioning by the officer. Officer Santiago testified that these questions
were important, because criminal history is relevant to admissibility into the
United States and, by making the false statement at issue, Pirela Pirela forestalled
further inquiry that would have occurred prior to the issuance of the visa.
The second witness, Special Agent Baer, testified regarding his training and
experience in the criminal investigation of visa and passport fraud. Through his
experience working with consular officers who adjudicated B1/B2 visa
applications, Special Agent Baer explained the adjudication process, as follows. A
consular officer adjudicates each visa application by considering numerous factors,
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including: whether a non-immigrant visa applicant is actually attempting to
immigrate to the United States; the applicant’s actual intentions relative to the
representations made on the application; and whether the applicant is ineligible for
a visa. The agent described three categories of ineligibilities: hard ineligibilities,
which preclude an applicant from reapplying absent approval from the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Homeland Security; ineligibilities that do not preclude an
applicant from reapplying in the future; and administrative suspension, which
suspends an application to allow for additional information and processing. An
administrative suspension occurs when the visa applicant checks “any potentially
derogatory boxes” on the application. The agent further testified that criminal
history may affect an applicant’s eligibility and that, at the very least, if a Bl/B2
visa applicant admitted a prior arrest or conviction on his application, additional
information would be requested by the reviewing officer. The result would
ultimately depend on the severity of the crime and might include mere suspension
of the application, hard ineligibility, or visa denial.
At the close of the Government’s case, Pirela Pirela renewed his motion for
a judgment of acquittal, which was again denied. Pirela Pirela elected not to testify
or present any evidence. During a brief closing argument, Pirela Pirela stressed
Special Agent Baer’s testimony that the mere fact that an applicant has a criminal
history does not automatically result in the denial of the visa application. In
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conclusion, the district court found that the testimony of the two agents further
supported the court’s prior ruling that Pirela Pirela’s false statement regarding his
criminal history did have a natural tendency to influence agency actions, such that
Pirela Pirela was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). By agreement of the parties,
the court proceeded directly into an expedited sentencing hearing, at which time
Pirela Pirela was sentenced to time served and a three-year term of supervised
release. This appeal followed, raising only the issue of the district court’s denial of
Pirela Pirela’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and interpretation of the phrase
“procured by means of” a false claim or statement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo both the interpretation of a criminal statute, United
States v. Rojas, 718 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), as well as the
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence.
United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1210 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “We
will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence in a non-jury trial unless,
upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no
reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The
“materiality” element of false statement prosecutions must be decided by the
factfinder, United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511-15 (1995); a district court’s
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bench trial findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, O’Ferrell v. United States,
253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
The question presented is both novel and narrow; it depends solely on the
meaning of the phrase “procured by means of,” as it is used in the first paragraph
of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). “When construing a criminal statute, we begin with the
plain language; where ‘the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear
and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must
presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’” United States
v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Steele,
147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). The language used in the
indictment tracked the statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly . . . uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains . . .
any such visa . . . for entry into . . . the United States, knowing it to
. . . have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or
to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (emphasis added). The fourth paragraph of section 1546(a)
provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly makes under oath. . . any false statement with
respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other
document required by the immigration laws or regulations . . . shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned . . . or both.
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(emphasis added). Pirela Pirela was charged and convicted under the first
paragraph, wherein the word “procure” appears without the word “material;”
however, the fourth paragraph specifies that it is the making of a material false
statement which is criminal. Pirela Pirela argues that Congress’s failure to employ
identical language in paragraphs one and four militates in favor of applying a
heightened materiality standard here, as opposed to the lower standard previously
found to be applicable to the fourth paragraph. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-
Ochoa, 607 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s misstatements were
material because capable of influencing agency action); United States v. Causevic,
636 F.3d 998, 1005 (8th Cir. 2011) (false statement need only have natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing the decision, and need not
actually be relied upon by agency in making its decision).
Indeed, it is a “well-established rule of statutory construction that courts
must give effect, if possible, to every clause and every word of a statute.”
Jaggernauth v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)). And, “[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). However, in the context of the unenumerated paragraphs
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of section 1546(a), the purported variations are not so readily deciphered. As
pointed out by the defense, the paragraphs criminalize different conduct and,
outside of the differences emphasized above, do not otherwise parallel each other’s
language. In other words, the independent application of the two paragraphs does
not require that the first paragraph espouse a heightened materiality standard. Thus,
the plain language is instructive but does not resolve the issue before the court.
Pirela Pirela urges us to interpret the key phrase “procured by means of” in
the same way that courts have interpreted the word “procure” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1425(a), which makes it unlawful to “knowingly procure[] or attempt[] to
procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other
evidence of naturalization or of citizenship[.]” In support thereof, Pirela Pirela
relies on case law from other circuits, citing the Supreme Court’s fragmented
decision in Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988). In interpreting another
denaturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), Kungys acknowledged a distinction
between the requirements that the misrepresented fact must have been material and
whether citizenship was procured as a result of that misrepresentation. 485 U.S. at
767. Kungys held “that the test of whether [the defendant’s] concealments or
misrepresentations were material is whether they had a natural tendency to
influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Id. at 772
(emphasis added). If the misrepresentation is such that the truth “would predictably
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have disclosed other facts relevant to [the applicant’s] qualifications[,]” id. at 774,
then proof thereof would raise a rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for
citizenship. Id. at 777. Acknowledging, then, that “citizenship is a most precious
right,” Kungys’s concurrence went on to establish that this “presumption of
ineligibility does not arise unless the Government produces evidence sufficient to
raise a fair inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed.” Id. at 783
(Brennan, J., concurring).2 An applicant could then refute that presumption, and
avoid denaturalization, by showing that “the statutory requirement as to which the
misrepresentation had a natural tendency to produce a favorable decision was in
fact met.” Id. at 777.
Following this analysis, Pirela Pirela argues that a valid conviction would
have required the Government to prove that, had Pirela Pirela responded truthfully
to the criminal history inquiry on his visa application, he would have been
statutorily ineligible for the visa. He cites to both Seventh and Ninth Circuit
decisions in support of his argument. See, e.g., United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d
709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009) (advising district courts to treat procurement as a separate
element from materiality, one requiring evidence that would raise a fair inference
2
The Ninth Circuit has recognized Justice Brennan’s concurrence as the controlling standard of
materiality in section 1425(a) prosecutions. See United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1304
(9th Cir. 1992). “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotation omitted).
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that the defendant was statutorily ineligible for naturalization); United States v.
Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing section 1425(a) conviction
for lack of evidence from which any factfinder could fairly infer that defendant
was actually ineligible for naturalization). Both the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kungys, as well as the circuit decisions cited by Pirela Pirela, are readily
distinguishable, in that they each involve a denaturalization statute under which
conviction would automatically result in the loss of citizenship. No such parallel
exists under section 1546(a).
The testimony of DSS Special Agent Baer established that there is no
automatic statutory ineligibility, with respect to an applicant’s response to the
criminal history inquiry on a B1/B2 visa application. Instead, at the very least, the
admission of a prior arrest or conviction on a B1/B2 visa application would trigger
the need for additional information and further processing, involving some degree
of discretionary decision-making on the part of the consular officer involved.
Pirela Pirela’s misrepresentation was therefore such that the truth “would
predictably have disclosed other facts relevant to [his] qualifications.” Kungys, 485
U.S. at 774. This necessary step in the decision-making process was forestalled by
Pirela Pirela’s false statement, which he made for fear that a truthful statement
would have resulted in visa denial. The Government need not prove whether the
end result would have been mere suspension, hard ineligibility or visa denial. Such
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a heightened burden of proof is not appropriate in a prosecution that would not
result in loss of citizenship upon conviction. Simply put, lawful possession of a
B1/B2 non-immigrant visa may not be readily equated with naturalization or
citizenship.
Instead, it is both reasonable and appropriate to apply a standard which
requires that Pirela Pirela’s false statement exhibited a level of materiality such
that it would have had “a natural tendency to influence or the capability to
influence government action.” United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359, 1363
(11th Cir. 1998) (as applied in prosecution pursuant to the Arms Export Control
Act). To this end, the Government analogizes to 18 U.S.C. § 542, which is a
customs enforcement statute, proscribing entry of goods by means of false
statements. Section 542 provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever enters or introduces . . . into the commerce of the United
States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false
invoice . . . or by means of any false statement . . . or procures the
making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto
without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement . . .
[s]hall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 542. The Government relies heavily on the Second Circuit’s explicit
adoption of the natural tendency test over a more stringent but-for materiality test,
in the context of section 542. United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d
131, 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he natural tendency approach is far more consistent
with the purpose of the statute–to ensure truthfulness of representations made
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during importation–than is a but for test”). We, too, find the Second Circuit’s
reasoning persuasive. Significantly, its analysis points out that the application of a
heightened standard would encourage lying, as the Government would “bear the
difficult burden of proving what would have happened if a truthful statement had
been made.” An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d at 136. Such an interpretation,
encouraging falsehoods in the face of a statute clearly prohibiting the making of
false statements, would undoubtedly frustrate the statutory purpose and lead to
absurd results. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1237 (11th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if
possible, so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.”) (quoting In re Chapman,
166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897)).
Pirela Pirela cites An Antique Platter of Gold not for its holding but for its
recognition of an apparent split in our sister circuits regarding the materiality
requirement of section 542, and he further points us to a binding former Fifth
Circuit decision, United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 602 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1979),
which requires a heightened materiality standard.3 In Ven-Fuel, an oil importation
case, the Fifth Circuit held fraudulent statements to be immaterial, because they
3
Fifth Circuit decisions issued before the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
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had “no significance whatsoever with respect to the actual importation of the oil”
but referred only to the quality of a collateral oil storage agreement. 602 F.2d at
753. The Fifth Circuit found that the statements could not be material “[a]bsent a
logical nexus” between the statements and the actual importation of oil. Id. While
there may be an authoritative divide regarding section 542, we are faced now with
determining the appropriate standard of materiality involved in a section 1546(a)
prosecution. Here, a logical nexus is not only present between Pirela Pirela’s false
statement and the ensuing agency action taken on his visa application, but the
making of that false statement materially altered the course of the adjudication
process. Pirela Pirela’s statement was significant to his visa application process.
In sum, a common-sense, practical interpretation of the first paragraph of
section 1546(a) criminalizes Pirela Pirela’s conduct. See United States v.
Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 887 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that a court has no
obligation “to override common sense and evident statutory purpose” in construing
criminal statutes (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Pirela Pirela’s conviction was
supported by sufficient evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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