Daniel R. Thompson v. Sheriff, Pinellas County FLorida , 542 F. App'x 826 ( 2013 )


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  •                Case: 13-10101       Date Filed: 10/18/2013       Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-10101
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-00063-WS-CJK
    DANIEL R. THOMPSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,,
    versus
    SHERIFF, PINELLAS COUNTY FL,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (October 18, 2013)
    Before PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, ∗ Judge.
    ∗
    Honorable Jane A. Restani, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by
    designation.
    Case: 13-10101     Date Filed: 10/18/2013     Page: 2 of 10
    PER CURIAM:
    In this case, plaintiff Daniel Thompson has sued Sheriff Jim Coats in his
    official capacity as Sheriff of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff”).
    Previous litigation has established that Richard Farnham, then a deputy sheriff in
    the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, violated the constitutional rights of plaintiff
    when he tased plaintiff in the course of arresting him. For purposes of this appeal,
    the Sheriff does not contest the fact of that violation of constitutional rights. The
    incident occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan at which time there was
    concern about looters. The incident occurred in Santa Rosa County, and Deputy
    Farnham had been sent to assist the Santa Rosa County Sheriff’s Department.
    However, the law is well established that a sheriff in his official capacity (i.e, the
    county) may not be subjected to liability predicated upon a theory of respondeat
    superior. The Supreme Court has established a high threshold for plaintiffs in cases
    like this. See Bd. of County Com’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 
    520 U.S. 397
    , 405,
    
    117 S. Ct. 1382
    , 1389 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not
    directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so,
    rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the
    municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”). The district
    court found no liability in this case and entered summary judgment in favor of the
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    Sheriff. Plaintiff appeals.
    In this appeal, plaintiff seeks to impose official capacity liability upon the
    Sheriff of Pinellas County on the basis of one of three theories. First, plaintiff
    argues that Sheriff Coats knew or should have known of a need to supervise his
    deputies with respect to the use of excessive force but was deliberately indifferent
    to that need with the predictable consequence that his deputies would use excessive
    force, thus violating the constitutional rights of arrestees. Second, plaintiff also
    seeks to impose liability pursuant to the theory that Sheriff Coats ratified Farnham’s
    unconstitutional conduct. Third, plaintiff seeks to impose liability under the theory
    that his constitutional injuries were caused by former Sheriff Everett Rice’s
    decision to hire Farnham despite red flags in Farnham’s background. We turn
    initially to plaintiff’s first theory.
    I.    PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SUPERVISE THEORY
    Plaintiff first asserts that three citizen complaints against Farnham before the
    September 20, 2004, incident at issue here placed the Sheriff on notice that deputies
    were engaging in conduct constituting an excessive use of force, and thus on notice
    that, in the absence of additional supervision, his deputies would engage in the use
    of excessive force and deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. As the
    Supreme Court indicated in Connick v. Thompson, __ U.S. ___, 
    131 S. Ct. 1350
    (2011):
    3
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    A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees
    is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference for
    purposes of failure to [supervise]. 1 … Policymakers’ continued
    adherence to an approach they know or should know has failed to
    prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious
    disregard for the consequences of their action—the deliberate
    indifference—necessary to trigger municipal liability.
    Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff in
    this case argues that the three citizen complaints against Farnham constitutes such a
    “pattern of similar constitutional violations” that the Sheriff was placed on notice
    that his deputies were engaging in the use of excessive force, and that the Sheriff’s
    failure to provide additional supervision evidenced a deliberate indifference to the
    likely consequence of deprivation of constitutional rights of arrestees.
    We agree with the district court that plaintiff’s evidence falls far short of the
    requisite proof. We note that Sheriff Coats has 900 deputies and that plaintiff has
    adduced evidence only with respect to Deputy Farnham. We also note that plaintiff
    has not challenged the existence and efficacy of the Sheriff’s written policies with
    respect to the use of force. And we note that the record contains ample evidence of
    adequate written policies with respect to the use of force, as well as evidence of
    satisfactory procedures and means to monitor use of force incidents by deputies. 2
    1
    The rule suggested by the Supreme Court for purposes of failure to train also
    applies to the failure to supervise. See Gold v. City of Miami, 
    151 F.3d 1346
    , 1350–51 (11th Cir.
    1998).
    2
    Plaintiff suggests that the computerized Personnel Intervention System was
    deficient in that it experienced operational challenges during 2004, and plaintiff argues that the
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    The record also reveals that the deputies receive training, and that Farnham received
    training, with respect to the appropriate use of the taser.
    Even if we assume arguendo that the “ordinarily necessary” pattern of similar
    constitutional violations might be demonstrated under some circumstances by a
    pattern of violations on the part of a single deputy, notwithstanding that he is one of
    many, and even if we assume arguendo that three previous violations by that deputy
    might under some circumstances be sufficient, we conclude that the three citizen
    complaints relied upon by plaintiff fall far short. We have carefully examined the
    record evidence with respect to each of these three. In each case, an investigation
    was conducted. In each case, relevant witnesses were interviewed. In each case,
    the investigation concluded that any complaint of wrong doing was unsubstantiated.
    We conclude that the investigation in each case was adequate; a perfect
    investigation is not necessary. We are satisfied that nothing in the investigation
    files, and nothing related to these three citizen complaints, indicates an obvious
    need for additional supervision. We cannot conclude that anything related to these
    three citizen complaints could put the Sheriff on notice of a need for additional
    supervision such that his failure to provide same would constitute deliberate
    Sheriff’s Office was unable to monitor its deputies to identify officers at risk of using excessive
    force. However, the record indicates that the Sheriff’s Office had a manual system as a back-up.
    In any event, the record evidence falls far short of indicating any deficiency in the system
    sufficiently obvious to place the Sheriff on notice that additional supervision was necessary to
    prevent the likely use of excessive force and deprivation of constitutional rights.
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    indifference.3
    Plaintiff also relies upon several citizen complaints which occurred after the
    September 20, 2004, incident at issue in this case. We conclude that such post-
    incident complaints could not have put the Sheriff on notice of a need for
    supervision as of September 20, 2004. See Connick, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at
    1360 n.7 (“[C]ontemporaneous or subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of
    violations that would provide notice to the city and the opportunity to conform to
    constitutional dictates.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover,
    each of these complaints was also investigated, relevant witnesses were
    interviewed, and the complaint was found to be unsubstantiated. We have carefully
    reviewed the record with respect to each of these, and we cannot conclude either
    that the investigation was inadequate or that the finding was not supported by the
    evidence.
    We cannot conclude that the district court erred in rejecting plaintiff’s failure
    to supervise theory.
    3
    We note incidentally that we seriously doubt that the Peterson incident even
    involved a use of force comparable to the tasing at issue in this case. The complaint by Peterson
    was that Officer Farnham had roughly handcuffed her and that the handcuffs were too tight. See
    Connick, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (“Without notice that a course of training is deficient
    in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training
    program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”) (emphasis added). We harbor similar
    doubts about whether the Blau complaint involved a comparable use of force. There, the
    complaint was that Officer Farnham drove his patrol car too close to the motorcycles on which
    complainant and his companion were riding, and that the officer placed his hand on his gun
    during his conversation with complainant.
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    II.    PLAINTIFF’S RATIFICATION THEORY
    Plaintiff first argues that post-incident nomination of Deputy Farnham for an
    award constitutes ratification of Farnham’s unconstitutional acts. We summarily
    reject this argument. The nomination was made by Sgt. Luben, not by Sheriff
    Coats, the policymaker. Even if Sheriff Coats approved the nomination, we readily
    conclude that this could not constitute ratification. The nomination occurred on
    December 18, 2004, at which time the Sheriff was not even aware of allegations of
    wrongdoing on the part of Farnham.
    Plaintiff also argues that the failure to discipline Deputy Farnham constitutes
    ratification. On the instant facts, we disagree. As noted above, there is no evidence
    of a “persistent failure to take disciplinary action,” which we have held can
    constitute ratification. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 
    777 F.2d 1436
    , 1443
    (11th Cir. 1985). Obviously, there could be no ratification in the absence of
    knowledge on the part of Sheriff Coats that Farnham had violated plaintiff’s
    constitutional rights by using excessive force. The record indicates that the Sheriff
    did not even know of allegations of excessive force until February 2005 when he
    was alerted to the FBI investigation. At that time, his Administrative Investigative
    Division (“AID”) began an investigation. Plaintiff had not filed a complaint with
    Pinellas County; rather, plaintiff only informally complained to Santa Rosa County,
    where the incident occurred.
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    The Sheriff’s AID obtained the investigation file compiled by Santa Rosa
    County. It reflected interviews with what appeared to be all relevant witnesses, and
    included written statements of many. None of the statements except that of plaintiff
    and his wife even hinted of improper action by Deputy Farnham. On the other
    hand, Farnham’s version of the events was corroborated by the only other deputy
    who could have witnessed the tasing. His statement said: “Deputy Farnham
    approached [Thompson] who was refusing to comply with Deputy Farnham’s
    commands. Deputy Farnham deployed his taser at [Thompson] to gain
    compliance.” Another deputy reported having spoken with Knowling (Thompson’s
    companion who was arrested with him at the time). The deputy’s account of what
    Knowling told him also is not inconsistent with Farnham’s version. According to
    the deputy, Knowling told him that he and Thompson were “approached by two
    persons holding [a] flash light and claiming to be Sheriff’s deputies”; Knowling
    described them as ordering Thompson and him to drop their weapons, which they
    refused to do initially because they did not believe the two men were deputies.
    Another deputy stated that when he arrived at the scene he observed:
    two white males, one ‘proned out’ and the other on his knees. The
    suspect on his knees went down to the ground. A white female
    standing in the yard behind the suspects were screaming he is a cop.
    The suspect later identified as Thompson had a handgun that he laid
    down in front of them when he went all the way down to the prone
    position.
    The statement of plaintiff’s wife also indicated a time that she could see that the
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    two men approaching them with flashlights were deputies, and that her husband did
    not at this time immediately lie down on the ground and drop his gun as had been
    ordered, but rather “raised his hands and said ‘I am the homeowner – I called you.’”
    In short, it is clear from the investigation file that all of the officers present thought
    that plaintiff and his friend, Knowling, were armed and were suspected looters who
    were not complying immediately with the orders of the deputies. The Sheriff also
    received a copy of a polygraph which was not indicative of deception when
    Farnham indicated that he deployed his taser because Thompson would not follow
    his lawful commands. Although asked for a statement, Thompson indicated that he
    was only going to deal with the FBI. The AID investigation concluded that no
    violations had occurred.
    Although the Sheriff did not take disciplinary action until later, when
    Farnham was indicted, we cannot conclude this failure could constitute ratification
    by the Sheriff of the unconstitutional acts of Deputy Farnham. The record does not
    establish that the Sheriff knew that unconstitutional acts had occurred, nor can we
    conclude that it was obvious from the facts available to the Sheriff at the time that
    unconstitutional acts had in fact occurred. 4
    4
    Plaintiff also argues that the Sheriff’s Office assisted in Farnham’s defense during
    his criminal trial. However, a Florida statute requires that an employing agency shall
    provide an attorney for any officer in the criminal action commenced against the officer
    under the circumstances that reasonably appeared at the time to the Sheriff. Whatever the
    facts later developed at Farnham’s trial may have shown, nothing in the facts available to
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    We cannot conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment that
    the Sheriff had not ratified Deputy Farnham’s unconstitutional act. 5
    III.    PLAINTIFF’S THEORY OF A DELIBERATELY
    INDIFFERENT HIRING DECISION
    We summarily reject plaintiff’s argument in this regard. We conclude that
    Bd. of County Com’rs of Byran County v. Brown, 
    520 U.S. 397
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 1382
    (1997), forecloses plaintiff’s position.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED. 6
    the Sheriff at the time indicated that Deputy Farnham’s actions were “manifestly
    indefensible.” Coon v. Ledbetter, 
    780 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (5th Cir. 1986).
    5
    Plaintiff also suggests that the response of the Sheriff’s Office to this incident, and
    the failure to discipline Farnham, somehow constituted evidence establishing liability under
    plaintiff’s failure to supervise theory. However, plaintiff fails to explain how the September 20,
    2004, single incident could have placed the Sheriff on notice beforehand of a need for additional
    supervision. See Connick, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1360–61 n.7 (“[C]ontemporaneous or
    subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of violations that would provide notice to the city
    and the opportunity to conform to constitutional dictates.”) (internal citations and quotations
    omitted). Plaintiff’s reliance on that single incident also falls far short of that “narrow range of
    circumstances” that the Supreme Court has suggested might rarely “reflect the city’s deliberate
    indifference to the highly predictable consequence … [of] violations of constitutional rights.” Id.
    at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 1361 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Nothing about the
    September 20, 2004, incident indicated that it would have been patently obvious to the Sheriff
    beforehand that, in the absence of additional supervision, Deputy Farnham would be highly likely
    to tase improperly or otherwise use excessive force. Indeed, Farnham had received training with
    respect to the use of the taser.
    6
    We cannot conclude that the district court erred with respect to its handling of Dr.
    Lyman’s affidavit. Arguments raised on appeal by appellant but not expressly addressed in this
    opinion are rejected without need for further discussion.
    10