Mark C. Jackson v. The Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company , 543 F. App'x 977 ( 2013 )


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  •               Case: 13-11988   Date Filed: 11/07/2013   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-11988
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00066-MP-GRJ
    MARK C. JACKSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THE HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 7, 2013)
    Before MARCUS, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mark C. Jackson appeals, pro se, the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment and denial of a new trial in his breach of contract suit against Hartford
    Case: 13-11988      Date Filed: 11/07/2013   Page: 2 of 5
    Life and Accident Insurance Company (Hartford) for failing to pay his claim under
    an accidental death policy. Hartford denied his claim because it did not believe
    that Jackson’s mother died by accident, independent of all other causes.            On
    appeal, Jackson argues that: (1) the district court’s order granting summary
    judgment in favor of Hartford violated the “fundamental fairness doctrine,”
    deprived him of Due Process, and violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury
    trial; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
    new trial, which violated his right to a jury trial. After careful review, we affirm.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Morales
    v. Zenith Ins. Co., 
    714 F.3d 1220
    , 1226 (11th Cir. 2013). Evidentiary decisions are
    reviewed for abuse of discretion. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 
    475 F.3d 1239
    , 1249
    (11th Cir. 2007). Similarly, we review the denial of a motion for a new trial for
    abuse of discretion. Moore v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 
    708 F.3d 1233
    , 1237 (11th
    Cir. 2013). To the extent that a motion for a new trial may be treated as a motion
    to alter or amend the final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 59(e), we also
    review for abuse of discretion. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 
    243 F.3d 1282
    ,
    1285 (11th Cir. 2001). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
    pleadings drafted by an attorney and are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v.
    United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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    Case: 13-11988     Date Filed: 11/07/2013   Page: 3 of 5
    First, we are unpersuaded by Jackson’s claim that the district court erred in
    granting summary judgment. The district court may grant summary judgment to a
    movant if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(a). We review the
    evidence presented at summary judgment and construe the facts in favor of the
    non-moving party. 
    Morales, 714 F.3d at 1226
    . Evidence that is inadmissible at
    trial cannot be used to avoid summary judgment. 
    Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1249
    .
    Further, we are not required to take testimony as true if that testimony is not based
    on personal knowledge. 
    Id. Here, because
    Jackson has not provided any admissible evidence to carry his
    burden to establish that his mother’s death was accidental, see New York Life Ins.
    Co. v. Coll, 
    568 So. 2d 1306
    , 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, for
    provisions covering accidental death, the beneficiary bears the burden to prove that
    the death was accidental), there was no a genuine dispute of material fact. For
    starters, there was no admissible evidence that the trailer was excessively hot
    because, first, evidence that the air conditioner was not functioning was based on
    speculation and, second, the information derived from the website, Weather
    Source, was based on inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, because there was no
    evidence that his mother suffered from diabetes, the information from the Mayo
    Clinic website defining diabetic ketoacidosis was irrelevant. As for Jackson’s
    3
    Case: 13-11988     Date Filed: 11/07/2013    Page: 4 of 5
    attempt to suggest his mother had diabetes or over-heated through the assertion
    that she had coffee and sugar in her stomach at the time of death was not based on
    admissible evidence; the medical examiner testified that it was a mere possibility.
    Moreover, the photograph of his mother apparently attempting to lift her shirt is
    insufficient on its own to allow a jury to find that his mother died of heat
    exhaustion or heat stroke. Thus, Jackson failed to provide any admissible evidence
    to create a genuine dispute of any material facts that would entitle him to relief
    under the policy.
    As for Jackson’s claim regarding his right to a jury trial, it is well-settled that
    the grant of summary judgment does not deprive a party of his Seventh
    Amendment right to a jury trial. Zivojinovich v. Barner, 
    525 F.3d 1059
    , 1066
    (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Hartford.
    Nor are we convinced by Jackson’s argument that the district court abused
    its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. To begin with, the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure only permit a grant of a new trial if there was a trial in the
    first place -- jury or nonjury. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 59(a)(1).            Thus, because
    Jackson’s motion for a new trial came after the district granted summary judgment,
    the requisite trial did not occur, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    denying the motion.
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    Case: 13-11988     Date Filed: 11/07/2013    Page: 5 of 5
    As for the merits of the motion, a litigant “cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to
    relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been
    raised prior to the entry of judgment.”         Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of
    Wellington, Fla., 
    408 F.3d 757
    , 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Similar to the motion to alter
    or amend the judgment in Michael Linet, Jackson’s motion was “essentially a
    motion to reconsider the district court’s prior summary judgment order.” 
    Id. His motion
    implicated already-presented evidence and arguments. As a result, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-11988

Citation Numbers: 543 F. App'x 977

Judges: Fay, Marcus, Martin, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 11/7/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023