A.L. v. Jackson County School Board , 543 F. App'x 1002 ( 2013 )

Case: 13-10901 Date Filed: 11/14/2013 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10901
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00299-RS-EMT
A.L.,
By P.L.B,
P.L.B.,
For Herself,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
JACKSON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(November 14, 2013)
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Before HULL, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants A.L., a minor, and his mother, P.L.B., appeal the district court’s
dismissal of their claims for injunctive relief (Count I), declaratory relief (Count
II), denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Count III), discrimination
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (Count IV), and
retaliation under the IDEA and § 504 (Count V).1 The district court dismissed
Appellants’ complaint based on their failure to exhaust administrative remedies
under the IDEA. We review the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust the
IDEA’s administrative remedies de novo. See Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward
Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). After careful review, we
affirm.
I.
1
In their complaint, Appellants also sought a petition for a writ of mandamus (Count VI).
This count is not addressed in Appellants’ initial brief to this court or in their reply brief.
Consequently, we do not address it on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385
F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a “legal claim or argument that has not been
briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed”).
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Given the complicated procedural history, we recount it here. In total, the
parties to this appeal have been involved in three due process hearings. 2 We refer
to those hearings as “AL I,” “AL II,” and “AL III,” respectively.
On June 7 and 21, 2010, an Individualized Education Program (IEP) was
developed for A.L. A new IEP was later developed on November 17, 2010. On
November 24, 2010, prior to the implementation of the November 17, 2010 IEP,
Appellants initiated AL I, the first of the three due process hearings, and raised
various issues regarding A.L.’s right to FAPE and A.L.’s November 17, 2010 IEP.
As a consequence, the November IEP did not take effect and the June IEP became
the stay-put IEP for A.L. pursuant to the automatic stay provisions of the IDEA.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). After numerous hearings, a final order in favor of the
Jackson County School Board (JCSB) was entered on December 27, 2012.
Appellants then initiated AL II in April 2012. AL II concerned many of the
same concerns as were challenged in AL I: that A.L. was denied FAPE and that a
new IEP had not been implemented since June 2010. In addition, Appellants
alleged that JCSB retaliated and discriminated against them. AL II was dismissed
2
Under IDEA, disputes between the parents and school boards are resolved through due
process proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). A request for a hearing may be made by either
the school board or the parents. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1)(A). In Florida, these hearings
are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Florida Division of Administrative
Hearings (DOAH). See Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 6A-6.03311.
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without an evidentiary hearing. The final order was filed in June 2012. This final
order is the subject of the instant appeal.
The final due process hearing, AL III, was initiated by JCSB in July 2012.
JCSB initiated this hearing to resolve Appellants’ challenges to A.L.’s FAPE and
because Appellants wanted to record A.L.’s IEP meetings. Appellants
counterclaimed for retaliation. A final order in favor of JCSB was entered in
February 2013.3
Appellants filed their complaint with regard to AL II in federal court on
September 13, 2012. On October 18, 2012, they amended their federal court
complaint. At that time, there had been no final order in either AL I or AL III.
JCSB moved to dismiss Appellants’ federal court complaint because: (1)
Appellants had not exhausted their administrative remedies as required under the
IDEA, and (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
district court granted JCSB’s motion to dismiss.
Now on appeal, Appellants argue that it was error for the district court to
grant JCSB’s motion to dismiss because they had complied with the IDEA’s
3
JCSB has requested that we take judicial notice of the pleadings from this due process
hearing (AL III). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that “[t]he court may judicially
notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the
trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The pleadings from AL III are pleadings and
orders filed with the Clerk of the Florida DOAH. As such, the facts “can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b). JCSB’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
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exhaustion requirements. JCSB argues that we should affirm the district court
because Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as their federal
court complaint was filed prior to the entry of a final order in either AL I or AL III.
While it is true that there were three separate due process hearings, the claims in
AL I and AL III were substantially similar to those in AL II. As such, JCSB
argues, by failing to exhaust their administrative remedies in AL I and AL III,
Appellants failed to comply with the IDEA and dismissal of AL II was therefore
appropriate.
II.
The IDEA guarantees that disabled students receive a FAPE through the
provision of various special education services, including an IEP as defined in 20
U.S.C. § 1414(d). See Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d
1309, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2003). A parent who wishes to challenge an IEP, or any
matter relating to the provision of a FAPE, may request an “impartial due process
hearing” before an ALJ. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
Once the administrative proceedings are complete, the IDEA provides that
either party may challenge those proceedings in state or federal court. See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In order to bring such a challenge, however, the IDEA
requires that a plaintiff first exhaust administrative remedies: “before the filing of a
civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this
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subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought
under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 4 “The philosophy of the IDEA is that
plaintiffs are required to utilize the elaborate administrative scheme established by
the IDEA before resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local school
authorities.” N.B. v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have interpreted the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement as applying to a
“broad” spectrum of claims. See M.T.V., 446 F.3d at 1158. In M.T.V., we found
that M.T.V.’s parents’ claims based on past retaliation, which included allegations
of harassment at IEP meetings, intimidating letters, and needless and intrusive
testing of M.T.V., were “related to” M.T.V.’s education within the meaning of the
IDEA and therefore subject to the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1158–59; see also
20 U.S.C. § 1415(o) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude a
parent from filing a separate due process complaint on an issue separate from a due
process complaint already filed.”).
III.
4
The exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserting the rights of disabled children
under not only the IDEA, but also the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Constitution. See M.T.V. v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446
F.3d 1153, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Here, the district court dismissed A.L.’s claims for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. We agree that the issues raised in Counts I-V of
Appellants’ amended complaint were substantially similar to those issues raised in
AL I and AL III. At the time Appellants filed their amended complaint, neither AL
I nor AL III had concluded as the ALJ had not yet entered a final order on either
matter. Consequently, Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
before bringing this matter to federal court, and therefore it was correctly
dismissed.
AFFIRMED.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Had the issues raised by the appellants in AL II been separate and distinct
from the issues raised in AL I, I would agree with the appellants that they could
file a federal action once the ALJ entered a final order in AL II. But, as the Court
correctly notes, the appellants filed AL II while AL I was pending, and the issues
they raised in AL II were largely the same as those presented in AL I. In other
words, AL II was duplicative of AL I and was dismissed by the ALJ on that basis.
Under the circumstances, the appellants did not exhaust their administrative
remedies as to the common issues raised in AL II until the ALJ entered a final
order in AL I on December 27, 2012.
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