United States v. Luis Angel Orobio Estacio ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 18-10491   Date Filed: 08/29/2018   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10491
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20705-KMM-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LUIS ANGEL OROBIO ESTACIO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 29, 2018)
    Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-10491    Date Filed: 08/29/2018   Page: 2 of 5
    Luis Angel Orobio Estacio appeals his 135-month concurrent sentences for
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on
    board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 
    46 U.S.C. §§ 70503
    (a)(1) and 70506(b), and possession with intent to distribute a
    controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
    United States, in violation of 
    46 U.S.C. § 70503
    (a)(1) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . He
    argues his sentences were substantively unreasonable because the 120-month
    minimum sentence would have provided effective deterrence and similarly situated
    defendants have received a downward variance to the statutory minimum.
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-of-
    discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). The party
    challenging the sentence bears the burden to show the sentence is unreasonable in
    light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
    The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
    necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2), including
    the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
    provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the
    public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2).
    The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
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    Case: 18-10491   Date Filed: 08/29/2018   Page: 3 of 5
    history and characteristics of the defendant. 
    Id.
     § 3553(a)(1). Additionally, the
    court must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
    defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Id.
    § 3553(a)(6).
    The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
    discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 
    483 F.3d 739
    , 743 (11th Cir.
    2007). A court can abuse its discretion when it fails to consider relevant factors
    that were due significant weight, gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant
    weight, or commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors
    unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
    banc). The district court may not apply a presumption of reasonableness to the
    sentencing guideline range and must actually consider the relevant statutory
    factors. Nelson v. United States, 
    555 U.S. 350
    , 352 (2009). However, the district
    court need not discuss each individual factor on the record. Irey, 
    612 F.3d at
    1194-
    95.   Rather, it is sufficient for the district court to acknowledge that it has
    considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. We will
    vacate a sentence only if the district court “committed a clear error in judgment in
    weighing the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 1190.
    Finally, although we do not presume that a sentence falling within the
    guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be
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    Case: 18-10491    Date Filed: 08/29/2018   Page: 4 of 5
    reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 
    526 F.3d 739
    , 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence
    imposed at the bottom of the guideline range and well below the statutory
    maximum penalty further indicates reasonableness. See United States v. Croteau,
    
    819 F.3d 1293
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding the sentence was reasonable in part
    because it was well below the statutory maximum); United States v. Carpenter,
    
    803 F.3d 1224
    , 1234 (11th Cir. 2015) (considering a sentence being “at the very
    bottom” of the guideline range a factor indicating reasonableness). While a district
    court may use its discretion to grant a downward variance from the guideline
    range, it has no obligation to do so. Carpenter, 803 F.3d at 1235.
    Here, Estacio’s guidelines range was 135-160 months. Estacio argues that
    the presentencing investigation report (“PSR”) noted that similar defendants
    received a downward variance to the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months
    and asserts that he should have received such a sentence. He further contends that
    a 120-month sentence would provide the same level of deterrence as the 135-
    month sentence the court imposed.
    We cannot say that the district court’s sentence was substantively
    unreasonable. Though the PSR mentioned that similar defendants have received
    15-month downward variances, neither the PSR nor Estacio provided specific
    information about any similarly situated defendants who received the statutory
    minimum sentence. And before sentencing Estacio, the district court had already
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    Case: 18-10491   Date Filed: 08/29/2018   Page: 5 of 5
    sentenced one of his similarly situated codefendants to 135 months’ imprisonment.
    So Estacio’s sentence was not disparate with the only similarly situated individual
    specifically identified.
    As for Estacio’s argument that 120 months would have provided sufficient
    deterrence, the district court concluded that the offense conduct was serious, and
    the sentence would provide both sufficient deterrence and punishment.
    In short, the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable
    sentence when it sentenced Estacio to 135-month concurrent sentences at the
    bottom of the guideline range because it considered deterrence along with the other
    § 3553(a) factors, such as the seriousness of the offense, and Estacio did not
    provide proof of similarly situated defendants receiving a downward variance to
    the 120-month statutory minimum.
    AFFIRMED.
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