Stanley v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 466 F. App'x 874 ( 2012 )


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  •          NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    JAMES J. STANLEY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    2011-3195
    __________________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in case no. SF0752100806-I-1.
    __________________________
    Decided: January 17, 2012
    __________________________
    JAMES J. STANLEY, of San Bernardino, California, pro
    se.
    SARA B. REARDEN, Attorney, Office of the General
    Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington,
    DC, for respondent. With her on the brief were JAMES M.
    EISENMANN, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL,
    Deputy General Counsel.
    __________________________
    STANLEY   v. MSPB                                         2
    Before LOURIE, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    James J. Stanley appeals the decision of the Merit
    Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissing his peti-
    tion for review as untimely. For the reasons set forth
    below, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On June 29, 2010, Mr. Stanley filed an appeal with
    the Board from the Department of Veterans Affairs
    employment action removing him from his position of
    Materials Handler. The administrative judge affirmed
    the agency’s decision to remove Mr. Stanley in an initial
    decision on October 22, 2010. Stanley v. Dep’t of Vet.
    Affairs, SF0752100806-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 22, 2010) (“Ini-
    tial Decision”).
    On October 22, 2010, the Initial Decision was sent to
    Mr. Stanley by U.S. Mail and to his representative, Phil-
    lip Haynes, by electronic mail. In the Initial Decision, the
    administrative judge stated that the decision “would
    become final on November 26, 2010, unless a petition for
    review is filed by that date or the Board reopens the case
    on its own motion.” Initial Decision 12.
    Mr. Stanley did not file a petition for review until De-
    cember 1, 2010. On June 16, 2011, the Board issued a
    final non-precedential order dismissing Mr. Stanley’s
    petition for review as untimely filed with no showing of
    good cause for the delay. Stanley v. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs,
    SF0752100806-I-1 (M.S.P.B. June 16, 2011). In its deci-
    sion, the Board noted that the certificate of service
    showed that Mr. Haynes was served electronically on
    October 22, 2010. Under the Board’s regulations, docu-
    3                                           STANLEY   v. MSPB
    ments served electronically are presumed to have been
    received on the day of electronic submission. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.14
    (m)(2). Accordingly, the Board found that Mr.
    Haynes received the Initial Decision on October 22, 2010.
    Because service on a party’s representative—here, Mr.
    Haynes—is imputed to the party, the Board concluded
    that Mr. Stanley also received the Initial Decision on
    October 22, 2010. The Board further found that Mr.
    Stanley had not shown good cause for missing the filing
    deadline and dismissed his petition for review as un-
    timely. Mr. Stanley has appealed. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    II. DISCUSSION
    This court’s review of a decision of the Board is lim-
    ited by statute. 
    5 U.S.C. §7703
    (c); O’Neill v. Office of
    Pers. Mgm’t, 
    76 F.3d 363
    , 364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We
    may reverse a decision of the Board only if it is “(1) arbi-
    trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
    in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed;
    or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c).
    On appeal, Mr. Stanley does not, in his opening brief,
    address the Board’s dismissal of his petition for review as
    untimely but rather reargues the merits of his underlying
    adverse employment action claim. The only issue before
    this court, however, is whether the Board abused its
    discretion in declining to waive its regulatory time limit
    for filing a petition for review. In his memorandum in
    lieu of oral argument, Mr. Stanley argued that Mr.
    Haynes had represented to him that his petition for
    review was timely filed an that he was unaware that Mr.
    STANLEY   v. MSPB                                           4
    Haynes had not filed his petition for review by the dead-
    line.
    The Board will waive its time limit for filing a petition
    for review only upon a showing of good cause. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.114
    (f). “[W]hether the regulatory time limit for an
    appeal should be waived based upon a showing of good
    cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and
    this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of
    the Board.” Mendoza v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    966 F.2d 650
    , 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Here, the Board
    found that Mr. Stanley’s appeal was untimely and that he
    had not demonstrated good cause for missing the filing
    deadline. Although Mr. Stanley may have relied on the
    statements of his representative who untimely filed his
    petition for review, such reliance is not a basis upon
    which to establish good cause for his delay in filing. See,
    e.g., Harris v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 10 F. App’x 918, 920
    (Fed. Cir. 2001). Based on the deference we afford to the
    Board, we see no reason to reverse the Board’s decision.
    Consequently, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-3195

Citation Numbers: 466 F. App'x 874

Judges: Dyk, Lourie, Per Curiam, Prost

Filed Date: 1/17/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023