Anibal San Antonio v. Mark Henry , 618 F. App'x 554 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10162
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00528-RV-CJK
ANIBAL SAN ANTONIO,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MARK HENRY,
RICHARD SUBSAVAGE,
JASON CROCKETT,
MARK SHIPMAN
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(July 9, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Anibal San Antonio (“San Antonio”) appeals the district court’s dismissal
without prejudice of federal-law claims arising from incidents that occurred while
San Antonio was an inmate at Blackwater River Correctional Facility in Florida
(“Blackwater”). The Defendants—Warden Mark Henry, Programs Warden
Richard Subsavage, Head Classification Officer Jason Crockett, and Senior
Chaplain Mark Shipman—are sued in their official and individual capacities.
The district court dismissed the claims now before us on the ground that San
Antonio had not properly exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. (Docs. 12, 14). We affirm the
district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice San Antonio’s “Law Clerk
Claim” for failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. We vacate the
district court’s judgment dismissing San Antonio’s “Dormitory Claims” and
remand them for further proceedings.
I. Facts
We presume the parties’ familiarity with the facts. This case was resolved
on the basis of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) directed
only at San Antonio’s complaint. He attached exhibits to his complaint that we
also have considered. We recite only the facts necessary to resolve the appeal.
These are the facts underlying the Dormitory Claims. When San Antonio
was an inmate at Blackwater, he was removed on April 5 by the Defendant
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Shipman from the Faith and Character Based Dormitory. San Antonio alleges that
he was removed for administrative reasons, but that the Defendant Shipman did not
comply with regulations of the Florida Department of Corrections. (Doc. 3, Ex. B,
¶¶ 16-19, 34-35). San Antonio does not allege that any other defendant was
involved in the decision to remove him. He filed an informal grievance against the
Defendant Shipman on July 19. San Antonio alleges that he waited so long to file
the informal grievance because reprisal would occur that would preclude him from
completing his certified law clerk training. (Id., ¶ 21). Blackwater denied the
formal grievance on August 9. Neither the record nor any party explains why nor
what happened to the informal grievance. On August 17, San Antonio mailed an
appeal of Blackwater’s August 9 formal-grievance decision to the Office of the
Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (“Central Office”). Central
Office rejected the grievance as untimely.
These are the facts underlying the Law Clerk Claim. On July 23, the
Defendant Crockett removed San Antonio from his position as a law clerk. San
Antonio does not allege in his complaint that any other defendant was involved in
this decision. San Antonio does not allege in his complaint any facts describing
why the Defendant Crockett removed him, but he includes conclusory statements
that he did so in retaliation for San Antonio’s filing the informal grievance against
the Defendant Shipman. (Id., ¶¶ 33, 38, 43). On July 25, San Antonio grieved the
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Defendant Crockett’s action directly to Central Office. Central Office rejected the
direct grievance on August 2, reasoning that San Antonio had not alleged in his
direct grievance sufficient reasons why he could not pursue the grievance against
the Defendant Crockett through Blackwater grievance channels. San Antonio took
no further action with respect to this grievance, which underlies the Law Clerk
Claim.
II. Standard of Review
We must conduct sua sponte, plenary review of subject matter jurisdiction
whenever it appears lacking. Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1468
(11th Cir. 1997). As a jurisdictional issue, mootness may be raised sua sponte by
this court at any time. National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329,
1331-32 (11th Cir. 2005). Factual findings underlying a Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act ruling are reviewed for clear error. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,
1377 (11th Cir. 2008).
III. Discussion
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Requirements
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act provides that “[no] action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
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U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has held that “proper exhaustion of
administrative remedies is necessary” as a prerequisite for prisoners to bring any
claim in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 541 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382
(2006) (emphasis added). Exhaustion is “proper” when the prisoner “[complies]
with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .” Id., 541 U.S.
at 90, 126 S. Ct. at 2386.
The grievance procedure promulgated by the Florida Department of
Corrections requires: (1) an informal grievance submitted to a designated staff
member within twenty days of a challenged occurrence; (2) a formal grievance
submitted to the warden’s office within the earlier of fifteen days (a) from the
response to the informal grievance, or (b) from the challenged occurrence; and (3)
a direct grievance to the Central Office within fifteen calendar days of the
challenged occurrence. FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33-103.005–103.007; 33-103-011(1).
A “direct grievance” (e.g., a grievance alleging that reprisal from prison staff will
result from filing an informal or a formal grievance) may be filed directly with the
Central Office. Id., 33-103.007(6)(a). The inmate must “resubmit his . . . grievance
at the appropriate level” if Central Office decides that it does not qualify as a direct
grievance. Id., 33-103.007(6)(d).
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B. Law Clerk Claim
San Antonio contends that the Central Office wrongfully rejected his direct
grievance underlying the Law Clerk Claim on the basis that it did not explain
adequately why he could not pursue the grievance at Blackwater. The Defendants
contend that there was a substantive defect in San Antonio’s grievance. And, the
Defendants contend that San Antonio could have timely amended and re-filed the
law clerk grievance and simply chose not to do so.
The Law Clerk Claim was not properly exhausted under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act as the Act is interpreted by the Woodford Court. The
district court was correct to dismiss it for failure to properly exhaust. San Antonio
had ample time to re-file either with Blackwater or with Central Office. His choice
not to do so was a failure to properly exhaust.
C. Dormitory Claims
San Antonio contends, and the Defendants concede, that the district court
erred in determining that San Antonio untimely filed the Dormitory Claims appeal
to Central Office. The Defendants contend, nevertheless, that San Antonio has not
stated a claim in his complaint for deprivation of his religious-freedom or
religious-expression rights under either the First Amendment or the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq. (“RLUIPA”).
The Defendants never raised a failure-to-state-a-claim challenge to either the
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RLUIPA or the First Amendment claim. They may not do so for the first time on
appeal. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1353–54
(11th Cir. 1998).
We question whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the
RLUIPA claim. The Government states in its brief that San Antonio is no longer
housed at Blackwater. (Red Brief 2, n.3). Because the only relief San Antonio may
obtain for a RLUIPA violation is declaratory and injunctive relief, see Smith v.
Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271–75 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655–1657 (2011) (abrogating the Smith
court’s holding that RLUIPA waived state sovereign immunity), San Antonio’s
RLUIPA claim might be moot. The district court should determine in the first
instance whether the RLUIPA claim is moot. And, because the district court
disposed of both of the Dormitory Claims solely on a failure-to-exhaust basis, it
has not considered the merits of either the RLUIPA or the First Amendment claim.
We, therefore, remand the Dormitory Claims for further proceedings.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s judgment
dismissing the Law Clerk claim. We vacate the district court’s judgment
dismissing the Dormitory Claims and remand them to the district court for further
proceedings.
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AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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