Jonathan Pace v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-12028   Date Filed: 01/14/2019   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12028
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-00181-JRK
    JONATHAN PACE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 14, 2019)
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-12028        Date Filed: 01/14/2019       Page: 2 of 6
    Jonathan Pace appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
    of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his application for a period of
    disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income under 42
    U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Pace contends that the administrative law judge
    erred in crediting the vocational expert’s testimony to find that Pace can perform
    work that is available in a significant number of jobs in the national economy.
    I.
    The Social Security regulations establish a five-step evaluation process that
    an ALJ must use to determine whether a claimant is disabled and, as a result, may
    receive a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental
    security income. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. This case is about the
    fifth step,1 at which the Commissioner must show that there is “work available in
    significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform.”
    Jones v. Apfel, 
    190 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920),
    abrogated on other grounds by 
    Washington, 906 F.3d at 1353
    . If the
    1
    “The first three steps deal with whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
    gainful activity, the medical severity of the applicant’s impairment(s), and whether the
    impairments meet the requirements of a listed impairment.” Washington v. Comm’r of Soc.
    Sec., 
    906 F.3d 1353
    , 1359 (11th Cir. 2018) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). At step four,
    which the ALJ proceeds to only if the claimant has failed to show that he is disabled at step
    three, the claimant must show that “his impairment prevents him from performing his past
    relevant work.” 
    Id. 2 Case:
    18-12028     Date Filed: 01/14/2019       Page: 3 of 6
    Commissioner can make that showing, “the claimant must prove she is unable to
    perform those jobs in order to be found disabled.” 
    Id. In August
    2013 Pace filed an application for a period of disability, disability
    insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. The Commissioner initially
    denied Pace’s application and did so again upon reconsideration. An ALJ held a
    hearing. At the hearing the ALJ asked a vocational expert whether there were jobs
    available in the national economy that a person with Pace’s alleged impairments
    could perform. The expert testified that such a person could perform the
    representative jobs of table worker, assembler, or stuffer, for which there were
    approximately 875,000 positions nationwide. The expert testified that her
    estimates were based on her experience, expertise, and onsite job analyses. Pace
    did not object to the expert’s qualifications or testimony.
    The ALJ issued a decision in which it found that Pace was not disabled. The
    ALJ proceeded through the first four steps of the evaluation process and found that
    Pace had several impairments, including degenerative disc disease and
    hypertension. But at step five the ALJ, crediting the vocational expert’s testimony,
    found that there was work available in significant numbers in the national economy
    that Pace could perform.
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    The Appeals Council denied Pace’s request to review the ALJ’s decision,
    which made that decision final. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.955. Pace sought judicial
    review of that decision, and the district court affirmed it.
    II.
    “[W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s
    decision is based.” Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). If
    that decision is based upon proper legal standards, “[w]e will not disturb [it] if, in
    light of the record as a whole, it appears to be supported by substantial evidence.”
    Lewis v. Callahan, 
    125 F.3d 1436
    , 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is
    more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
    
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). “Even if the
    evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] factual findings, we must
    affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.” Martin v.
    Sullivan, 
    894 F.2d 1520
    , 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). This limited review means that
    “[w]e may not decide the facts anew, reweighs the evidence, or substitute our
    judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    , 1240
    n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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    III.
    Pace contends that the ALJ erred in crediting the vocational expert’s
    testimony to decide at step five that he can perform work that is available in a
    significant number of jobs in the national economy. He argues “that the testimony
    of the vocational expert” about the number of positions for that work —
    approximately 875,000 — “is not supported by the substantial evidence.” The
    question, though, is not whether the expert’s testimony is supported by substantial
    evidence. It is whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
    
    Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439
    ; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). And we
    think that it is.
    Vocational experts are “expert[s] on the kinds of jobs an individual can
    perform based on his or her capacity and impairments.” 
    Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240
    .
    Their “testimony is crucial to an ALJ’s determination at step [five].” 
    Jones, 190 F.3d at 1230
    . For a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial
    evidence, “the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
    claimant’s impairments.” 
    Id. at 1229.
    The vocational expert’s testimony is substantial evidence that supports the
    ALJ’s decision that Pace could perform work that is available in a significant
    number of jobs in the national economy. For one thing, at Pace’s hearing the ALJ
    posed a hypothetical question to the expert, which Pace did not object to, that
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    “comprised all of [his] impairments.” 
    Jones, 190 F.3d at 1229
    . A reasonable
    person would accept the expert’s testimony as adequate to support the ALJ’s
    decision. See 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178
    . The expert based her calculation of the
    number of positions that a person with Pace’s impairments could perform on her
    experience, expertise, and onsite job analyses. Pace did not object to that
    calculation at the hearing. And he has not offered us any evidence showing that it
    was erroneous.
    AFFIRMED.
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