Shirley A. Tolbert v. Jefferson County Commission , 318 F. App'x 747 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 22, 2008
No. 08-10229 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00904-CV-LSC
SHIRLEY A. TOLBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 22, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Shirley A. Tolbert appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for a new
trial in her employment discrimination lawsuit, filed pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623. Tolbert, who was
then a 61-year-old budget analyst, alleged that her former employer, Jefferson
County Commission, violated the ADEA by disciplining and ultimately
discharging her, despite her compliance with the County’s policies. In this appeal,
Tolbert argues that the district court abused its discretion by not granting her
motion for a new trial because she presented evidence of age discrimination that
was insufficiently or entirely unrebutted at trial by the County. Finding no abuse
of discretion, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to
F ED. R. C IV. P. 59 for an abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, 253 F.3d
588, 595 (11th Cir. 2001). Our broad deference is warranted because “the trial
court[] [had] first-hand experience of the witnesses, their demeanor, and a context
of the trial. This level of deference is particularly appropriate where a new trial is
denied and the jury’s verdict is left undisturbed.” Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure
Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). “[N]ew trials
should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is
against the great – not merely the greater – weight of the evidence.” Lipphardt v.
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Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tolbert’s motion
for a new trial. The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “When a plaintiff alleges disparate
treatment, liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age)
actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2105, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Although intermediate
evidentiary burdens shift back and forth [when the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination], ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff.’” Id. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106 (quoting Texas Dep’t of
Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d
207 (1981)) (alteration in original).
Tolbert argues that the district court abused its discretion by not granting her
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motion for a new trial because her evidence of age discrimination was
insufficiently or entirely unrebutted at trial by the County. Tolbert contends that
the County’s proffered reasons for discharging her were pretextual because she
would have had to violate county policies to comply with her supervisor’s
instructions. She further contends that she would have been evaluated negatively if
she had disobeyed those regulations. She points to her own trial testimony to
establish the County’s discriminatory animus.
The County responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion
because the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. The County
recognizes that Tolbert established a prima facie case of age discrimination. But
the County notes that it met its burden of producing legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for her dismissal, namely her non-compliance and unprofessional conduct.
Thus, Tolbert bore the burden of persuading the jury that her discharge was the
direct result of intentional age discrimination.
The County argues that the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of
the evidence because Tolbert’s only proof of intentional age discrimination was her
own uncorroborated testimony. The County also notes that the jury observed the
witnesses’ demeanor, including Tolbert’s unresponsive and elusive answers to
questions posed at trial. Thus, the County argues that we should defer to the jury’s
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credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence.
We agree with the County. In reaching its verdict, the jury was free to
weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations. All of Tolbert’s evidence
tending to establish discriminatory animus was contradicted by the testimony of
several witnesses that tended to discredit her evidence. Therefore, the jury’s
verdict for the County was not against the great weight of the evidence, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tolbert’s motion for a new
trial.
AFFIRMED.
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